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INTRODUCTION
On April 5, 1979, President Carter announced his intention
to end federal price controls on domestic crude oil.' Under the
authority of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 2 the Presi-
dent began to phase out these controls on June 1, 1979. 3 All
controls on domestic crude oil will be lifted by October 1981. 4
The wisdom of these controls has been vigorously debated
and intensely criticized.5 By lifting the controls the President has
followed the recommendations of critics who have argued persis-
tently that controls have serious adverse effects. These critics
maintain, for example, that controls decrease domestic production
of oil, thus increasing American dependency on foreign oil
supplies, and give false pricing signals to consumers, thus en-
couraging excessive consumption. 6 In his speech of April 5,
however, the President also emphasized a procedural reason for
his decision: "In order to control energy price, production, and
distribution, the Federal bureaucracy and red tape have become so
complicated, it is almost unbelievable." 7
I Presidential Energy Address, 15 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 609, 610 (Apr. 5,
1979) [hereinafter cited as Energy Address].
2 15 U.S.C. § 760(b) (1976).
' Energy Address, supra note 1, at 610.
4 Id.
5 See, e.g., Bartlett, There Is No Fuel Like Enough Fuel, 25 INST. OIL & GAS L. & TAX.
247 (1974); Erickson, Peters, Spann & Tese, The Political Economy of Crude Oil Price Controls,
18 NAT. REsOURCES J. 787 (1978); Comment, The Case for Decontrolling the Price and Alloca-
tion of Crude Oil, 53 TEXAS L. REV. 1275 (1975). But cf. Wiener, Monopoly and Phase III: The
Consumer's Case Against Price Increases in the Oil Industry, ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. Winter
1972-73, 43, 50 (federal antitrust action against oil producers would reduce excessive prices
resulting from monopolization).
6 Bartlett, supra note 5, at 248-50; Erickson, Peters, Spann & Tese, supra note 5, at
795-97; Comment, supra note 5, at 1289-90, 1296-97.
7 Energy Address, supra note 1, at 610.
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This Article focuses on the development of this federal
bureaucracy and its procedures for enforcing its substantive oil
policy. Specifically, this inquiry examines the structure of the De-
partment of Energy (DOE) and the functioning of the oil en-
forcement processes within this new structure. Thus, it concen-
trates on the process by which DOE issues remedial orders and
allows for their appeal, through both administrative agencies and
the courts.
This examination yields significant procedural and structural
lessons of both a general and specific nature. On a general level,
substance, agency structure, and procedure are inextricably woven
together. This is as it should be. In addition to being consistent
with such trans-substantive process values as efficiency, accuracy,
and acceptability to the parties, agency structure and procedure
must be appropriate for the regulatory task at hand. In adminis-
trative law, as in art, form should be "the very shape of content." 8
Content, however, can also be the cause of conflicting pro-
cedural and structural demands, particularly when the proposed
content of an agency's rules or orders is controversial, uncertain,
or both. As the saga of DOE reveals, the process of establishing
an administrative framework to carry out uncertain or controver-
sial substantive programs easily can become politicized. Agency
structure and processes can become a mechanism for absorbing,
thwarting, or mitigating actual and potential substantive conflict.
The result can be either too much procedure in the case of a
particular program or an administrative structure that is more a
monument to distrust and wariness of bureaucracies than an effi-
cient means for carrying out a preordained congressional policy.
Because some domestic oil controls will exist for the next year
and a half, an examination of the Energy Department's structure
and its enforcement processes within that structure yields signifi-
cant lessons for the short-term future. Recommendations for im-
proving these processes will thus be of significance not only to the
numerous enforcement actions now pending within DOE, 9 but
also to the new actions that continually are being brought.
More important, an understanding of the evolution of this
"almost unbelievable" federal bureaucracy may guide future reg-
ulatory reform and reorganization efforts. The Department of
8 B. SHAHN, THE SHAPE OF CONTENT 62 (1960).
9 As of June 30, 1979, DOE had the following enforcement actions outstanding:
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Energy Organization Act (DOE Act) 10 allocated decisionmaking
responsibility among a cabinet-level secretary, various executive
agencies under his control, 1 and the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC), an independent agency. 12  Combining an
executive agency and an independent commission under one ad-
ministrative roof risks fragmenting internal policymaking and, at
least with respect to enforcement procedures, duplicating adminis-
trative processes and functions. A critical examination of the
rationale and workability of this type of structural arrangement is,
thus, appropriate, particularly in light of proposals for further
reorganization of the federal bureaucracy*13
Pending Administrative Enforcement Actions
of the Economic Regulator- Administration (ERA)
Issued Enforcement Documents Number Amount
Office of Special Counsel (OSC)
Notices of Probable Violation 30 $ 520,847,187
Proposed Remedial Orders 19 1,745,222,829
OSC Subtotal 49 2,266,070,016
Office of Enforcement (OE)
Notices of Probable Violation 90 $ 259,419,142
Proposed Remedial Orders 124 34,081,726
OE Subtotal 214 $ 293,498,868
DOE Total Pending Actions 263 $2,559,568,884
Letter from Lynn R. Coleman, General Counsel, DOE, to William C. Bush, Administrative
Conference of the United States (Aug. 27, 1979) (on file at Cornell Law Review). Enforce-
ment actions have continued to occupy DOE from the time of President Carter's address
up to the last few months. Compare N.Y. Times, May 3, 1979, §A, at 1, col. 6 with EN.
USERS REP. (BNA) No. 332, at 9 (Dec. 20, 1979). Moreover, in response to a recommenda-
tion made by the Sporkin Task Force Report, an Office of Special Counsel was created in
1977. See generally 2 ECONOMIC REGULATORY ADMINISTRATION, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT
OF ENERGY, TASK FORCE ON COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, FINAL REPORT at vi (repr. Mar.
1978) (Stanley Sporkin, Task Force Chairman) [hereinafter cited as Sporkin Report]. The
sole purpose of this office is to enforce oil pricing and allocation regulations as they are
applied to the 34 major oil companies. From December 1, 1977 to November 30, 1978,
more than 60 proceedings were begun or pending on overcharge violations totaling in
excess of $1.5 billion. See Status Report, Office of Special Counsel (1979) (on file at Cornell
Law Review).
10 42 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7352 (Supp. 1 1977).
"I See text accompanying notes 99-108 infra.
12 See text accompanying notes 94-98, 110-20 infra.
'3 See, e.g., Interior Department Revamp Called for in Carter Proposal, 37 CONG. Q. 379, 379
(1979); Reorganization Planned for National Resources, Economic Development, 37 CONG. Q. 33,
33-34 (1979).
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Finally, the DOE experience provides lessons regarding the
appropriate proceedings for administrative enforcement adjudica-
tion. Although Congress usually has not exempted compliance
and enforcement proceedings from the adjudicatory requiremebts
of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),14 it has consistently
provided for such an exemption throughout the administration of
the energy program.1 5 Thus, DOE enforcement processes repre-
14 This, of course, is not the case when rulemaking procedures are called for. Over the
years Congress and the courts have added significantly to the procedural requirements of
the informal rulemaking process of § 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5
U.S.C. § 553 (1976). See Verkuil, Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking, 60 VA. L. REV. 185,
187 (1974). See generally Hamilton, Rulemaking on a Record by the Food and Drug Administra-
lion, 50 TEXAS L. REV. 1132 (1972). For an excellent discussion of what the courts have
been doing to § 553, see Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, The D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme
Court, 1978 SuP. CT. REV 345.
The rulemaking requirement of the DOE Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7101-7352 (Supp. 1 1977),
is an example of the well-established trend to augment the procedural requirements of
§ 553 on an agency-by-agency basis. The DOE Act provides more extensive rulemaking
procedures than the APA. For example, a 30-day comment period is required for all
rulemaking, including interpretative rules and rules granting exemptions or relieving re-
strictions. 42 U.S.C. § 7191(b) (Supp. I 1977). The APA exempts such rules from the
30-day notice period. 5 U.S.C. § 553(d) (1976). The DOE Act requires that before the
Secretary may promulgate any rule within his jurisdiction, he must afford interested par-
ties the opportunity orally to present their views and data. He may dispense with an oral
presentation only if he determines that no substantial issue of law or fact is involved and
that the rule, regulation, or order is unlikely to have a substantial impact on the national
economy or on large numbers of individuals or businesses. 42 U.S.C. § 7191(c) (Supp. I
1977). The Conference Report makes clear that the Secretary should provide an opportu-
nity for oral argument "in most instances." H.R. REP. No. 539, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 82,
reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 925, 953.
When the Secretary determines that no oral presentation is necessary, the DOE Act
requires that the rule be promulgated in accordance with the rulemaking procedures of
§ 553 of the APA. 42 U.S.C. § 7191(c) (Supp. I 1977). These procedures do not apply
where the rule involves a military or foreign affairs function or the matter concerns agency
management or personnel, public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts. 5 U.S.C.
§ 553(a) (1976). The DOE Act, however, eliminates the exemption for public property
loans, grants, or contracts, leaving only the exemption for military or foreign affairs func-
tions, and agency management or personnel matters or benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 7191(b)(3)
(Supp. I 1977).
Many of the acts governing the substantive matters transferred to DOE contain their
own procedural requirements, in excess of those of the APA. For the procedural provision
of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act, see 42 U.S.C. § 6295(b) (1976). Section 6295(b)
provides that when the Secretary proposes a rule setting energy efficiency standards for
consumer products under the Act, he must allow 90 days for public comment and must
wait 120 days before promulgating the rule. The DOE Act provides that when procedural
safeguards prescribed by the statutes governing the transferred authorities are greater than
those of the APA, the greater safeguards will apply. 42 U.S.C. § 7191(a)(1) (Supp. 1 1977).
"5 See text accompanying notes 161-93 infra. The procedural history of the oil program
begins with the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-379, 84 Stat. 799, as
amended by Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-210, 85 Stat.
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sent an experimental attempt to strike a balance among "accuracy,
efficiency, and acceptability" 16 arguably different from that re-
quired by the APA. Proposals to amend the adjudicatory sections
of the APA are now pending in Congress.1 7  An examination of
DOE's approach to such adjudication will guide comment on these
proposed reforms.
These tasks should begin with an examination of the new
administrative context surrounding the developing enforcement
of oil regulation. Thus, this Article first examines the 1977 De-
partment of Energy Organization Act, focusing on the legal rela-
tionships between the Secretary of Energy, the various executive
units under his supervision and control, and the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission. Second, the Article focuses on the pro-
cedures used to enforce oil pricing regulations. From this
background emerge some general conclusions on administrative
procedure and structure and a number of specific recommenda-
tions for the improvement of DOE's regulatory process.
I
THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
A. An Overview
Congress passed the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of
1973 (EPAA) 18 in the aftermath of an oil embargo imposed by
743, as amended by Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-28, 87
Stat. 27. The amendments to this Act exempted the Cost of Living Council from the ad-
judicatory provisions of the APA. See Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971,
Pub. L. No. 92-210, § 207(a), 85 Stat. 747. These exemption provisions were incorporated
by reference in the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-159, § 5a,
87 Stat. 633 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 754(a) (1976)). These exemptions were continued in a
different form in the DOE Act, Pub. L. No. 95-91, §§ 503, 504, 91 Stat. 590 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 7193, 7194 (Supp. 1 1977)).
16 Boyer, Alternatives to Administrative Trial-Type Hearings for Resolving Complex Scientific,
Economic, and Social Issues, 71 MICH. L. REV. 111, 137 (1972); see Cramton, A Comment on
Trial-Type Hearings in Nuclear Power Plant Siting, 58 VA. L. REV. 585, 592-93 (1972).
'7 S. 2147, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); S. 755, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); S. 262, 96th
Cong., Ist Sess. (1979).
"s Pub. L. No. 93-159, 87 Stat. 627 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 751-756 (1976)). For
discussions of this Act, see TASK FORCE ON REFORM OF FEDERAL ENERGY ADMINISTRATION,
FEDERAL ENERGY ADMINISTRATION REGULATION 9-10 (P.MacAvoy ed. 1977) [hereinafter
cited as PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE REPORT]; Langdon, FEA Price Controls for Crude Oil and
Refined Petroleum Products, 26 INST. OIL & GAS L. & TAX. 55 (1975); Note, National Energy
Goals and FEA's Mandatory Crude Oil Allocation Program, 61 VA. L. REV. 903 (1975). For a
discussion of the EPAA as later amended, see Richardson, Crude Oil Pricing-Current Regu-
lations and Practices, 23 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 803 (1977).
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the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).19
Congress intended this Act to minimize the adverse economic
consequences of oil shortages from the embargo and the fourfold
increase in the price of OPEC oil that followed the embargo. 0 To
accomplish these goals, Congress gave the President broad pricing
and allocation authority over crude oil, residual fuel oil and vari-
ous refined petroleum products.21
Though the EPAA was directed at problems with long-term
consequences, it was, in effect, crisis legislation. It was hastily
passed 22 and granted the President only "temporary authority to
deal with shortages" of crude oil, residual fuel oil, and refined
products. 23  Congress never intended to provide for oil pricing
and allocation controls on a long-term or permanent basis. 4
19 OPEC, an intergovernmental oil producers' cartel, was formed in 1960 by Iran, Iraq,
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela. It now includes Algeria, Indonesia, Abu Dhabi,
Libya, Qatar, Nigeria, Ecuador, and Trinidad. OPEC controls approximately 85% of the oil
in international commerce and accounts for about 50% of the total amount of oil con-
sumed in the United States. See M. WILLRICH, ENERGY AND WORLD POLITICS 6-8 (1975);
THE ENERGY PROJECT AT THE HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL, ENERGY FUTURE 223-24, 232 (R.
Stobaugh & D. Yergin eds. 1979). For a history of the function and impact of the OPEC
cartel, see Z. MIKDASHI, THE COMMUNITY OF OIL EXPORTING COUNTRIES (1972);
Lenczowski, The Oil-Producing Countries, in THE OIL CRISIS 59 (R. Vernon ed. 1976); Mik-
dashi, The OPEC Process, in THE OIL CRISIS 203 (R. Vernon ed. 1976). For an analysis of
the relationship between OPEC and the large oil companies, see J. BLAIR, THE CONTROL OF
OIL 276-93 (1976).
2 In addition to curbing the inflationary impact of the OPEC price increase, Congress
sought, through the EPAA, to preserve competition within the petroleum industry.
Though major oil companies produced and refined their own crude oil, most independent
refineries depended primarily on foreign oil supplies and the domestic "spot market."
Note, supra note 18, at 904. Congress feared that the independents' reliance on higher
priced foreign oil could drive them out of the market. See id. at 905, 909. One objective of
allocation and price regulation is the "preservation of an economically sound and competi-
tive petroleum industry." 15 U.S.C. § 753(b)(1)(D) (1976).
21 15 U.S.C. § 753(a) (1976).
22 S. 1570, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), was introduced on April 13, 1973. 119 CONG.
REc. 12314 (1973). It was reported from committee on May 17 (S. REP. No. 159, 93d
Cong., Ist Sess. 1 (1973)) and passed on June 5 (119 CONG. REC. 18064 (1973)). The
House version, H.R. 9681, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), was introduced on July 30, 1973.
119 CONG. REC. 26725 (1973). It was amended in committee and reported to the full
House on September 29. H.R. REP. No. 531, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in [1973] U.S.
CODE CONG. & An. NEws 2582, 2582. The House approved the measure on October 17.
119 CONG. REC. 34454-78 (1973). S. 1570 then became H.R. 9681 (id. at 34478-79), the
conference report was dated November 10 (H.R. REP. No. 628, 93d Cong., Ist Sess.
(1973)), and the bill became law on November 27, 1973 (Emergency Petroleum Allocation
Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-159, 87 Stat. 627 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 751-56 (1976))).
2315 U.S.C. § 751(b) (1976).
24 The Act's original termination date was later repealed. See Emergency Petroleum
Allocation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-159, § 4 (g)(1), 87 Stat. 632, repealed by Energy Policy
and Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 94-163, § 401(b)(1), 89 Stat. 946 (1975).
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Congress also viewed the administrative machinery necessary
to carry out this program as temporary. In 1974, Congress
created the Federal Energy Administration (FEA), a temporary 25
executive agency whose primary responsibility 26 was to implement
the EPAA.27 Congress later expanded the substantive powers
conferred by the EPAA,28 and extended the life of FEA. 9 With
the passage of the DOE Act in 1977,30 most pricing respon-
25 Long before federal sunset legislation became common Congress included a provi-
sion abolishing FEA on June 30, 1976. Federal Energy Administration Act of 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-275, § 30, 88 Stat. 115.
26 See generally H.R. REP. No. 748, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-4 (1973), reprinted in [1974]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2939, 2940-41.
27 Federal Energy Administration Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-275, 88 Stat. 96
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 761-786 (1976)).
21 In the course of this expansion, Congress amended the EPAA twice. The first
amendment came with the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-
163, 89 Stat. 871.
[This 1975 amendment] attempted to provide revisions of the EPAA and addi-
tional legislation, forming the basis for a national energy policy. The EPCA
established a comprehensive national energy policy to accomplish the following
goals:
1. maximize domestic production of energy and provide for
strategic storage reserves of crude oil, residual fuel oil and refined
petroleum products;
2. minimize the impact of disruptions in energy supplies by provid-
ing for emergency standing measures;
3. provide for domestic crude oil prices that will encourage domes-
tic production in a manner consistent with economic recovery; and
4. reduce domestic energy consumption through the operation of
specific voluntary and mandatory energy conservation programs.
In the short term, the EPCA was designed to reduce the vulnerability of
the domestic economy to increases in import prices, and to insure that available
supplies would be distributed equitably in the event of a disruption in pe-
troleum imports. For the long run, the EPCA was intended to decrease depen-
dence upon foreign imports, enhance national security, achieve the efficient
utilization of scarce resources, and guarantee the availability of domestic energy
supplies at prices consumers can afford.
SPORKIN REPORT, supra note 9, app., at A-17 to -18. Pursuant to this Act, President Carter
now seeks to phase out price controls completely. See note 2 supra.
In 1976 Congress amended the Act again by passing the Energy Conservation and
Production Act, Pub. L. No. 94-385, 90 Stat. 1125 (1976). "In addition to amending vari-
ous provisions of the FEA Act and extending it for an additional 18 month period, [this
Act] established a broad range of energy conservation measures and provided for the en-
hancement of domestic crude oil production." SPORKIN REPORT, supra note 9, app., at A-20.
29 Act of June 30, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-332, 90 Stat. 784. The first expiration date was
June 30, 1976. Federal Energy Administration Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-275, § 30, 88
Stat. 115. Although the Act in 1976 set July 30, 1976 as the next expiration date, it was
later extended to December 31, 1977. Federal Energy Administration Act Amendments of
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-385, §112, 90 Stat. 1132.
'0 Pub. L. No. 95-91, 91 Stat. 565 (codified primarily at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7352 (Supp. I
1977)).
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sibilities of FEA were delegated to the Economic Regulatory Ad-
ministration (ERA),31 and that agency became a permanent part
of our energy program.32  The DOE Act thus institutionalized
much of the administrative machinery of the energy crisis.33
Chance as well as design may have helped forge this long
chain of legislation that culminated in the DOE Act. Though Pres-
idents Nixon and Ford both proposed somewhat similar reorgani-
zations, 34 President Carter's plan to establish a new energy de-
partment was superbly timed. The winter of 1977 was one of the
harshest in recent years,35 and it perhaps crystallized the growing
consensus that a serious "energy problem" existed. 36  President
Carter capitalized on this growing perception and convinced Con-
gress that establishing a centralized energy department was an
important first step in addressing this problem in a comprehen-
sive manner.
The support for some federal action was nearly unanimous. 37
But disagreements over the underlying causes of the "energy
SI See notes 106-07 and accompanying text infra.
32 See generally 42 U.S.C. § 7136 (Supp. 1 1977).
33 "A BILL To establish a Department of Energy in the executive branch by the reor-
ganization of energy functions within the Federal Government in order to secure effective
management to assure a coordinated national energy policy, and for other purposes." De-
partment of Energy Organization Act: Hearings on S. 826 and S. 591 Before Senate Comm. on
Governmental Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1977). The bill was introduced that day in the
Senate as S. 826, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 5666 (1977), by Senator Ribicoff
(123 CONG. REC. 5666 (1977)), and in the House of Representatives the next day as H.R.
6804, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), by Rep. Brooks. Id. at 5885.
34 President Nixon first proposed establishing a Department of Energy and Natural
Resources in his April 18, 1973, message to Congress: "I shall propose legislation to estab-
lish a Department of Energy and Natural Resources (DENR) building on the legislation I
submitted in 1971, with heightened emphasis on energy programs." Special Message to the
Congress on Energy Policy, 1973 PUB. PAPERS 302, 318. The bill submitted took form as S.
2135, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). 119 CONG. REC. 22889 (1973) (remarks of Sen. Jackson).
President Ford also submitted a detailed plan for reorganizing the energy bureaucracy into
a new Department of Energy. President Ford submitted his plan on January 11, 1977, just
before he left office. Touchy Policy Issues Complicate Carter Efforts at Energy Reorganization, 35
CONG. Q. 165, 166-67 (1977).
" See Now, the Gas Crisis, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 7, 1977, at 14; The Big Freeze, TIME, Jan. 31,
1977, at 22.
6 just prior to the DOE Act, Congress passed the Emergency Natural Gas Act of 1977,
Pub. L. No. 95-2, §§ 1-14, 91 Stat. 4. This Act gave the Federal Power Commission (FPC)
the authority to allocate natural gas supplies to parts of the country in greatest need. On
the heels of this Act, the administration proposed its version of the DOE Act.
37 Energy reorganization was a major part of presidential candidate Carter's platform
in 1976. Popular opinion held that the Nixon and Ford administrations had followed a
stopgap, haphazard approach to energy policy. Congress was eager to respond, as evi-
denced by bipartisan sponsorship of the Carter bill in both the Senate and the House.
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problem" as well as a blurring of causes with effects undermined
the chances of forming any kind of general consensus over the
appropriate substantive responses.3 8  For example, those who saw
Statements and debate over the bill revealed a shared assumption that energy reorganiza-
tion was an urgent priority. Republican Senator Javits asserted that he "co-sponsored this
important measure to help to emphasize the bipartisan nature of this undertaking and to
demonstrate to the President that support for a Department of Energy has a broad politi-
cal base." 123 CONG. REC. 5671 (1977). Republican Representative John B. Anderson stated
that:
As one who has been closely tied to energy policy through by [sic] 13 years
on the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and as one who has for years recog-
nized the real hazards of proceeding without a sense of direction, it has been
particularly frustrating the last 2 years as bureaucratic confusion, political con-
frontation, and technological puritanism have inhibited efforts to come to grips
with our growing energy shortfall. This past winter has been a shock to our
system economically, politically, and technically and it serves as fair warning
that things are not going to get better by themselves. The executive branch and
the Congress must forge a new alliance in order to sift through the multitude
of options for energy conservation, energy production, and environmental pro-
tection.
Id. at 6239. Republican Senator Heinz remarked that:
Another factor in our failure to develop a responsible energy policy over
the past 4 years has been the constant partisan wrangling on policy between
Congress and the administration. I am pleased to join in sponsoring Mr. Car-
ter's reorganization plan today because I believe that our energy policy, like our
foreign policy, should be pursued on a bipartisan basis without regard to
short-term political advantage. The issue is far too important for that.
Id. at 5672.
1a The phrase "energy crisis" is used in a variety of contexts and conveys a variety of
meanings within those contexts. See Aman, The Energy Crisis: A Few Perspectives, 5 CORNELL
L.F. 11 (June 1978). Perhaps the phrase most commonly refers to an overall shortage of
energy resources, particularly natural gas and oil. See, e.g., 123 CONG. REC. H5,319 (daily
ed. June 2, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Allen).
Quite apart from agreeing about the existence of a shortage, there is little agreement
about the reasons for the shortage.
For remarks by legislators during the debate over the DOE Act expressing diverse
opinions, see 123 CONG. REc. H5,892-93 (daily ed. June 3, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Findley);
id. H5,274-75 (daily ed. June 2, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Rudd); id. S7,941 (daily ed. May
18, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Helms); 123 CONG. REC. 10907-09 (1977) (remarks of Sen.
Kennedy).
Many persons believe that excessive government regulation caused our energy prob-
lems. See, e.g., E. MITCHELL, U.S. ENERGY POLICY: A PRIMER 71-73 (1974); 123 CONG. REC.
6124-25 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Tower); cf. id 6123 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Ribicoff)
(before DOE, agency fragmentation contributed to energy problems). Artificially low
energy prices have not provided the incentives necessary for discovery of new energy
sources. At the same time, these low prices have created more demand than would other-
wise have existed if prices had been allowed to rise gradually. In an unregulated market,
consumers would receive accurate pricing signals, and producers would have greater incen-
tives to take the necessary risks and bear the added costs required to find new energy
supplies. Thus, a free-market approach might increase energy supplies and eliminate the
price-related shortages we now face. See E. MITCHELL, supra, at 73.
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the energy crisis primarily in income redistribution terms and
doubted that charging consumers higher prices would result in
The free-market approach implies that consumers may continue to use energy as they
please, that is, as much as they can afford. Other analysts, however, focus on our uses of
energy as the underlying cause of the energy crisis. As one critic has put it:
Living in the most affluent society in history, Americans took large
amounts of the resources of the globe and became the best clothed, housed,
fed, transported, and entertained people in the world.
It was, however, never enough. The American people were insatiable.
They demanded more of everything; taller buildings; extravagant space pro-
grams; more powerful, luxurious autos; weed-free lawns; second houses;
boats-everything. And this spiral still didn't bring contentment.
S. UDALL, C. CONCONI & D. OSTERHOUT, THE ENERGY BALLOON 22-23 (1974). Although
artificially low prices may have facilitated our materialistic excesses, such criticism suggests
that we are the real culprits because we have chosen to consume whatever energy is avail-
able. The energy crisis thus raises an entirely different set of issues and presents an oppor-
tunity to reexamine our way of life and, perhaps, change it substantially.
Besides tracing the underlying causes of the "energy crisis," various commentators
have focused on its socio-economic effects. In particular, they have stressed the economic
impact of shortages and high prices on poor and middle class energy users. See, e.g., E.
GRIER, COLDER ... DARKER: THE ENERGY CRISIS AND LOw-INcoME AMERICANS (1977);
Henderson, Energy Policy and Socioeconomic Growth in Low-Income Communities, 8 REV. BLACK
POLITICAL ECON. 87 (Fall 1977); Schexnider, Blacks, Cities, and the Energy Crisis, 10 URB.
AFF. Q. 5 (1974). Many assume we can have more energy if we are willing to pay the
market-clearing price. This, however, entails a transfer of wealth from the consumer to the
utility or oil company. Such a result would burden consumers, particularly those with fixed
incomes. Viewing the energy crisis in terms of income redistribution, many persons see the
chief concern of energy policy as the plight of the poor-rising prices versus fixed in-
comes. Income redistribution may be the most politically troublesome aspect of the "energy
problem." Thus, not surprisingly, the primary purpose of much energy legislation is to
soften the economic impact of high priced energy upon these vulnerable segments of the
consuming public. See, e.g., H.R. 3919, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (windfall profits tax).
The relationship between energy resources development and the environment further
complicates the "energy problem." See generally ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT: A RISK
BENEFIT APPROACH (H. Ashley, R. Rudman & C. Whipple eds. 1976). Coal is an abundant
resource and nuclear power offers a long-term source of supply, but increased reliance on
these energy sources means a trade-off between environmental values and energy self-
sufficiency. See generally HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON THE ENVIRONMENT AND THE ATMOSPHERE OF
THE COMM. ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., RESEARCH AND DEVELOP-
MENT NEEDS TO MERGE ENVIRONMENTAL AND ENERGY OBJECTIVES (Comm. Print 1978); SEN-
ATE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, 93D CONG., 1ST SESS., COAL SURFACE MIN-
ING AND RECLAMATION: AN ENVIRONMENTAL AND ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT OF ALTERNATIVES
(Comm. Print 1973); Hearings on H.R. 4047, H.R. 4295, and H.R. 7976 Before the General
Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
See also Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 and Amendments of 1977, 30 U.S.C.
§§ 801-825 (Supp. 1 1977)); Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7626
(Supp. I 1977). For discussions of safety aspects of nuclear energy, see B. COMMONER, THE
POVERTY OF POWER 82-120 (1976); AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY
RESEARCH, Is NUCLEAR POWER SAFE? (M. Laird moderator 1975); Bodansky & Schmidt,
Safety Aspects of Nuclear Energy, in THE NUCLEAR POWER CONTROVERSY 8 (A. Murphy ed.
1976); Kistiakowsky, Nuclear Power: How Much Is Too Much?, in THE NUCLEAR POWER
CONTROVERSY 157 (A. Murphy ed. 1976). Yet Congress, in setting up DOE, failed to deal
with the environmental aspects of energy choosing to leave control of the environment
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increased supplies were less likely to support the deregulation
plans urged by others. Such fundamental differences in the per-
ception of the problem involved delayed the legislative process
and confused its ultimate substantive product.39 Moreover, this
ambivalence over substance had a significant effect on the ad-
ministrative structure Congress designed to combat the energy
crisis.
B. The Administration's Bill-The Beginnings of the Department of
Energy Organization Act of 1977
The introduction of the legislation that ultimately resulted in
the Department of Energy Organization Act of 1977 sparked a
congressional battle over the substance of a rational energy pro-
gram.4" Yet the initial bill contained no indication of what new
substantive policies the proposed energy department would im-
plement.41 The Carter Administration reasoned that centralized
with other agencies. See Byse, The Department of Energy Organization Act: Structure and Proce-
dure, 30 AD. L. REv. 193, 194-98 (1978).
Finally the phrase "energy crisis" connotes enormous international problems. The
Arab embargo of 1973 and the Iranian cut-off of 1979 indicate our dependence on foreign
powers that may prove hostile to our long run interests. For an analysis of the effects on
the West of OPEC's various decisions, see Pindyck, OPEC's Threat to the West, FOREIGN
PoL'y, at 36, passim (No. 30 Spring 1978); see also Levy, The Years That the Locust Hath Eaten:
Oil Policy and OPEC Development Prospects, 57 FOREIGN AFF. 287, 287-305 (Winter 1978-79)
(OPEC members' interests may diverge from those of the United States). At stake is our
national security. The attempt to bolster our security raises important questions about our
ability to and the wisdom of achieving energy self-sufficiency in an increasingly interde-
pendent world economy.
The National Energy Act, Congress' response to the "energy problem," consists of five
separate major pieces of legislation affecting energy policy. They are: (1) the Natural Gas
Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350; (2) the Public Utility Regulatory
Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117; (3) the Powerplant and Industrial
Fuel Use Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-620, 42 Stat. 3289; (4) the National Energy Conser-
vation Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-619, 92 Stat. 3206 (1978); (5) the Energy Tax Act, Pub.
L. No. 95-618, 92 Stat. 3174 (1978).
'9 See, e.g., The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350. This
Act was one of five parts of the National Energy Act and the legislation around which most
of the controversy was centered. The disagreement in Congress over whether federal price
controls on natural gas should be completely eliminated, phased out on a gradual basis, or
retained delayed passage of the National Energy Act for nearly 19 months. The Carter
energy plan was presented to Congress in April 1977. It was rejected by the Senate, which
approved ending federal price controls for new gas on October 4, 1977. In conference, a
compromise was struck which allows for gradual phasing out of all controls by 1985. The
Senate passed the conference report on October 9, 1978, the House passed it six days later,
and the plan became law November 9, 1978.
o See notes 37-52 and accompanying text supra.
41 The Administration presented its bill on March 1, 1977, less than six weeks after
President Carter took office. The proposed energy policy to accompany the new executive
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administration of any energy program, regardless of its substan-
tive bent, was far superior to existing fragmented policymaking
machinery.42  To increase centralization, the Administration's bill
department was not scheduled to be outlined until late April. See Department of Energy:
Remarks Outlining Proposed Legislation To Create the Department, [1977] 1 PuB. PAPERS
257.
This caused much irritation and some opposition in Congress. See notes 89-90 and
accompanying text infra. Suspicions that the President would use the DOE Act to preempt
congressional input into energy policy formulation tempered the desire to jump on the
reorganization bandwagon. Thus, many legislators felt that reorganization prior to substan-
tive policy placed the "cart before the horse." See, e.g., 123 CONG. REc. H5,272 (daily ed.
June 2, 1977) (remarks by Rep. Armstrong); id. H5,391-92 (daily ed. June 3, 1977) (re-
marks by Rep. Treen); id. S13,287 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1977) (remarks by Sen. Stevens).
Senator Roth very aptly asked:
Is natural gas going to be deregulated? If so, that affects the transfer of
power from the Federal Power Commission to the new Department. Is solar
energy going to be given a high priority in the new Administration's plans? If
so, that may determine whether one of the eight assistant secretaries should be
specifically designated as responsible for solar energy. Similar questions are
raised on every page of this bill. And those are the kinds of questions which I
think should be answered before an organization is cast in concrete.
I also hasten to warn that if this bill is based on a hidden agenda, not one
which is merely unknown, then this should be revealed to the Congress. When
the administration energy proposals are revealed in another month or two it
will be clear to everybody concerned whether this reorganization bill was drawn
with policy objectives clearly in mind.
Department of Energy Organization Act: Hearings on S. 826 and S. 591 Before the Senate Comm.
oni Governmental Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 106 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Senate
Hearings]. Similar views were also voiced in the House: "Until we finally really know what
the President is going to do ... it is very hard to understand how you can really organize
and create a department to carry those policies out." Department of Energy Organization Act:
Hearings on H.R. 4263 Before the House Comm. on Government Operations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
210-11 (1977) (statement of Rep. Wydler).
The public hearings held by both the Senate and the House elicited similar concerns
from witnesses: "We ... support ... government [energy] reorganization .... The main
uncertainty involves the lack of an enunciated energy policy for the Department of Energy
." Id. at 401 (statement of Jeffrey Knight, Legislative Director, Friends of the Earth).
42 We need a new organizational entity which has the scope of authorities to
make trade-offs in an age of fuel scarcity; which has the public support to
pursue a vigorous conservation policy; which has the capability to collect and
analyze meaningful energy data, to conduct research and development which
relates to policy priorities, and to regulate responsibly and equitably. And we
need to insure that this organization does not lose sight of the important con-
siderations that must be intimately involved with our energy problems: Protec-
tion of the environment; consultation with States and localities; recognition of
the vital role which energy matters will play in foreign affairs; and protection
of the consuming public's interest.
There will likely be differences about specific policy objectives in the fu-
ture. But I believe there should be no dispute about the need for establishing
an organizational base within which these policies can be carried out.
Reorganization of the Federal energy, establishment to deal more effectively with our
energy problems is an idea whose time has come. We can no longer live with the frag-
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sought to abolish the Federal Power Commission (FPC), FEA, and
the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA).43
mentation, the duplication, the overlapping jurisdictions, and the conflicting mandates
evident in the current organization for dealing with energy problems.
No agency anywhere in the Federal Government has the broad scope of
authorities to deal with our energy problems in a comprehensive manner.
In the area of national energy policy, for the first time, we will have the
responsibility for the formulation of energy policy vested in one Government
institution. Assisted by an Under Secretary for Policy and Evaluation, the Sec-
retary will be able to speak authoritatively for the Executive branch on those
national energy policies needed to put energy supply and demand back into
balance.
By establishing the Department, we will be assured of having one Gov-
ernment body with sufficient scope and authority to effectively oversee the
development of national energy policy. Therefore, the need no longer will
exist for a formal, statutory Energy Resources Council, and this legislation will
abolish it. However, energy-related issues will obviously continue to cut across
departmental lines, and a less formal interdepartmental coordinating body will
be established by Executive order, with the Energy Secretary as chairman, to
address these concerns.
Senate Hearings, supra note 41, at 121-24 (testimony of James R. Schlesinger, Assistant to
the President) (emphasis added).
In general, duplication, overlapping jurisdiction, fragmentation of respon-
sibility, and conflicting mandates have hampered the government's ability to
formulate and implement a coherent, long-range national energy policy.
Foremost among those issues needing organizational resolution is that of
energy policy formulation and decision-making. Currently, the central
mechanism for directing policy development and coordination, as well as for
monitoring and evaluating program implementation, is the statutory Energy
Resources Council. The ERG did not and could not, with its members' other
duties, devote itself as a body to the day-to-day problems and issues which
energy policy formulation demands.
The absence of a single agency responsible for policy development has re-
sulted too frequently in inconsistent and uncoordinated short and long-range
planning assumptions and policies.
Energy policy can neither be effectively developed nor implemented with-
out the benefit of a single entity capable of providing coherence to all of our
energy-related programs and of melding these efforts together into a planned
and concerted effort to achieve national energy objectives.
With the Department of Energy, responsibility for the formulation of
energy policy will be directed to the Secretary of Energy. With the support of a
consolidated organization with the authority and capability to manage Federal
actions needed to implement energy policy, this legislation will achieve the sin-
gular task of locating clearly the executive's responsibility for the development
and execution of energy policy objectives.
Id. at 127-28 (statement of John F. O'Leary, Administrator, FEA). See id. at 164 (testimony
of Richard L. Dunham, Chairman, FPC); Department of Energy: Remarks Outlining Pro-
posed Legislation To Create the Department, [1977] 1 PUB. PAPERS 257; Department of
Energy: Message to the Congress Transmitting Proposed Legislation, [1977] 1 PuB. PAPERS
257, 257-59.
43 S. 826, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 301, Senate Hearings, supra note 41, at 4-5 (1977).
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The bill proposed the creation of a cabinet level office of Secre-
tary of Energy,4 4 various executive agencies under the Secretary's
supervision or control, 45 and a Board of Hearings and Appeals.46
The powers previously exercised by the agencies to be abolished
by this legislation were largely retained; however, the proposed
bill allocated these powers primarily among new executive ad-
ministrative units.4 7
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the Administration's
bill was its attempt to allocate primary energy policymaking power
to an executive agency rather than to an independent regulatory
commission. From the Carter Administration's point of view, this
had a number of advantages, including greater presidential con-
trol over energy policy. 48 Moreover, increased centralization in
an executive agency would result in greater accountability to the
electorate: policy would be made primarily by a cabinet level offi-
cial with closer ties to the popularly-elected President.
Executive policymaking signalled a second significant change:
a move to more effective use of the rulemaking process in for-
mulating energy policy.4 9 Proponents of the bill argued that ad-
44 Id. §§ 201, 301, Senate Hearings, supra note 41, at 5, 7-8.
45 Id. §§ 204-205, Senate Hearings, supra note 41, at 6-7.
46 Id. § 401, Senate Hearings, supra note 41, at 15-17.
4' The Act as passed by Congress, however, essentially allocated powers within the De-
partment between the Secretary of Energy and an independent adjudicatory agency
(FERC). See note 93 and accompanying text infra. The Act, however, provides FERC with
considerably more power than the Administration had initially planned to delegate to the
Board of Hearings and Appeals. See note 59 and accompanying text infra.
4 The White House Fact Sheet on Energy Reorganization Legislation 8, 10-11 (Mar. I,
1977) (on file at Cornell Law Review) [hereinafter cited as White House Fact Sheet].
" The Administration hoped to accomplish this not only by substituting rulemaking
for adjudication, but also by eliminating the bifurcation of oil and natural gas regulation
between the FEA and FPC. The gradual shift to rulemaking therefore had substantive as
well as procedural consequences. Though not stressed by the Administration, expedited
and coordinated oil-gas regulation and increased use of rulemaking procedures lay at the
core of the reorganization plan.
The FEA has regulatory functions that have been exercised since 1974, and
has not performed those functions on the basis of an on-the-record formal ad-
judicatory procedure.
That covers all petroleum products.
By contrast, natural gas, which has been regulated since 1938 by the Fed-
eral Power Commission, has had considerable experience in dealing with formal
on-the-record adjudicatory procedures.
We do not see the reason for discrepancy in the treatment of petroleum on
the one hand, and natural gas on the other, and we think that we should move
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judicatory hearings had been used far too extensively in making
toward administration of these fuel sources in the same manner, preferably
within the same agency.
In addition to that, Mr. Chairman, on-the-record hearings by the Federal
Power Commission have been most time consuming.
By placing these matters in this same agency, we can trade off more effec-
tively between informal rulemaking authorities, and formal adjudicatory pro-
ceedings on-the-record, and it would be our intention to do so.
Senate Hearings, supra note 41, at 131 (remarks of James R. Schlesinger, Assistant to the
President). Another witness stated that:
[I]n the major energy pricing decisions of the'Federal Power Commission, I
have not found the legal maxims under which we have been forced to operate
particularly useful in making the hard choices presented to us.
In addition, our current standards of judicial review certainly do not
further the certainty which I believe to be so important in energy decisionmak-
ing, and to which the President alluded in his recent press conference remarks.
Therefore, although I fully support the idea of a single decisionmaker on
major energy policy and pricing decisions, we must realize that the bill before
us does nothing to eliminate the time lag of judicially created uncertainty.
It has always puzzled me that petroleum product price and allocation re-
sponsibility resided with FEA, while virtually identical electric power and
natural gas functions remained with FPC.
In just 112 years that I have served as Chairman of the Commission, large
amounts of time and funds have been expended to attempt to reconcile the
differences between FEA and FPC regulations and procedures, and to coordi-
nate policies between the two agencies.
These efforts were only partially successful, but the burden in terms of
cost, delay, and frequent inconsistency is one the Nation should not have to
bear, and one it would not have to bear if the reorganization proposed by the
President is accomplished.
There is, of course, a direct economic relationship between licensing, price,
and supply of natural gas, electricity, petroleum-indeed, all sources of
energy-and it simply makes sense to have all governmental actions related to
these functions coordinated within a single agency.
Id. at 166-67 (testimony'of Richard L. Dunham, Chairman, FPC). However, some ex-
pressed reservations that the transition to coordination of oil and gas regulation would
prove complicated and messy because of the historical split between the two:
Now, what is good about the way FPC functions is that the same agency
decides all aspects of natural gas and electric power cases which come before it,
utilizing a single, integrated staff.
Under the provisions of the bill, it is impossible to say how the cases would
be handled. Indeed, it is impossible to know how the 15,000 cases which are
already docketed should be handled. It would be an appalling task to go
through the files and attempt to determine which files should be assigned to
the Administrator, which to the Hearings and Appeals Board, and perhaps
which to the Secretary or to other agencies.
If assignment is to be made on the basis of whether the case is expected to
go to hearing, what happens when there is a settlement? Must the file be
moved from the Board back to the Administrator?
If so, what are the risks and the frustration if a new staff must begin
examination of the transactions de novo.
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essentially policy decisions better handled by rulemaking.50 They
claimed that such over-judicialization of energy policymaking re-
sulted in unnecessary delay and cost as well as a decisionmaking
Another good thing about the Federal Power Commissin [sic] is that there
is a close working relationship between the Commission and staff to the extent
permissible without violating ex parte considerations.
This is the essence of the advantage of the regulatory agency over the
courts, in deciding technical questions involving complex situations and numer-
ous issues.
Now, if there is to be a division of function between the Administrator and
the Board, each will need an expert staff. It is difficult enough to assemble one
competent group of staff experts. I do not visualize the feasibility of a dual
staff arrangement. It would be hard to recruit two staffs or to establish condi-
tions which permitted them to function in tandem.
There would be infinite possibility for delay and confusion if matters were
transferred from one staff to another.
Id. at 206 (testimony of Joseph C. Swidler, former Chairman, FPC). See also id. at 166
(testimony of Richard L. Dunham, Chairman, FPC).
For example, James Schlesinger testified that:
We would hope over a period of years to move increasingly toward infor-
mal rulemaking and decisionmaking procedures, and to reduce the amount of
formal on-the-record adjudicatory proceedings; however, in individual cases
which determine the rights of individuals we shall always expect to retain ad-
judicatory proceedings of sufficient formality to assure due process.
But I think more and more can be moved by these more flexible methods,
and that would be our intention.
Id. at 132. See also id. at 125. Groups at both ends of the political spectrum tempered their
criticisms of FPC by cautious appreciation of the due process protections afforded by for-
mal adjudication, and suspicion that undue emphasis on expedition of cases might, in fact,
be more harmful than helpful. As former FPC Chairman Joseph C. Swidler observed:
[Tihe FPC is probably unique in the very large number of so-called big cases it
handles proceedings which involved very large investments, large revenues,
numerous parties, intervenors, distributors, producers, and an enormous con-
sumer interest.
Hundreds of millions of dollars are at stake here. I do not say that all of
the proceedings before the FPC are handled with the efficiency and dispatch
that we ought to expect, but I do say that it proceeds in a very careful way that
all interests are taken into account, that its procedures have been highly de-
veloped over a long period of time, and that they are generally satisfactory to
the industries and to the intervening parties.
Id. at 204-05. Lee C. White, another former FPC Chairman, echoed Swidler's analysis and
noted that competing policies favored different groups, thus making energy reorganization
a politically sensitive issue:
Again, as Mr. Swidler said, I think there are a number of areas where
rulemaking and simplified procedures can be used. You cannot kid yourself.
One guy's due process is another fellow's inability to get something done.
Here we are asking the administration to move forward. The new ad-
ministration is seizing the responsibility. As a lawyer, sometimes I know that
time is my client's friend and sometimes his enemy, and so it is the age-old
question of how do you cut through and make sure the due process is really
not undue process, or unduly burdensome, or lengthy.
Id. at 208.
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process incapable of responding quickly to future energy
emergencies. 51
51 We need to construct an effective Government organization that can meet
the challenge and propose a rational solution. In my opinion, such an organi-
zation can only be effective if we confer upon the Secretary of Energy the
authority to establish overall policy direction on energy matters, the right to
manage resources, to coordinate the manner and the ability to meet energy
demands, including recurrent crises, in an expeditious and effective manner.
123 CONG. REC. H5,296 (daily ed. June 2, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Brooks).
But the old FPC structure and system had its defenders. Rising to the defense on this
point was FPC Administrative Law Judge Curtis L. Wagner, Jr., in an exchange with
Senator Ribicoff:
Chairman RIBICOFF. This is the trouble. If you are talking about an
emergency situation where there is an actual allocation for an emergency, and
if it takes 3 or 4 months to make a decision, in 3 or 4 months the emergency is
over. How do you solve that?
Judge WAGNER. In an emergency situation, we hold an emergency hearing.
We waive briefs. We have on-the-record arguments, and we issue our decision
the next day if necessary. We quite often do this.
I had an emergency situation this past month in the case of Philadelphia
Gasworks v. Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Co. The case was set for hearing by the
Commission on Friday. I convened hearings on Monday morning at 9. I con-
cluded the hearings on Thursday afternoon and immediately certified the rec-
ord and recommended action to the Commission which issued a final order the
next day.
The case was handled in less than a week.
Chairman RIBicoFF. All right.
Senate Hearings, supra note 41, at 784-85.
Senator Metcalf, on the other hand, challenged the emergency notion itself, thereby
refraining the argument over location and efficiency of government energy action:
In the name of emergency-one that is yet to be proved to this Senator-
we are being asked, in essence, to delegate all Federal powers over the price
and allocation of energy supplies to the head of a new department, subject to
the direct control of the President, without adequate standards, and without
sufficient safeguards of due process, or administrative protection against arbi-
trary abuse of discretion.
In time of war or other imminent and endangering threats to our security,
such aggregation of power in the President may be justified, but today it is very
questionable and must be looked at with much more than the peripheral in-
spection we have thus far given it in the Senate.
123 CONG. REc. S7,956-57 (daily ed. May 18, 1977).
Senator Percy, in support of increased use of rulemaking, remarked that:
If there is any one thing we know in any area where there is rulemaking or
decisionmaking, it is that we really need decisions made as swiftly and as ex-
peditiously as possible. It is indecision that causes so many mistakes in judg-
ment and so much condemnation of Government, because of our inability to
get off the dime and make up our minds.
It is the decision of the committee, then, that the proposal that we have
made best handles this sensitive and difficult issue. By emphasizing rulemaking,
it does attempt to speed up economic regulatory decisions on energy resources.
Id. S7,918.
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1. Board of Hearings and Appeals
Even though most of the policymaking power was to reside in
the executive, the proposed Department of Energy Organization
Act also provided for the creation of a Board of Hearings and
Appeals. This was to have been an independent regulatory com-
mission with the sole function of rendering adjudicatory decisions
in certain cases. 52  In essence the Board was to have been a
specialized in-house energy court.
In functioning as the agency's own judicial branch the Board
was to have been completely independent of the Secretary. Its
members-a chairman and two others-were "not [to] be respon-
sible to or subject to the supervision or direction of any officer,
employee, or agent of the Department." 53 Members were to
have been appointed to four-year terms of office and could be
removed by the President "only for inefficiency, neglect of duty,
or malfeasance in office." 54 Action by the Board was to have
been "final agency action" 55 and thus subject to judicial review,56
but board decisions were not to have been subject to any further
review within the Department of Energy.57
Under the Administration's proposal, the Board would have
had no power to initiate any actions nor could it define its own
jurisdiction. 58  The proposed bill would have limited the Board
by granting it jurisdiction "to hear and determine matters arising
under any function vested in or delegated to the Secretary involv-
ing ... any agency determination required by law to be made on
the record after opportunity for an agency hearing." 59 By use of
the magic words "on the record," proponents of the bill clearly
intended the Board to be involved only if adjudication or formal
rulemaking were statutorily required. 60  If there was any doubt as
to whether a statute required adjudication or formal rulemaking,
the Board would not be empowered to decide such a question.
52 S. 826, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 401, 402, Senate Hearings, supra note 41, at 15-18
(1977).
a Id. § 401(d), Senate Hearings, supra note 41, at 16.
5 Id. § 401(b), Senate Hearings, supra note 41, at 16.
5 Id. § 401(e), Senate Hearings, supra note 41, at 16-17.
56 Id. § 501(a), Senate Hearings, supra note 41, at 18.
57 Id. § 401(e), Senate Hearings, supra note 41, at 16.
58 Id. § 401 (a)(2), Senate Hearings, supra note 41, at 15.
59 Id. § 401(a)(2)(A)(i), Senate Hearings, supra note 41, at 15 (emphasis added).
60 Concerns over the procedural safeguards for those proceedings that were not
statutorily required to be "on the record" prompted opposition to this provision.
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Rather, the Secretary would decide whether the Board had juris-
diction to hear the case. 6 1  In addition, when adjudicatory proce-
Another apparent problem with the bill seems to be the reduction of due
process protections which have always been associated with ratemaking under
the EPA and NGA. Any person familiar with the ratemaking process recognizes
that ratemaking, regardless of how classified in the lawyers' lexicon, is an ad-
judicatory process and that cross-examination is the consumer's best and some-
times only ally. However, under the bill, specifically Sec. 401(a)(2) ... , the
Board would have mandatory jurisdiction only over those agency determina-
tions "required by law to be made on the record after opportunity for an
agency hearing," and since the ratemaking provisions of the FPC (Sections 205
and 206) and the NGA (Sections 4 and 5) do not specifically require "on the
record" hearings, the bill as written opens the door for the Secretary (through
the Administrator of ERA) to set rates by rulemaking. Thus under the bill,
there exists the very real possibility that the long-established practice of settling
rates for public utilities and natural gas companies only after full adjudicatory
hearings will be abolished in favor of settling rates by informal rulemaking pro-
cedures.
I have not seen any viable reason yet advanced for shifting the certificate
and ratemaking functions of the FPC to the DOE. The shift of such functions
from an independent regulatory agency to an executive branch can only reflect
the desire of the bill's authors to effect substantive changes in the administra-
tion of the FPA and NGA, under the guise of a reorganization bill. Under the
bill's approach the consumer-protection objectives of the FPA and NGA are
being jettisoned by the administration in order to achieve, inter alia, ratemaking
by rulemaking (rather than by adjudication) which.could enable the administra-
tion to effect a policy of deregulation of electric and gas prices by administra-
tive fiat.
Senate Hearings, supra note 41, at 108-09 (statement of Sen. Metcalf). See id. at 227-28
(statement of Robert C. McDiarmid, former Assistant to the General Counsel for FPC); id.
at 514, 527 (testimony of Alex Radin, Executive Director, American Public Power Associa-
tion); id. at 749 (statement of George M. Stafford, Chairman, ICC); id. at 785-86 (letter of
Judge Curtis L. Wagner, Jr., Chairman, Committee on Status and Compensation, Member
of Legislative Committee, Federal Administrative Law Judges Conference).
61 S. 826, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. § 401(a) Senate Hearings, supra note 41, at 15 (1977).
During hearings on the bill this proposed power of the Secretary was clearly recognized
and heavily criticized. See note 99 supra.
First it is, I think, essential to take a look at each of the functions per-
formed presently by the FPC and determine whether they should or could be
better handled in the Hearings and Appeals Board instrumentality rather than
within other elements of the proposed department. As I understand it, the
current proposal would give to the Secretary the right to decide which respon-
sibilities should be assigned to the Hearings and Appeals Board. I believe that
Congress should mandate those particular functions that in its judgment are to
be handled by such a board and permit the Secretary to refer any matters in
addition to those Congressionally mandated that he wishes to assign to the
more formal judicial-like process of the Appeals Board. As an illustration, the
responsibility for handling rate cases on the electric utility side of the FPC re-
sponsibilities, which normally involve disputes between sellers of electric energy
to other utilities (privately, publicly, and cooperatively owned) is the type of
issue that lends itself to a trial-like procedure rather than Executive Branch
policy-making.
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dures clearly were not statutorily required, the Secretary would
have had the discretion to assign any other matter to the Board if
he determined that adjudicatory procedures were nevertheless
appropriate. 62  As the judicial arm of the new department, the
Board could only have reacted to cases statutorily required to be
brought before it or assigned to it at the discretion of the Secre-
tary.63
Many proponents of the bill hoped that the Board's jurisdic-
tion would be relatively limited.6 4  They anticipated that matters
Senate Hearings, supra note 41, at 212 (statement of Lee C. White, former Chairman, FPC).
Senator Roth remarked that:
They talk about any agency determinations required by law to be made on
the record. But we will be doing away, as I understand it, with the FPC com-
mission. And it is only FPC administrative practices that require determinations
on the record. The law does not impose such requirements, so is there assur-
ance that this Board has any jurisdiction beyond what the Secretary wants to
give?
I have an open mind as to whether rulemaking is the proper approach or
not, but it does seem to me that if they are going to move in that direction we
have to build in some safeguards.
Id. at 522. Judge Curtis L. Wagner, Jr., Member of Legislative Committee, Federal Ad-
ministrative Law Judges Conference stated that:
As S. 826 now stands, the Board of Hearings and Appeals, or the energy
court as we would prefer to call it, would have jurisdiction to hear and decide
most rate cases only if, and to the extent that, the Secretary chose to delegate
authority to the Board.
It is not beyond the realm of reason to conjecture that some Secretary in
the future might become dissatisfied with the Board's interface of facts, law,
and policy and discipline the Board by merely withdrawing its jurisdiction.
Id. at 783. To similar effect, Representative Brown of Ohio observed that:
Under the legislation submitted by the administration, the authorities of
the Secretary that are taken over from the Federal Power Act and the Natural
Gas Act-those authorities formerly held by the Federal Power Commission-
would also embrace his opportunity to change those administrative procedures
at his will. That is one of the big hooks here, because he might limit the ad-
ministrative procedures under his own authority when the choice comes to him.
I do not think they should be limited.
123 CONG. REC. H5,297 (daily ed. June 2, 1977).
62 S. 826, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 401(a)(2)(B), Senate Hearings, supra note 41, at 15
(1977).
63 See id. § 401(a)(2), Senate Hearings, supra note 41, at 15.
64 The assumption is that the matters to be decided by the Hearings and
Appeals Board would be the minimum that the courts will insist be decided
that way, and the ones that the Secretary or the Administator decides should
be determined in the rulemaking mode.
Senate Hearings, supra note 41, at 205 (testimony of Joseph C. Swidler, former Chairman,
FPC). The Administration believed that the Secretary would be the dominant figure in the
Department.
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previously decided by adjudication, but fully susceptible of resolu-
Secretarial role: The Secretary or the Administrator of the Economic Reg-
ulatory Administration, as the Secretary's delegate, will carry out informal
rulemaking and issuance of policy statements covering the regulatory areas
within the Department ...
In addition, the Secretary (or the Administrator of the Economic Regula-
tory Administration) will have the ability to issue prospective rules simplifying some
of the proceedings now conducted by on-the-records [sic] rulemaking or adjudication to
the extent that he is not constrained from doing so under the applicable or-
ganic statutes. Until such time as the Secretary or the Administrator issues such rules,
however, these types of formal rulemakings or adjudications will be performed by the
Board of Hearings and Appeals, as described below ...
Board of Hearings and Appeals role: Initially, the Board of Hearings and Ap-
-peals would have jurisdiction over all proceedings which must be conducted on
the record by law, and which the Secretary determines should be conducted on
the record. Initially, it is anticipated that all proceedings conducted on the rec-
ord under the practice of the constitutent agencies and commissions involved
would continue to be so conducted.
The Board of Appeals may determine to hear such matters initially itself, or
may use Administrative Law Judges to make initial determinations which the
Board would then review.
In practice, this means that the Board would have jurisdiction over much of
the FPC's current work load. Many of these proceedings, however, are now
conducted by the FPC in a formal, on-the-record manner even though this is
not required by existing statute and case law. In these areas, principally natural
gas transportation and electric power rate-making, the Secretary (or the Adminis-
trator of the Economic Regulatory Administration) would be free to attempt to establish,
by rule, less formal procedures for determination in these areas.
White House Fact Sheet, supra note 48, at 11 (emphasis added). See generally Senate Hear-
ings, supra note 41, at 115-20 (letters from James R. Schlesinger, Assistant to the President,
to Sen. Lee Metcalf as appended to statement of Sen. Metcalf).
In addition, many witnesses pointed out that the Secretary's potential control over the
Board was not confined to jurisdiction, but also extended to staffing, budgeting appropria-
tions, and other housekeeping areas.
Senator ROTH. Dr. Schlesinger, I would like to follow up the question by
Senator Glenn, with respect to an independent energy regulatory administra-
tion.
You mentioned physically they will be separate.
What about the housekeeping and personnel, will that come under the
jurisdiction of the Department of Energy, or would they make their recom-
mendations independently?
Dr. SCHLESINGER. They make their recommendations independently.
The administration would be handled by the central personnel office, but
the selection of individuals would come from the Board of Hearings and Ap-
peals and the like.
Senator ROTH. What about the size of their personnel, and budget, would
that be approved by the Department, or would that be directly, would that go
directly to the Congress?
Dr. SCHLESINGER. Both.
If prior precedent were followed, the Congress would hear of any requests
for money, or for personnel, from the Board of Hearings and Appeals, and the
budget would be presented as a unified budget, rather than as a separate
budget.
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tion by rulemaking, could then be handled by rulemaking proce-
dures.
Senator ROTH. But to that extent, and I am not saying that is wrong or
right, it is a matter of policy, and the Cabinet Secretary would have assistants
who would help with respect to those recommendations?
Dr. SCHLESINGER. Yes, sir.
Id. at 139.
There are other threats to true independence. For example, the bill gives
the Secretary broad powers over the Board's budgetary process, over hiring,
and over general administrative control. In addition, since the members of the
Board are to be appointed by the President and are to hold relatively short
terms of office (four years), there is a potential for dramatic changes with each
change of administration.
Id. at 750 (statement of George M. Stafford, Chairman ICC).
As an independent body, the Commission employs its own personnel. The
present staff has developed considerable expertise and is of invaluable service
to the Commission. Assuming these individuals are transferred to the Depart-
ment of Energy, under the present structure they would presumably be as-
signed to the Economic Regulatory Administration. From there, they could be
detailed to the Board. The failure to provide the Board with its own staff could
thus give rise to at least two potential problems.
The first and most obvious problem is that the ability of the Board to carry
out its responsibilities could be crippled by the Secretary of the Department of
Energy, if he were unsympathetic or unresponsive to the needs of the Hearings
and Appeals Board. By his control over the budget and personnel functions of
the new department, the Secretary would be in a position to dictate the size and
character of the staff of the Board. If the staff were inadequate to perform
properly the duties of the Board, regulation would suffer.
A second problem is the ability of the Board to secure information it may
need a [sic] regulate effectively. The Administration's energy reorganization
plan calls for a centralization of energy information collection and dissemina-
tion. This approach should not foreclose assignment to the Board of personnel
which will permit it to obtain data required to implement the provisions of the
Federal Power Act, and to make available to the public information which will
be of aid to consumers.
Id. at 528-29 (statement of Alex Radin, Executive Director, American Public Power Associa-
tion).
If the Board of Hearings and Appeals is to truly have the independence
proposed by the President, it should have the authority to transmit appropria-
tion requests directly to Congress without review by either the Secretary of
Energy or any other element within the proposed department.
Id. at 782 (testimony of Judge Curtis L. Wagner, Jr., Member of Legislative Committee,
Federal Administrative Law Judges Conference).
In addition, the members of the Board of Appeals are reduced in level of
pay from present FPC Commissioners. See, section 713 of S. 826. And by being
located "within" the Department of Energy, the Board may necessarily become
dependent upon the agency for appropriations, staff, office space and other
operational necessities to a degree of practical dependence upon the Depart-
ment.
Id. at 808 (Library of Congress, Congressional Research Services Analysis of Titles IV and
V of S. 826, by Robert Poling, Legislative Attorney, American Law Division).
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2. The Economic Regulatory Administration
As initially proposed, the Economic Regulatory Administra-
tion (ERA) clearly would have been one of the most powerful
agencies within the Energy Department.6 5  In addition to exercis-
ing control over the price and allocation of oil, ERA also was to
have been in charge of natural gas ratemaking, natural gas cur-
tailment and, in effect, all matters capable of being handled by
rulemaking.6 6  ERA's precise relationship to both the Secretary
and to the Board of Hearings and Appeals was not entirely
clear; 67 however, ERA clearly was intended to be one of the most
powerful executive agencies under the Secretary.68
" See S. 826, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. §§ 205, 301-310, 501(c), 502, 601-623, Senate Hear-
ings, supra note 41, at 6-15, 19, 23-37 (1977).
6 See id. §§ 205, 301, Senate Hearings, supra note 41, at 6-8. Section 301 transferred
FEA authority to the Secretary, and § 205(b)(1) specified that the Secretary would "utilize
the Economic Regulatory Administration to administer ... any function which may be del-
egated to the Secretary under the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973." Section
205(b)(3) authorized the Secretary to confer upon the ERA "such other functions as the
Secretary may consider appropriate." As the Administration explained, the Secretary or the
ERA "as the Secretary's delegate" would handle "all FEA regulatory activities." White
House Fact Sheet, supra note 48, at 11. Moreover, "[a]ppeals from individual orders issued
in the area of petroleum pricing and allocation will be through the same type of exceptions
and appeals processes as are now used in FEA." Id. Administration statements and tes-
timony show that rough comparisons were made between FEA and ERA on the one hand,
and FPC and BHA on the other, at least insofar as their procedural nature was concerned.
The major exception to the transfer of FEA to the Secretary/ERA was the proposed
Energy Information Administration (EIA). See S. 826, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. § 204, Senate
Hearings, supra note 41, at 6 (1977). FEA information-gathering functions, as well as those
of other bodies incorporated within DOE, were to become EIA responsibilities. Notably,
however, the Secretary was to make this delegation and could do so on a "non-exclusive
basis," presumably permitting him to duplicate EIA authority elsewhere within DOE. Still,
the EIA administrator could "act in the name of the Secretary for the purpose of obtaining
enforcement of the delegated function." Id. § 204(c), Senate Hearings, supra note 41, at 6.
67 Though the Secretary could "utilize" ERA to administer designated functions and
"such other functions as the Secretary may consider appropriate" (S. 826, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 205(b), Senate Hearings, supra note 41, at 7 (1977)), the administrator of ERA was to
be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, rather than by
the Secretary (id. § 205(b), Senate Hearings, supra note 41, at 6-7). The Board of Hearings
and Appeals was to have jurisdiction "to hear and determine matters arising under any
function vested in or delegated to the Secretary" involving agency determinations to be
made on the record. Id. § 401(a)(2), Senate Hearings, supra note 41, at 15. Members of the
Board were not to be "responsible to or subject to the supervision or direction of any
officer, employee, or agent of the Department" (id. § 401(d), Senate Hearings, supra note 41,
at 16), nor were Board decisions to be subject to further review by the Secretary or any
officer or employee of the Department (id. § 401(e), Senate Hearings, supra note 41, at
16). See notes 53-57 and accompanying text supra.
68 Indeed, the most significant fact about ERA authority was its definition as a secretar-
ial creature. The Administration bill and supplementary explanations make it clear that
no line of independence between ERA and the Secretary was foreseen; the latter had dis-
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C. The Department of Energy Organization Act of 1977
The Department of Energy created by Congress 6 9 differed
significantly from the Administration's proposal. Congress re-
jected the President's plan to centralize substantial power under
executive control.7 0  Congress preferred a relatively weak execu-
tive whose power is, to a large extent, offset by a strong indepen-
dent regulatory commission-the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC). 71  The Administration's proposed Board of
Hearings and Appeals would have been simply an agency court;
the commission Congress created, however, is essentially the Fed-
eral Power Commission reincarnated, an independent commission
responsible for a wide range of energy programs similar to those
of its predecessor.72
The resulting Department of Energy thus consists of both an
executive agency7 3 and an independent regulatory commission.7 4
The Act allocates significant powers to a newly created cabinet
level office of Secretary, and to various executive departments
under his supervision and control. 75  But it provides even greater
powers to FERC.7 6  The net result is not only an agency of
enormous size, complexity and power, but one whose power is
considerably fragmented.
Under the new Act, the old problem of interagency fragmen-
tation has, to a large extent, 77 given way to a new problem-
cretion to make and change the division of authority between them. See S. 826, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 205(b), Senate Hearings, supra note 41, at 7 (1977). There was never an attempt
to distinguish ERA as a clearly defined and autonomous office; in fact, ERA itself received
relatively little comment or analysis. Instead, the congressional focus was directed at the
Secretary and the Board of Hearings and Appeals as the significant statutory entities. See
generally notes 61 & 64 supra.
69 DOE Act, Pub. L. No. 95-91, 91 Stat. 567 (codified primarily at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7101-
7352 (Supp. 1 1977)).
70 See notes 110-14 and accompanying text infra.
1 See notes 47-48 and accompanying text supra; notes 112-14 and accompanying text
infra.
72 See text accompanying notes 94-98 infra.
13 Byse, supra note 38, at 198-201.
74 42 U.S.C. §§ 7171-7177 (Supp. I 1977) ("Federal Energy Regulatory Commission").
75 See notes 99-108 and accompanying text infira.
76 See notes 94-98 and accompanying text infra.
7 Interagency fragmentation still exists to a large extent. Though many agencies were
consolidated within the new Department,
there are still at least sixteen federal regulatory agencies, within and outside the
executive branch, each created and governed by its own separate statutes, with
responsibilities that directly affect the price and supply of energy:
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intraagency fragmentation.
AGENCY
The Act disperses powers among the
FUNCTION
Department of Energy
(Executive)
Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission
(Quasi-Independent)
Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
(Independent)
Department of the Interior
(Executive)
Interstate Commerce
Commission
(Independent)
Department of Commerce
(Executive)
Environmental Protection
Agency
(Executive)
National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration
(Department of Transportation)
(Executive)
U.S. Coast Guard
(Department of Transportation)
(Executive)
Materials Transportation Bureau
(Department of Transportation)
(Executive)
Occupational Safety and
Health Administration
(Department of Labor)
(Executive)
Price and allocation reg-
ulation for oil products,
fuel selection for power
plants, energy research
and development.
Interstate gas pipeline and
electricity rates and gas
field prices; new conven-
tional power plant licensing;
veto over certain DOE decisions.
Nuclear energy plant li-
censing, nuclear fuel
export.
Offshore oil and gas leasing,
public land leasing for oil,
gas, and coal, coal mine
safety, wilderness and en-
dangered species protection.
Oil and coal slurry
pipeline routes
and rates.
Tanker construction and
safety, marine sanctuaries.
Vehicle and smokestack
emission levels, water
quality, wildlife impact,
veto over DOE power plant
coal conversion orders.
Safety regulations affecting
vehicle weight and fuel
consumption; miles per
gallon requirements for
vehicle output.
Inspection of tankers and
LNG carriers and monitoring
their movements.
Pipeline safety.
Workplace levels for benzene
and other energy-related
substances.
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various executive units and FERC. 78  FERC exercises broad au-
thority over wholesale electric rates7 9 and wellhead and pipeline
natural gas rates 80 as well as oil pipeline rates, 81 but the Secre-
tary, or an executive unit under his supervision and control, regu-
lates wellhead oil prices 82 as well as the allocation of oil among
various categories of buyers.8 3  The Commission has authority to
develop natural gas curtailment plans 8 4 but the Secretary is au-
thorized to set curtailment priorities.8 5 The Commission can
issue certificates of public convenience and necessity relating to
the importation of liquid natural gas, 86 but authority to determine
overall import policy resides with the Secretary.87 In addition to
Consumer Product Safety Safety of home insulation
Commission and other energy-related
(Independent) materials and equipment.
Internal Revenue Service Tax regulations affecting
(Department of Treasury) energy producers and
(Executive) consumers.
International Trade Import injury and relief,
Commission including tariffs and
(Independent) quotas on energy imports.
Federal Trade Commission Antitrust regulation and
(Independent) litigation involving energy
industry.
Department of Justice Antitrust regulation and
(Executive) litigation involving
energy industry.
With sixteen captains holding a different spoke of the wheel, it is no wonder
that the Government finds it difficult to steer a firm energy course.
COMMISSION ON LAW AND THE ECONOMY, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, FEDERAL REGULA-
TION: ROADS TO REFORM 105-08 (proof of final report Sept. 1979) (footnote omitted) [here-
inafter cited as ABA REPORT].
78 42 U.S.C. § 7131-7172 (Supp. 1 1977).
79 Id. § 7172(a)(1)(B).
80 Id. § 7172(a)(1)(C).
81 Id. § 7172(b).
82 Id. § 7151. See S. REP. No. 164, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 39-40, reprinted in [1977] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 854, 893; H.R. REP. No. 539, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 78, reprinted in
[1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 925, 949. In general, FPC functions not transferred
to or vested in the FERC by § 7172 are transferred to the Secretary by § 7151.
83 42 U.S.C. § 7151 (Supp. 1 1977).
84 Id. § 7172(a)(1)(E).
85 Id. §§ 7151(b), 7172(a)(1)(E).
86 Id. § 7172(a)(1)(D).
87 Id. § 7172(f). See note 82 supra. See also 42 U.S.C. §§ 7151, 7172(a)(1)(D) (Supp. I
1977); H.R. REP. No. 539, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 65, 74-79, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE
518
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this separation of substantive powers between the executive and
the Commission, the Act provides for further checks and balances
within the agency. The most important provisions of this sort au-
thorize Commission review of both adjudicatory and legislative
decisions made by the executive agency. 8
The evolution of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
and its powers was precipitated by Congress' fear of excessive
executive control. 89 At the root of this fear was the uncertainty
in Congress over the possible substantive policies the President ac-
tually might propose and in any event the lack of any consensus
on the appropriate substantive policy options. 90 Many legislators
anticipated the worst. Congress eventually assuaged at least some
of its fears, not by resolving the substantive questions, but by
building a set of checks and balances into the structure of the new
agency.
Perhaps the foremost "anticipated problem" was the possibil-
ity of total deregulation of natural gas.91 Many members of Con-
CONG. & AD. NEWS 925, 935-36, 945-950.
There was, however, a good deal of uncertainty over the extent of the Secretary's
authority over imported natural gas. On October 17, 1978, the Secretary published a final
order delegating to ERA and FERC certain functions concerning the regulation of exports
and imports of natural gas. Importation and Exportation of Natural Gas, 43 Fed. Reg.
47,769 (1978). The question as to which agency had jurisdiction over which aspects of such
tases arose because § 402 of the DOE Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7172 (Supp. 1 1977), specifically
gave to FERC regulatory jurisdiction under §§ 4, 5, and 7 of the Natural Gas Act, 15
U.S.C. § 717c, 717d, 717f (1976), but assigned to the Secretary of Energy the general
authority to "regulat[e] the exports or imports of natural gas." 42 U.S.C. § 7172(f) (Supp. I
1977). The provision failed to limit the Secretary's authority specifically to matters arising
under § 3 of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717b (1976), and the Secretary could have
construed his authority broadly to regulate all aspects of natural gas import or export
projects. The delegation orders attempt to clear this problem up by, in effect, assigning all
nuts and bolts matters to FERC. Specifically, FERC now has authority over such applica-
tions pursuant to §§ 1, 4, 5 and 7 of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 717, 717c, 717d,
717f (1976), but also pursuant to § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 717b (1976), insofar as the functions
thereunder are representative of those areas traditionally within the expertise of FERC's
predecessor, the Federal Power Commission.
Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that Charles Curtis, Chairman of FERC, recently
urged Congress to consider "whether the decision with regard to importation of natural gas
should best be placed entirely in the Commission in one proceeding." Foster Report No.
122, Aug. 9, 1979, at 5 (on file at Cornell Law Review).
8 See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 7172(b)-(c), 7173, 7174, (Supp. I 1977). See also text ac-
companying notes 142-48 infra.
9 Byse, supra note 38, at 198-203.
o See notes 35-40 and accompanying text supra.
S ,ee note 93 infra.
The deregulation battle lines began to form prior to the submission of the bill that
eventually became the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat 3350
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (Supp. 11 1978)). Congress' fears over deregulation were
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gress feared that James Schlesinger would become the new Sec-
retary and that given secretarial authority over natural gas pric-
ing, he might attempt to effect substantial or total decontrol. 92 To
guard against a decontrol-oriented policy of any new Secretary, as
well as to prevent too great a concentration of power within the
executive, many of these members favored structural proposals
that would provide significant administrative checks and balances
within the department, particularly on pricing decisions made by
the Secretary. 93
made explicit when debate over that bill began. See Natural Gas Pricing Proposals of President
Carter's Energy Program: Hearings on S. 256 and S. 1469 (Part D) Before the Senate Comm. on
Energy and Natural Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 42-45 (1977). Congress stalled the bill for
over a year and passed it in such a compromised form that the effectiveness of the Act has
been extensively criticized since the day it went into effect. One commentator has described
it as "an intricate labyrinth of regulatory provisions" that "may well be the most complex
regulatory statute ever enacted in the United States." Pierce, Natural Gas Policy Act of
1978--Change, Complexity, and a Major New Role for the KCC, 47 J. KAN. B.A. 259, 274
(1978). This complexity resulted from Congress' inability to decide the decontrol issue. Id.
at 260-61.
9' See Nomination of Dr. James R. Schlesinger to be the Nation's First Secretary of Energy:
Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 9,
12-13, 63, 73-74 (1977).
Many observers recognized that one reason Congress created FERC was to prevent the
Energy Secretary from effecting substantial decontrol. In urging Congress to give the
power to determine natural gas prices to the Secretary rather than FERC, one editorial
writer stated:
The fear of the legislators, of course, is not the the President [and the Sec-
retary] would peg prices too low but that [they] would raise them higher than
the voters might enjoy. Exactly the President's intent although he himself was
less than forthright about it when he first proposed this innocent sounding
"reorganization" measure to consolidate all Government agencies dealing with
energy.
N.Y. Times, June 7, 1977, at 34, col. 1-2. This reason for the amendment was at least
implicitly acknowledged during the House debate over the amendment:
Mr. SYMMS: ...
Then is the gentleman telling us that the Secretary of Energy of the De-
partment of Energy will deregulate the price of natural gas because if the Con-
gress will not do that, all of this argument is superficial anyway?
Mr. LEvrrAs: I cannot speak for what the new Secretary will do. He certainly
cannot do any worse than what has happened so far.
I have heard the President's energy message, and it sounds a lot more like
a movement in the direction of deregulation to stimulate production than do
the actions taken by the Federal Power Commission ....
123 CONG. REC. H5,314 (daily ed. June 2, 1977). Cf note 93 infra (because of these fears
compromise plan checked Secretary's power to set price regulations).
93 Senator Percy stated:
Authority for setting oil and gas prices was, perhaps, the most controversial
issue which was resolved in conference. Many were worried by the administra-
tion proposal to place all pricing authority in the hands of the Secretary of
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1. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
The foremost structural check on executive power was (and
still is) the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), an in-
Energy. At the same time it was necessary that pricing issues be resolved ex-
peditiously and with some input from the Secretary so that pricing policy is
consistent with other energy policies.
This legislation accomplishes both ends. It establishes an independent
5-member Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to oversee all pricing deci-
sions. It also allows the Secretary of Energy, a political appointee, to initiate
pricing actions and to participate in Commission proceedings where appro-
priate.
123 CONG. REc. S13,282 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1977). Senator Javits remarked that:
Mr. President, the key point is not where the central power lies; the key
point is how well will the public be served. The conferees have placed great
authority in a five-member politically balanced and independent commission,
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. When decisions regarding the fair
and reasonable price to be charged consumers is in issue, these decisions will be
made without regard to political pressures. These decisions will be made as a
result of public hearings with all parties represented.
This balance is essential to ensure that the functions of the Department,
other than its regulatory functions, will not interfere with the quasi-judicial,
regulatory function. We have, in that respect, I believe, tread successfully the.
fine line between the interests of producers and the needs of consumers.
Id. S13,286. Representative Eckhardt declared:
Mr. Chairman, I feel that those who have said it makes no difference
whether the authority to regulate price be within the executive department or
be protected by a collegial body simply do not understand the basis of this
process. We have delegated, and probably necessarily so, the greatest amount of
power in this area of energy that this Congress has ever delegated. If we dele-
gate that power directly to the Secretary of a department of the executive
branch, we are confounding the situation. We are creating a situation in which
the delegation of authority from Congress to engage in policymaking is to the
head of a department of the executive branch. I think that would be a grave
mistake.
The gentleman from Ohio (Mr. BROWN) has pointed out the enormous
authority, almost unlimited with respect to procedure, that has been granted to
the FEA. Add to that the authority of the Federal Power Commission and leave
all this to an executive department's unbridled authority and Congress will have
indeed abdicated from its constitutionally defined position as prime
policymaker in our divided system of government. We all know that we have
some greater opportunity to oversee and influence a regulatory agency, from
both sides of this aisle, than to oversee and influence a part of the executive
family. We know that the regulatory agencies have to be more nonpartisan,
because they have to answer to Congress more directly than do those receiving
a part of the executive budget-that of a department. These departments in
the executive family can transfer funds from one area to another. Why should
we delegate so much authority here today?
Id. H5,316 (daily ed. June 2, 1977).
But these fears were, to some extent, misguided. As Representative Brooks succinctly
observed in urging passage of the energy bill: "[T]he Secretary will not have any powers
that have not been created by Congress. What Congress gives, it can take away." Id.
H5,270.
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dependent commission which replaced the old Federal Power
Commission. Like its predecessor, FERC consists of five members
appointed for staggered terms of four years. 94  They are ap-
pointed by the President with advice and consent of the Senate,
and can effectively be removed only for cause. 95 The new Com-
mission is thus independent of direct Presidential or Secretarial
control. It retains virtually all of the old FPC's powers under the
Natural Gas Act including its ratemaking, certificate and licensing
authority 96 and now has jurisdiction over oil pipelines as well. 97
In exercising its powers, FERC clearly is in the Department of
Energy but not of it. FERC decisions are not subject to review
within the Department. They constitute final agency action and
can be reviewed only by the courts.98 This is not, however, the
case for many oil pricing decisions made by the executive wing of
the Department.
2. Executive Regulatory Functions
The Secretary and executive agencies under his supervision
exercise broad authority with regard to gathering and collecting
information,99 research and development, 100 conservation,' 0 ' self-
94 42 U.S.C. § 7171(b) (Supp.I 1977).
95 Id. It is important to note that the members of FERC are not "statutorily protected
against summary removal from office; but the 'political inadvisability of such a traumatic
step' helps protect them against dismissal, none the less." W. GELLHORN, C. BYSE & P.
STRAUSS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 131 (7th ed. 1979). The authors go on to speculate that:
"The reason that ... FERC ... members have no explicit statutory protection against re-
moval is, doubtless, that those agencies were created after the Myers case and before the
Humphrey case, at a time when legislative draftsmen believed the President's power to be
illimitable." Id. at 131 n.7.
96 42 U.S.C. § 7172(a)-(b) (Supp. 1 1977), as amended by Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (Supp. 11 1978)).
97 42 U.S.C. § 7172(b) (Supp. 1 1977). The Conference Report makes clear that FERC's
jurisdiction over oil pipelines is extremely broad. See H.R. REP. No. 539, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 75-76, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 925, 946-47.
9' See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7172(g), 7192 (Supp. 1 1977).
99 Id. § 7135(a) (gathering and collecting information which is relevant to energy re-
source reserves, production, demand, technology, and related information relevant to
adequacy of energy resources to meet demands).
100 Id. § 7139 (energy research and development).
101 Id. § 7112(2) (delaring Congress's purpose that DOE coordinate energy conservation
throughout the federal government); id. § 7132(b) (providing for an Under Secretary who
"shall bear primary responsibility for energy conservation" as well as whatever other duties
the Secretary delegates); id. § 7133(a)(9) (listing various conservation functions as among the
duties of Assistant Secretaries); id. § 7266 (requiring various other departments and agen-
cies to designate their own "principal conservation officer[s]").
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inspection, 10 2 and certain energy-regulatory duties.' 0 3  Of particu-
lar interest are the executive regulatory functions. The DOE Act
transferred to the Secretary the authority to regulate the price
and allocation of domestic crude oil.104 The Secretary, in turn,
has delegated this power to FEA's successor, the Economic Reg-
ulatory Administration (ERA).' 0 5  Thus, ERA has the power to
set the price of first sales of domestic crude oil, the price of re-
sidual fuel oil, and the price of refined petroleum products such
as propane, butane, and naptha. 0 6  It also has the authority pre-
viously exercised by FEA to allocate coal among those plants pro-
hibited from consuming oil or gas.' 0 7  In addition, the Secretary
controls the regulation of imports and exports of natural gas and
electricity. 08
3. FERC as a Check on Executive Power
By arming the Secretary with the significant powers outlined
above, as well as other functions,'a 9 Congress granted formidable
102 Id. § 7138 (self-inspection to detect fraud or abuse in programs and operations).
103 Id. § 7136 (establishing the Economic Regulatory Administration as the Secretary's
primary vehicle for regulatory action).
114 Id. § 7151(a). These powers previously had been exercised by FEA under the
Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, 15 U.S.C. §§ 751-760(h) (1976). See id. § 757
(granting authority to President to regulate price and allocation of domestic crude oil); id.
§ 754(b) (granting authority to President to delegate his authority under this Act); id.
§ 764(a) (functions of FEA include those delegated to it by President); Exec. Order No.
11,748, 38 Fed. Reg. 33,575 (1973) (delegating to FEO all authority vesting in President by
EPAA and § 203(a)(3) of Economic Stabilization Act of 1970); Exec. Order No. 11,790, 39
Fed. Reg. 23,185 (1974) (transferring to FEA functions previously exercised by FEO).
102 DOE Delegation Order No. 0204-24, 42 Fed. Reg. 60,726 (1977).
106 ERA derives its authority by delegation of powers that originate in the old substan-
tive provisions of 15 U.S.C. §§ 757, 753 (1976).
107 Id. § 792(d).
108 The DOE Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7151(b), 7172(f) (Supp. 1 1977), transferred from the old
FPC to the Secretary the authority to regulate imports and exports of natural gas under
section 3 of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717b (1976). See also note 87 supra. Similarly,
the Secretary assumes FPC's authority over the importation and exportation of electrical
power under Exec. Order No. 10,485, 18 Fed. Reg. 5,397 (1953).
109 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7152(a) (Supp. 1 1977). That section transfers to the Secretary
the power to regulate and control certain power-marketing and power-transmission func-
tions which previously were scattered among several authorities, including the Southeastern
Power Administration, the Southwestern Power Administration, the Aaska Power Ad-
ministration, and the Bonneville Power Administration. The Secretary also took over from
the Department of Interior a number of functions concerning the leasing of federal lands.
Id. § 7152(b). Such functions included: (1) developing and regulating bidding systems for
the award of federal leases; (2) the establishment of diligence requirements for operations
on federal leaseholds; (3) the specification of lease terms and procedures; and (4) the set-
ting of production rates for leaseholds. Id. The Act also transferred to the Secretary from
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authority to a centralized executive department. But the powers
simultaneously accorded FERC substantially offset this executive
power. Indeed, FERC's capability to check the exercise of
executive power is particularly evident in the Commission's au-
thority to review many executive decisions.
a. FERC Review of Executive Rulemaking-The Commission Veto.
The DOE Act delegates a legislative veto power to FERC. t10
The Secretary may not take certain energy action"' or adopt
"rules, regulations, and statements of policy" which "may signifi-
cantly affect any function within the jurisdiction of the Commis-
sion" 112 unless the Commission agrees with this action or the Sec-
retary adopts the changes specified by the Commission. 1 3  Where
the Commission recommends nonadoption, the Secretary may not
act at all. The Commission's veto authority is absolute, for both
the entire proposed rule and any portion of it." 4  Thus, in re-
viewing certain secretarial rules FERC can effectively thwart cer-
tain policy actions proposed by the Secretary.
b. Commission Review of Executive Adjudication. In addition to
its veto power, the Commission exercises judicial powers over sec-
the Department of Housing and Urban Development the authority to develop and prom-
ulgate energy standards for new buildings, pursuant to § 304 of the Energy Conservation
Standards for New Buildings Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6833, 7154 (Supp. I 1977). In
addition, the Act transferred to the Secretary from the Secretary of the Navy jurisdiction
over various naval petroleum reserves and oil shale reserves. Id. § 7156.
There are, however, certain key omissions from the Secretary's authority. In addition
to those powers exercised by FERC, the Secretary apparently lacks authority over coal-
slurry pipelines and the rail transportation of coal. See 123 CONG. REc. H8,256 (Aug. 2,
1977) (remarks of Rep. Horton, a Conference Committee member).
110 42 U.S.C. § 7174 (Supp. I 1977). Congress has retained a veto power over certain
energy actions as well. Under the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 751-760h (1976), as amended by the Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. §
6421 (1976), any major oil pricing or allocation decision by the then-FEA was subject to a
15-day congressional veto procedure. The DOE Act retains this congressional veto power,
but provides an opportunity for a Commission veto before the congressional veto. 42
U.S.C. § 7172(c)(1) (Supp. I 1977).
"1 42 U.S.C. § 7172(c)(1) (Supp. I 1977). Energy actions are any actions taken by the
Secretary under 15 U.S.C. §§ 757, 760 (1976). They include, for example, any rules seek-
ing to exempt petroleum products from regulation as well as any amendment to adjust the
composite price of crude oil in excess of 10% per annum. The Secretary must refer such
matters to the Commission. 42 U.S.C. § 7174(a) (Supp. 1 1977); H.R. REP. No. 539, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 77, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 925, 948.
112 42 U.S.C. § 7174(a) (Supp. 1 1977).
',3 Id. § 7174(c). See also H.R. REP. No. 539, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 80, reprinted in [1977]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 925, 951. FERC's action, however, is not final agency action,
and there can be no judicial review until the Secretary acts upon FERC's recommendations.
42 U.S.C. § 7174(c) (Supp. 1 1977).
114 42 U.S.C. § 7174(c) (Supp. 1 1977).
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retarial action. It may review the Secretary's issuance of remedial
orders directed at alleged violators of any rule, regulation, or
order promulgated under the Emergency Petroleum Allocation
Act of 1973.115 Moreover, the Commission has the authority to
review all denials of petitions for various adjustments from rules
or regulations issued pursuant to the DOE Act.' 16  With regard
to certain oil pricing decisions made by the Secretary, FERC is, in
effect, an in-house court.
The DOE Act was not sufficiently clear when it came to de-
fining the relationship between the Secretary and the Commission
in general 1 1 7 and the scope of the Commission's adjudicatory role
115 Id. § 7193(c).
116 Id. § 7194(b).
"' Though the primary result of the Act's progress from Carter bill to congressional
enactment is the division of power between two competing entities, the Secretary and the
FERC, Congress left their precise relationship unresolved. Debate over the Moss amend-
ment to the bill included at least one recognition that, regardless of the statutory allocation
of authority, an inevitable tension would exist between these two entities:
Mr. EVANS of Colorado. ... It seems to me that we might have a two-
headed horse, in a way. We might have a President and a Secretary of Energy
who want to take a certain direction in regard to energy, and we might have an
independent commission that thinks that the President and Secretary are wrong
and feel that we ought to go another way. What would be the situation if this
amendment passes?
Mr. DINGELL. I think we have a horse with two heads or two tails-the
gentleman can take his pick-where under the bill as drawn, or under the
amendment as offered by the gentleman in California, in either event we have
a Secretary and we have a Commission. What we are doing is defining which
end of the horse is going to go which way under which particular set of cir-
cumstances at which time. Also, we lay out a set of circumstances where it will
function more in the daylight and less in the dark, where there will be more
public input and more public appreciation of what is going on, and less action
by that two-headed horse, or two-tailed horse, in the dark. That is the basic
difference.
Mr. EVANS of Colorado. The problem to which the gentleman alludes is
inherent within the bill?
Mr. DINGELL. Regardless of whether the Moss amendment is present or
absent.
123 CONG. REC. H5,313 (daily ed. June 2, 1977).
Members of both houses expressed the view that since DOE would be a new agency,
Congress should take a wait-and-see attitude regarding its ultimate structure and size:
This has been a hard assignment; it will continue to be. I think all of us
agree that it is not the final word in a Department of Energy. The Senator
from Connecticut, the distinguished chairman, observed from time to time that
there had to be trial and error in this kind of operation. After this department
has functioned awhile and has gone through a shake-down period, we will be in
a better position to determine whether any changes are necessary and will be
able to deal with those issues at an appropriate time.
Id. S7,916-17 (daily ed. May 18, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Jackson).
I also feel that this agency needs to have the opportunity to find out how
best to perform its functions. It might be that after operating for a while, it can
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in particular. From the face of section 503 of the statute, the
Commission arguably could have the power of de novo review of
executive adjudications.11 The Commission has chosen, instead,
to play more of an appellate role. The preference for the appel-
late role is prompted largely by the executive agency's develop-
ment of elaborate procedures for issuing remedial orders in the
executive wing of the agency.
II
ADMINISTERING AND ENFORCING OIL PRICE CONTROLS-A
TEMPORARY EMERGENCY BECOMES A WAY OF LIFE
The overlay of FERC review with executive remedial order
procedures has resulted in a gaggle of administrative procedures.
reduce the number of employees. However, it does have a tremendous respon-
sibility. I believe the Congress has a hold on the number of employees, through
the authorizing and appropriating committees when this agency has to come
before us for its budget authorizations .... That would be the manner in which
we should attack this.
Id. H5,387 (daily ed. June 3, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Horton concerning proposed, but
later defeated, amendment to place a statutory limit on the number of DOE employees).
The political climate which gave rise to the DOE Act did not encourage careful, delib-
erate consideration of details or implications. For example, Senator Durkin offered some
rather acerbic comments that illustrate the atmosphere during final debate over the Ad-
ministration Bill:
This may be the finest bill this body has ever passed, or it may be the worst, but
I estimate that 75 percent of the membership does not know whether it is the
best or the worst.
This thing is slid through. I am afraid that many constituents across the
country, when they see the impact of this bill on energy prices and the impact
on the appeal procedure, will want to know who voted for this thing, will want
to know who supported it.
However, as the Senator from Idaho said, I can read the tea leaves; I can
read the handwriting on the wall. This bill is going to be passed ...
... I am not going to keep people here any longer tonight. I am going to
vote "no" on this bill because I think it has been taken up and moved too fast,
and I submit that there are many Members in the Chamber who do not know
what this bill does.
Id. S7,958 (daily ed. May 18, 1977). Durkin later voted against the Conference Report. See
id. S13,291 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1977).
118 Section 503(c) of the DOE Act provides:
If within thirty days after the receipt of the remedial order issued by the
Secretary, the person notifies the Secretary that he intends to contest a reme-
dial order issued under subsection (a) of this section, the Secretary shall im-
mediately advise the Commission of such notification. Upon such notice, the
Commission shall stay the effect of the remedial order, unless the Commission
finds the public interest requires immediate compliance with such remedial or-
der. The Commission shall, upon request, afford an opportunity for a hearing,
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Congress authorized FERC review largely in response to the in-
adequate procedures employed by the executive agencies origi-
nally charged with enforcing the Emergency Petroleum Allocation
Act. 1 9 But the executive procedures that recently have evolved
may now render FERC review superfluous. To understand why
Congress conferred this authority on FERC in the first place, as
well as to evaluate the wisdom and efficacy of continuing FERC
review, the history of the oil enforcement process must first be
examined. 2 °
A. Acting in an Emergency-The Initial Lawmaking Stage
Hasty lawmaking often breeds future difficulties. The initial
federal response to the OPEC embargo of 1973 was rushed and
confused both at the legislative stages and the administrative
stages of the program.
1. Legislation in a Crisis
Congress passed the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act
(EPAA) during a time of perceived crisis.' 2 ' Like many
including, at a minimum, the submission of briefs, oral or documentary evi-
dence, and oral arguments. To the extent that the Commission in its discretion
determines that such is required for a full and true disclosure of the facts, the
Commission shall afford the right of cross examination. The Commission shall
thereafter issue an order, based on findings of fact, affirming, modifying, or
vacating the Secretary's remedial order, or directing other appropriate relief,
and such order shall, for the purpose of judicial review, constitute a final
agency action, except that enforcement and other judicial review of such action
shall be the responsibility of the Secretary.
42 U.S.C. § 7193(c) (Supp. 1 1977). This section can be read to require de novo review by
FERC. See note 192 infra.
Section 503, however, provides for secretarial issuance procedures. This section has
been read to authorize substantial procedural requirements in the executive wing of the
agency. See note 192 infra.
119 See notes 156-70 and accompanying text infra.
120 Though the focus of this Article is on the enforcement process within DOE, much of
the analysis dealing with unnecessary duplication of administrative procedures is applicable
to the adjustment process carried out by the Department under its authority in § 504 of
the DOE Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7194 (Supp. I 1977). Pursuant to this provision, FERC has
authority to review denials of requests for adjustments by the executive. Like § 503 of the
Act it mandates certain minimum procedures the commission must provide. This process is
considered in detail in a preliminary report submitted to the Administrative Conference.
A. Aman, The Concept and Process of Administrative Equity: A Preliminary Report to the
United States Administrative Conference (Apr. 30, 1979) (on file at Cornell Law Review).
121 See Federal Energy Administration's Enforcement of Petroleum Price Regulations: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1975) [hereinafter cited as FEA Hearings] (testimony of Frank G. Zarb).
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"emergency" measures, including various energy bills enacted to
date,122 a sense of an acute need, sugarcoated by an expectation
that the emergency was temporary, spurred the passage of the
EPAA; the shock to our system caused by OPEC's actions was
serious but its effects were not expected to linger. Under these
circumstances, the strong medicine Congress prescribed-a broad
grant of substantive power to the executive branch to control- the
price and allocation of domestic crude oil coupled with expedited
procedures to implement and enforce this program-was readily
acceptable.
In passing the EPAA, Congress borrowed heavily from the
wage and price control legislation that immediately preceded its
action, the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970.123 The EPAA simply
incorporated by reference the procedures for administrative de-
cisionmaking and judicial review promulgated in the 1970 Act
and employed by the Cost of Living Council. Like the Stabilization
Act, the EPAA specifically exempted its administrators from many
of the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, particu-
larly those governing adjudicatory hearings. 124  Similarly, the
EPAA incorporated the two-tier judicial review approach used
under the Economic Stabilization Act: final enforcement orders
are appealable first to a federal district court and then to a
specialized appellate court, the Temporary Emergency Court of
Appeals. 125
See also PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 18, at 5-14; notes 21-24 and accom-
panying text supra. See also 2 SPORKIN REPORT, supra note 9, at i.
122 See, e.g., Emergency Natural Gas Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-2, 91 Stat. 4 (codified
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717u (Supp. 1 1977). For pending legislation, see S. 1308, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1979); H.R. 4985, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1979) (presently pending Energy Mobili-
zation Board legislation).
123 Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-379, 84 Stat. 799, as amended by
Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-210, 85 Stat. 743, as
amended by Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-28, 87 Stat.
27, reprinted at 12 U.S.C. § 1904 note (1976).
124 Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-210, § 207(a), 85
Stat. 747. As one commentator has noted: "Having concluded that the requirements of the
Administrative Procedure Act would result in 'too cumbersome and dilatory a procedure,'
Congress exempted, in the 1971 amendments, the control agencies from most of the Act's
provisions." Comment, Administration and Judicial Review of Economic Controls. 39 U. Cm. L.
REV. 566, 579-80 (1972) (footnotes omitted). For a discussion of these procedures and their
relationship to the APA, see Note, Phase V: The Cost of Living Council Reconsidered, 62 GEO.
L.J. 1663, 1679-90 (1974).
125 The EPAA, 15 U.S.C. § 754 (a)(1) (1976), incorporated by reference §§ 205-207,
209-211 of the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-379, 84 Stat. 799, as
amended by Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-210, 85 Stat.
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2. Regulations in a Crisis
The urgency of the crisis, which had hurried Congress'
enactment of the EPAA, undoubtedly would have accelerated the
administrative action pursuant to this Act. But the administrators
involved were subject to a congressional edict to act with dispatch.
The EPAA required that regulations providing for the mandatory
allocation at "equitable prices" of crude oil, residual fuel and vari-
ous refined petroleum products 126 be issued within fifteen days of
the Act's passage.'2 Shortly after President Nixon signed the Act
743, as amended by Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-28, 87
Stat. 27, reprinted at 12 U.S.C. § 1904 note (1976). Section 211 (d)(l) of the amended Act
sets forth the appropriate standard for judicial review of agency action:
[N]o regulation of any agency exercising authority under this title shall be en-
joined or set aside, in whole or in part, unless a final judgment determines that
the issuance of such regulation was in excess of the agency's authority, was
arbitrary or capricious, or was otherwise unlawful under the criteria set forth in
section 706(2) of title 5, United States Code, and no order of such agency shall
be enjoined or set aside, in whole or in part, unless a final judgment deter-
mines that such order is in excess of the agency's authority, or is based upon
findings which are not supported by substantial evidence.
Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-210, § 211(d)(1), 85 Stat.
749.
Agency actions are reviewable in two stages. Section 21 l(a) of the Economic Stabiliza-
tion Act, as amended, granted exclusive original jurisdiction over controversies arising
under the title in the federal district courts. Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of
1971, Pub. L. No. 92-210, § 211(a), 85 Stat. 748, reprinted at 12 U.S.C. § 1904 note (1976).
Section 211 (b)(2) of the Act's amendments further created a special appellate court to re-
view district court decisions under the EPAA-the Temporary Emergency Court of
Appeals-and provided that "Except as otherwise provided in this section, the Temporary
Emergency Court of Appeals shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all appeals from the dis-
trict courts of the United States in cases and controversies arising under this title or under
regulations or orders issued thereunder." Id. § 211(b)(2), 85 Stat. 749, reprinted at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1904 note (1976).
Both the district courts and the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals historically
took a most deferential approach in reviewing FEA decisions. See Elkins, The Temporary
Emergency Court of Appeals: A Study in the Abdication of Judicial Responsibility, 1978 DUKE L.J.
113, 128-29. Moreover, even district court review of an FEA remedial order is appellate in
nature. The provisions of the Economic Stabilization Act incorporated by reference did not
authorize a district court reviewing FEA decisions to grant a de novo hearing as a matter
of right. Rather the statute authorized application of a substantial evidence test (Economic
Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-210, § 211(e)(1)(B), 85 Stat. 749) to
a record that may have been incomplete and was compiled by a factfinder who may not
have been completely independent (see text accompanying notes 156 & 162 infra). In short,
although judicial review was provided, the complainant may not have received a full or fair
evidentiary hearing.
126 15 U.S.C. § 753(a),(b)(1)(F) (1976). See also Mandatory Petroleum Allocation Regula-
tions, 39 Fed. Reg. 1,924, 1,932-49 (1974).
127 15 U.S.C. § 753(a) (1976).
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into law, he established the Federal Energy Office (FEO).' 28
Within one week of FEO's creation, it issued the mandatory regu-
lations required by the Act.'1 9
Administrators of any complicated regulatory program often
are denied the luxury of time to think through all of the conse-
quences of the drastic actions required in a crisis. The energy
program was an acute case: the time constraints were unusually
tight, and technical expertise in and an understanding of regula-
tion as it affected a diverse and enormously complex petroleum
industry was, to a large extent, lacking. 130  Given such handicaps,
it is hardly surprising that FEO officials followed Congress' exam-
ple and relied heavily on the work of others-specifically the reg-
ulations previously drafted and used by the Cost of Living Coun-
cil (CLC) 131 in administration of its Phase IV price controls under
the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970.132 The CLC regulations
had been designed to apply to a variety of industries. 33  But the
12' Exec. Order No. 11,748, 3 C.F.R. 822 (1973), revoked by Exec. Order No. 11,790, 3
C.F.R. 882 (1974).
129 Mandatory Petroleum Allocation Regulations, 39 Fed. Reg. 1,924, 1,932-49 (1974).
For a general history of the implementation of this Act and the beginnings of FEO, see M.
WILLRICH, ADMINISTRATION OF ENERGY SHORTAGES 139-40 (1976); PRESIDENTIAL
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 18, at 9-11; see also SPORKIN REPORT, supra note 9, app., at
A1-A24.
120 See, e.g., FEA Hearings, supra note 121 (testimony of Frank Zarb). According to Mr.
Zarb: "FEA confronted an entirely new problem with which none of us had any direct
experience. Most of the people involved had little direct knowledge of the energy indus-
try's complexity. We were in a true emergency situation which put a premium on decisive
action." Id. at 7. See also Crude Oil Pricing Compliance Problems: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Energy and Power of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 99 (1977) (testimony of David G. Wilson, former Deputy General Counsel of FEA).
Paul Bloom, presently Special Counsel of DOE in charge of enforcement actions
against major oil companies, recently observed with respect to the regulations issued to
carry out the oil pricing programs that:
This scheme of regulations was developed literally during emergency con-
ditions, and while it was constructed in good faith, the framers of this regula-
tory program were unable to enjoy optimal conditions where they could objec-
tively and cautiously construct a complex regulatory package of importance and
significance to the United States .... In addition, this rather extraordinary and
complex program had to be administered by an agency set up as a temporary
emergency agency, which therefore had difficulty in obtaining a permanent,
highly qualified staff.
Bloom, Enforcement Procedures for Price Regulation Audits and Overcharges, 13 TuLSA L.J. 715,
716-17 (1978) (footnote omitted).
131 See M. WILLRICH, supra note 129, at 181.
132 Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-379, 84 Stat. 799, as amended by
Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-210, 85 Stat. 743, as
amended by Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-28, 87 Stat.
27, reprinted at 12 U.S.C. § 1904 note (1976).
132 See generally SPORKIN REPORT, supra note 9, app., at A-1.
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FEO adopted and applied them to the petroleum industry, ini-
tially without much in the way of adaptation or modification. 34
B. Administering the Emergency Program
Many of the problems plaguing the oil enforcement program
today are traceable to this emergency incorporation-by-reference
approach to legislation and regulation. Congress and the adminis-
trators involved drew upon imperfect statutes and rules in shap-
ing the EPAA program that arguably were problematic even when
applied to the task for which they were specifically designed-
Phase IV of the wage and price control program administered by
the Cost of Living Council. 135  Moreover, there was no reason to
suspect that this scheme was adequate to handle the different task
of regulating the petroleum industry. As a result, the initial sub-
stantive regulations issued often were vague and imprecise,1 36 and
the procedures by which they were to be enforced were exceed-
134 M. WILLRICH, supra note 129, at 181. Robert Montgomery, then General Counsel of
FEA, noted that the regulation writers operated in a crisis atmosphere.
"It is important to recognize, during this time period, the embargo was in full swing,
and the actions that FEA were taking with regard to its initial regulations were by and
large feverish attempts on our part to reconcile the initial regulatory program, not-
withstanding everyone's efforts. Thus, our actions were not at all perfect or absolutely
consistent with the real world, to the changing situation and to the problems that were
developing in certain geographic locations in certain parts of the industry, which in our
view required immediate and the most expeditious possible actions." Congressional Oversight
of Administrative Agencies (Federal Energy Administration): Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sep-
aration of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1975).
' See Note, supra note 124, at 1669-77.
136 The result of this process was a set of regulations possessing the immediately dis-
cernible characteristic of incomprehensibility. See PRESIDENTIAL TAsK FORCE REPORT, supra
note 18, at 6; Trowbridge, Enforcement of Criminal Sanctions for Violation of Federal Controls on
the Price of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products, 17 Am. Cuim. L. J. 201, 215 (1979).
Though there were attempts to clarify these regulations they often confused matters
even more. Major changes were constantly being introduced into the regulations. See
Longview Ref. Co. v. Shore, 554 F.2d 1006, 1016 n.26 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1977). The
result was an enormously complex set of regulations that required a team of lawyers and
accountants to understand. See FEA Hearings, supra note 121, at 13 (testimony of Gorman
C. Smith, Assistant Administrator for Regulatory Programs). Mr. Smith noted that some of
the major refiners had lawyers "who [spent] their time analyzing every line and phrase in
our regulations," and accountants "who [had] access to the numbers and ... computerized
capabilities," but the refiners still could not ensure compliance because of the difficulty in
interpreting the regulations. Id.
Much of the recent and past litigation surrounding the enforcement process stems
from these unclear regulations. Some courts have suggested that new interpretations of
these regulations constitute retroactive rules and cannot be applied to past transactions. See,
e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. DOE, 596 F.2d 1029, 1062-63, 1065 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.
1978).
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ingly informal. The fairness of the procedures first used to en-
force EPAA regulations was questionable, even for a short-lived
emergency program. This question of fairness became even more
pronounced as the emergency program gradually became a more
permanent part of our regulatory landscape.
1 37
1. The Federal Energy Office-The Beginning Stage of
the Energy Program
The EPAA offered little procedural guidance to the Federal
Energy Office (FEO), the first agency charged with the responsi-
bility of enforcing this act. FEO relied heavily on procedures used
by the Cost of Living Council,1 38 and adopted exceedingly infor-
mal, and at times abusive, procedures. In OKC Corp. v. Oskey
Gasoline & Oil Co., a39 for example, the district court noted a
number of irregularities in FEO's enforcement procedures, in-
cluding:
presence of an ill disclosed tape recorder; refusal of FEO to
swear witnesses; and the unwillingness for FEO to have the
proceedings reported by a court reporter. The most serious ir-
regularity in this Court's view is an apparently unsolicited
"friendly" ex parte communication from one of the parties to
the hearing officer after the hearing. This is a most serious re-
sult from FEO's attempt to be informal.140
Despite finding irregularities that were unwise, deficient, and a
disservice to everyone involved,14 1 the court felt "constrained to
find that FEO was acting within its lawful authority," and upheld
FEO's decision in this case. 142  This case is typical of the hands-
off approach applied by courts. The usual rationale was that the
temporary emergency nature of the energy program necessitated
deference to the agency. 143  In short, the courts did little to cor-
137 Oil regulation began in 1970 with the Economic Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 91-
379. 84 Stat. 79, reprinted at 12 U.S.C. § 1904 note (1976). As the authority to issue and
enforce orders and regulations under that Act was about to expire in 1974, price regula-
tion on the oil industry was retained with passage of the Emergency Petroleum Allocation
Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-159, § 4 (g)(1), 87 Stat. 627. Regulation under this Act should
have ended in 1975, but was extended. Enforcement proceedings are expected to carry on
past the new termination date in 1981. See notes 1-9 and accompanying text supra.
138 See SPORKIN REPORT, supra note 9, app., at A-10.
139 381 F. Supp.'865 (N.D. Tex. 1974).
140 Id. at 869 n.15.
141 Id. at 869.
142 Id.
143 Elkins, supra note 125, at 129 & n.73 (discussing the Temporary Emergency Court of
Appeals). See Atlantic Richfield Co. v. FEA, 556 F.2d 542, 548 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.
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rect the legislature's lack of procedural guidance to FEO. The
emergency powers of the agency were largely unfettered. 44
2. The Federal Energy Administration -The Middle Years
Five months after President Nixon established FEO, Congress
passed the Federal Energy Administration Act of 1974 145 thereby
abolishing FEO and replacing it with the Federal Energy Ad-
ministration (FEA). This agency was created primarily to ensure
the existence of a more elaborate and centralized administrative
framework than FEO, outside the office of the President.1 46
Like its predecessor, FEA continued an informal adjudicatory
approach in its enforcement proceedings. 47  FEA regulations au-
1977); Mandel v. Simon, 493 F.2d 1239, 1240 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1974) ("The [al-
location] plan must necessarily be considered in light of the fact that the governing statute
demanded immediate and extensive regulation of a new and complex area; the program is
only in its first month of operation."). The Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals has
stated that:
Where the obvious intent of Congress is to give the President and his dele-
gates broad power to do what reasonably is necessary to accomplish legitimate
purposes rendered necessary by a recognized emergency, and regulations are
fashioned to implement the Congressional mandate, the court should not inter-
fere with the prerogative of the agency to select the remedy which for rational
reasons is deemed most appropriate.
Condor Operating Co. v. Sawhill, 514 F.2d 351, 359 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 976 (1975). Even earlier the court had declared that:
In light of the emergency nature of the authority delegated to the FEO and the
difficulty of its duty to establish complex but fair procedures within a short
time, a requirement that it submit any and every amendment to the Attorney
General and the FTC would be counterproductive. We do not believe that the
Act itself or the legislative history thereof establish such a requirement.
Reeves v. Simon, 507 F.2d 455, 459-60 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
991 (1975).
144 See, e.g., Mode, Federal Petroleum Regulation in the Courts, 29 INST. OIL & GAS L. &
TAx 39 (1978).
I'l Pub. L. No. 93-275, 88 Stat. 96 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 761-790h (1976)).
146 [W]hen H.R. 11793 [the FEA Act] is enacted into law and the Federal Energy
Administration is established, it will supersede and replace the Federal Energy
Office, established by Executive Order 11748 ....
H.R. 11793 ... retains and enlarges upon the combination of policy and ad-
ministrative responsibilities assigned to the [FEO] Administrator under Execu-
tive Order 11748. Because administrative responsibilities are pre-eminent in an
emergency, it is appropriate to remove the office from the Executive Office of
the President and constitute it an independent agency.
H.R. REP. No. 748, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 13, 15 (1973), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 2939, 2951-52.
247 The continued perception of the emergency nature of the substantive regulatory
program generated a feeling that flexibility and speed were needed. The continued
exemption from the adjudicatory provisions of the APA allowed for procedural ex-
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thorized its office of enforcement to issue a remedial order
whenever "any report required by the FEA or any audit or inves-
tigation discloses, or the FEA otherwise discovers, that there is
reason to believe a violation of any provision of this chapter, or
any order issued thereunder, has occurred, is continuing or is
about to occur." 148  Under such circumstances, FEA could begin
an enforcement proceeding "by serving a notice of probable viola-
tion or by issuing a remedial order for immediate compliance." 149
Informal conferences could be requested and were routinely
granted.1 50 The recipient of the notice bore the burden of prov-
ing any inaccuracies in the notice of probable violation. If the re-
cipient failed to convince the prosecutors that the allegations were
incorrect, FEA could issue a remedial order. 5' The order con-
sisted of "a written opinion setting forth the relevant facts and the
legal basis of the remedial order." 152 It was effective upon is-
perimentation. See generally M. WILLRICH, supra note 129, at 184 (FEA exempt from APA
adjudicatory hearing requirements). See also notes 123-38 and accompanying text supra. But
see 15 U.S.C. § 766(c),(i) (1976) (continued requirement of elaborate rulemaking proce-
dures). These factors militated in the direction of informal adjudicatory procedures even in
enforcement cases.
In addition, the FEA initially had a short life expectancy. See H.R. REP. No. 748, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2939, 2940. Frank
Zarb, an early FEA administrator, pointed out that the short life span of FEA "made it
difficult for me and my predecessors to plan and execute an adequate staffing program. It
has been hard to plan future requirements and attract fully qualified and dedicated people
to an agency that offered very limited job security." 2 SPORKIN REPORT, supra note 9, at ii.
See generally Standard Oil Co. v. FEA, 453 F. Supp. 203, 206 (N.D. Ohio), affd, 596 F.2d
1029 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1978); Bloom, supra note 130, at 716-17. Thus FEA was
forced to enter into a Memorandum of Understanding with the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) in which FEA temporarily transferred its enforcement and compliance responsibility
to IRS. M. WILLRICH, supra note 129, at 193. Professor Willrich has noted that:
For the period from January 11, 1974, through June 30, 1974, the FEA trans-
ferred all compliance and enforcement responsibility for allocation and price
regulation to the IRS. IRS assigned 300 investigators to this work .... The FEA
assumed control of enforcement activities in July with about 850 investigators.
Id. Though FEA eventually regained control of enforcement, the legacy of the IRS inves-
tigatory approach, with its emphasis on informal conferences and lack of well defined pro-
cedures prior to judicial review, contributed to the development and continuation of FEA's
flexible approach to procedure.
148 10 C.F.R. § 205.190(b) (1974).
149 Id. A person receiving a notice of probable violation had 10 days to respond. Id.
§ 205.191(b). Failure to do so was treated as a concession of the "accuracy of the factual
allegations and legal conclusions stated in the notice." Id. § 205.191(f). The response was to
be in a writing as full and complete as possible. Id. § 205.191(c).
150 See generally 39 Fed. Reg. 32,262 (1974).
152 10 C.F.R. 205.192(a) (1974).152 Id. See Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Zarb, 532 F.2d 1362 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1976).
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suance and, though an administrative appeal was provided, appeal
of the order did not automatically stay its effectiveness. 153
If a party took an appeal, FEA regulations required its filing
with the Office of Exceptions and Appeals (OEA), an administra-
tive unit within FEA. 154  The procedures used for adjudicating
contested orders on appeal also were informal, and full blown
evidentiary hearings were seldom granted. As one commentator
noted: "Officials in OEA believe that, given the time delays in-
volved, hearings contribute so slightly to improving decisions that
they should be used only rarely." 155
FEA's enforcement procedures were criticized for various
reasons. Though administrative enforcement proceedings may
threaten severe civil sanctions usually in the form of pay back ob-
ligations, 156 FEA's procedures purposefully did not allow for a full
evidentiary hearing as a matter of right. 157  Nor was an enforce-
ment action automatically stayed when an administrative appeal
was filed. 58 Moreover, it was argued that the process was seri-
ously flawed because: (1) the burden of proof rested on the recip-
ient of a remedial order and it remained on the recipient
throughout the administrative enforcement process; 159 (2) ex
parte contacts, though not openly encouraged, nonetheless oc-
curred and FEA's regulations did not address this problem; 160
and most important, (3) there appeared to be a combination of
prosecutorial and judicial functions within the Office of Excep-
tions and Appeals (OEA) 16 1-all OEA decisions were subject to
153 10 C.F.R. 205.192(b) (1974).
154 Id. § 205.195(b). In addition to remedial order appeals, the Office of Exceptions and
Appeals was responsible for all applications for exception (id. § 205.52), modification or
rescission (id. § 205.132(a)), and appeals from the denial of such applications as well as
appeals from all orders and interpretations issued by FEA's national office (id.§ 205.103(a)).
205.103(a)).
155 M. WILLRICH, supra note 129, at 197.
156 See text accompanying notes 306-07, 318-320 infra. The statute also provides for
criminal and civil penalties. See 15 U.S.C. § 754(a)(3) (1976).
M See Craven, New Dimension in Federal Regulation of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products
under the Department of Energy, 29 INST. OIL & GAs L. & TAx. 1, 11 (1978); notes 150 & 155
and accompanying text supra.
158 See C.F.R. 205.192(b) (1974); Craven, supra note 157, at 12; note 153 and accom-
panying text supra.
' See 10 C.F.R. § 205.106 (1974); Craven, supra note 157, at 12; note 151 and accom-
panying text supra.
160 See Craven, supra note 157, at 11 n.42. See generally note 140 and accompanying text
supra.
161 See Craven, supra note 157, at 11.
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review by a committee that included representatives from the en-
forcement wing of the agency. 162
Access to the courts did not cure these problems. District
court review of administrative enforcement proceedings was ap-
pellate in nature. The Economic Stabilization Act prescribed this
kind of district court review for the Cost of Living Council's pro-
gram, in part to assure easy access to judicial review. The assump-
tion was that, particularly in small cases, it would take the place of
appellate review at the circuit level.16 3  This type of review may
have had some justification for the 1970 wage and price control
program, but Congress incorporated it by reference into the Fed-
eral Energy Administration Act with little apparent thought.
Other alternatives-either eliminating district court review al-
together or recasting it in the more familiar mold of an indepen-
dent factfinder developing a complete record de novo-may have
been preferable. As it was, both the district court and the Tem-
porary Emergency Court of Appeals had to rely on the record
developed by FEA. 164
3. Administering the Oil Program Under the Department of Energy
Organization Act of 1977
Section 503 of the DOE Act was devised primarily to meet
many of the criticisms made of FEA's remedial order procedures.
Though this provision resolved some of the earlier problems, its
success was by no means complete.
a. FERC Review. The DOE Act authorized review of execu-
tive remedial orders by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commis-
sion.165  By granting such power to an independent agency not
involved in the enforcement of the oil program in any way, Con-
gress was able to meet one of the major criticisms of the old
scheme: the apparent combination of enforcement and judicial
functions within the old Office of Exceptions and Appeals.
Further, FERC review of executive orders dealing with oil pricing
162 See id.; notes 150-56 and accompanying text supra.
163 See note 125 supra.
164 See id.
165 The legislative history makes clear that the primary purpose of § 503 of the DOE Act
was to "assure that the Department's review of any initial action ... will be by officials who
in no way were involved in the Department's original action. This guarantees a separation of
the prosecutorial and judicial functions relating to enforcement." H.R. REP. No. 539, 95th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 85, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 925, 956 (emphasis added).
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matters is consistent with another overall goal of FERC review-
checking executive power. 166
Beyond such structural changes, the DOE Act corrected de-
ficiencies in FEA procedures as well. Section 503 of the DOE Act
explicitly provides for the granting of stays of remedial orders
unless "the Commission finds [that] the public interest requires
immediate compliance with such remedial order."'167  More im-
portant, the new Act provides a right to a hearing which must
include, "at a minimum, the submission of briefs, oral or
documentary evidence, and oral arguments." 168 Though the new
Act guarantees a hearing, a full evidentiary hearing is not guaran-
teed as a matter of right. 16 9  Congress sought to correct the
abuses of the past, but it also sought to preserve the flexible pro-
cedural approach that evolved during the emergency phase of this
program. As Congressman Eckhardt, the sponsor of the new Act's
procedures, noted:
We do not grant quite as many procedural safeguards to the
person subjected to agency action as does [sic] sections 554 and
556 of the Administrative Procedure Act: but [the new Act]
does give the right to a person to have an oral hearing, gives
him an opportunity to contest the agency position and gives
him a record on which a court may ultimately determine
whether the agency decision was based substantially on the rec-
ord as a whole. No such procedures are now provided. 70
166 See generally text accompanying notes 92 & 93 supra.
167 42 U.S.C. § 7193(c) (Supp. I 1977).
168 Id.
161 Id. It can be argued, however, that § 503's requirement in § 503 of "an opportunity
for a hearing" triggers §§ 554, 556, 557 of the APA. See, e.g., Wong Yang Sung v.
McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, modified, 339 U.S. 908 (1950); United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry.,
410 U.S. 224 (1973). This argument has been rejected by Professor Byse, who pointed out
that:
[Slection 5 of the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973 exempts reme-
dial orders from the adjudicative provisions of the APA. Accordingly when
Congress added the remedial order amendment to the DOE bill, it was working
in a context of an exemption from the APA. Rather than simply deleting the
exemption or providing that sections 554-557 should apply to remedial orders
... the amendment provided for a "hearing" and then identified certain of the
ingredients of the hearing, This is a strong indication that the proposed
amendment was to give recipients of remedial orders the procedural safeguards
contained in the amendment rather than those contained in the APA. I agree
with Representative Eckhardt that the adjudicative provisions of the APA are
not applicable to remedial order procedures.
Byse, supra note 38, at 222 (footnotes omitted). See also text accompanying note 170 infra
(statement of Rep. Eckhardt).
170 123 CONG. REc. H5,372 (daily ed. June 3, 1977). Pursuant to § 503 of the DOE Act
FERC can grant full-blown evidentiary hearings. Section 503 does not, however, explicitly
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b. The Executive Response. If the FERC procedures mandated
by the DOE Act alone controlled in enforcement proceedings,
they would constitute an adequate procedural framework for the
task at hand. 17' But the procedural issues surrounding the en-
forcement process are more complex because of the executive's
reaction to FERC's statutorily mandated role. Congress failed to
specify the precise procedural relationship between DOE's execu-
tive wing, which issues remedial orders, and FERC, which reviews
them; the legislature provided only that the Secretary was not
precluded from developing procedures prior to or incident to ini-
tial issuance of a remedial order 172 by the Office of Hearings and
Appeals (OHA), successor to FEA's Office of Exceptions and Ap-
peals. Given FERC's mandatory procedural safeguards, minimal
executive procedures for this issuance process would have suf-
ficed. Instead, an elaborate set of issuance procedures has been
developed on OHA's behalf almost as if the executive wing was
oblivious to the existence of the FERC review process. The net
result is a set of procedures at OHA that resembles the minimal
procedures section 503 of the DOE Act requires FERC to provide.
This redundancy began when the Economic Regulatory
Agency (ERA), an executive agency charged with the enforcement
of the EPAA, 173 acting on behalf of OHA, issued an elaborate set
provide for the use of administrative law judges. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that
the linguistic approaches of the APA and the DOE Act differ significantly. The APA places
emphasis on the rights of the litigant. Section 556 of the APA states that "a party is entitled
to present his case or defense by oral or documentary evidence, [and] to submit rebuttal
evidence." 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1976). Section 503 of the DOE Act, however, emphasizes the
Commission's discretion. Thus, "[tihe Commission shall, upon request, afford an opportu-
nity for a hearing, including, at a minimum, the submission of briefs, oral or documentary
evidence, and oral arguments." 42 U.S.C. § 7193(c) (Supp. 1 1977).
1" See note 168 and accompanying text supra.
172 DOE Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-91, § 503(e), 91 Stat. 590 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
7193(e) (Supp. 1 1977)), as amended by the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978,
95-620, § 805(b), 92 Stat. 3348. Section 503 presently provides that:
Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect any procedural action
taken by the Secretary prior to or incident to initial issuance of a remedial
order which is the subject of the hearing provided in this section, but such
procedures shall be reviewable in the hearing.
42 U.S.C. § 7193(e) (Supp. 1 1977).
M As noted earlier (see text accompanying notes 110-13 supra), the Economic Regulatory
Agency is the primary executive unit under the Secretary of Energy. It has, in effect, taken
over the duties of the old Federal Energy Administration. The Office of Hearings and
Appeals was initially placed within ERA. This Office, in effect, replaces the Office of Ex-
ceptions and Appeals which previously handled, among other things, adjudication of con-
tested remedial orders.
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of procedures "to provide a fuller administrative review of the
issues raised in each remedial order prior to the issuance of the
order in final form." 174  Enforcement proceedings still begin by
serving the alleged violator with a notice of probable violation
(NOPV),'1 75 and an alleged violator may request an informal con-
ference. 76  Up to this point, these provisions make a good deal
174 43 Fed. Reg. 3,995 (1978).
'75 Administrative Procedures and Sanctions, 10 C.F.R. § 205.191(a) (1979). NOPV's
may be issued either by ERA's national Office of Enforcement, ERA's Office of Special
Counsel or by regional ERA enforcement offices. Within 30 days of service of the NOPV,
the recipient may file a written reply containing "a statement of all relevant facts pertaining
to the act or transaction that is the subject of the Notice of Probable Violation." Id.
§ 205.191(c). In addition, "the reply shall include a discussion of the relevant facts pertaining
which support the position asserted, including rulings, regulations, interpretations, and
previous decisions issued by DOE or its predecessor agencies." Id. § 205.191(d).
If a reply is not filed, a firm "shall be deemed to have admitted the accuracy of the
factual allegations and legal conclusions stated in the Notice of Probable Violation, and the
ERA may proceed to issue a Proposed Remedial Order." Id. § 205.191(f). Thus, a litigant
cannot choose to ignore a NOPV. Failure to reply to a NOPV will result in a proposed
remedial order (PRO) and most likely a claim that there was a failure to exhaust adminis-
trative remedies, should the litigant choose to contest the PRO.
176 Id. § 205.191(e). If the reply to the NOPV and conference fail to convince the en-
forcement staff that an order should not be issued, a proposed remedial order (PRO) may
be issued by ERA. Id. § 205.192(b). The PRO must set forth the proposed findings of fact
and conclusions of law upon which it is based. In addition, "[it shall also include a discus-
sion of the relevant authorities which support the position asserted, including rulings, reg-
ulations, interpretations and previous decisions issued by DOE or its predecessor
agencies." Id. § 205.192(d). Within 20 days after service of the PRO, ERA can supplement
this order with further "information relating to the calculations and determinations which
support the findings of fact set forth in the Proposed Remedial Order." Id. § 205.193A. At
this stage of the proceeding, ERA has the burden of establishing a prima facie case against
an alleged violator. This burden is met, however, "by the service of a Proposed Remedial
Order that meets the requirements" set forth above. Id. § 205.192A(a).
A copy of the PRO must be served on the alleged violator and a notice of the pro-
posed order must be published in the Federal Register. A copy of this notice is then mailed
by ERA "to all readily identifiable persons who are likely to be aggrieved by issuance of the
Proposed Remedial Order as a final order." Id. § 205.192(c). "Within 15 days after publica-
tion of the notice ... in the FEDERAL REGISTER, any aggrieved person may file a Notice of
Objection." Id. § 205.193(a).
Once a PRO is issued, all further proceedings take place before the Office of Hearings
and Appeals. As the regulations state, "[i]n order to exhaust administrative remedies with
respect to a Remedial Order proceeding, a person must file a timely Notice of Objection
and Statement of Objections with the Office of Hearings and Appeals." Id. § 205.193(f).
Upon receipt of a Notice of Objection, the Office of Hearings and Appeals must pub-
lish a notice in the Federal Register. This notice sets forth the basic outline of the PRO and
states that any person who wishes to participate in the proceedings must file an appro-
priate request with OHA within 20 days after publication. Based on the response to this
notice, OHA then prepares an official service list. Id. § 205.194.
Within 40 days of service of a Notice of Objection, the contestant must file a Statement
of Objections. Id. § 205.196. This is intended to be a very detailed response to the PRO
and a thorough discussion of the contestant's case. Any participant, including the ERA
Office of Enforcement, may file a response within 30 days of receipt of the objections. Id. §
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of sense. They provide the government and an alleged violator an
opportunity to discuss the case, define the issues, and possibly set-
tle the dispute. 177  This is not, however, the extent of the execu-
tive's remedial order procedures. If the parties fail to settle the
dispute at the informal conference stage, more elaborate ad-
judicatory proceedings begin before OHA. 178
Viewed in isolation-without regard to the FERC hearing re-
quirements imposed by section 503-the adjudicatory procedures
developed by OHA represent a substantial improvement over
those used by FEA. For example, unlike FEA remedial orders,
which were subject to review by internal committees that included
members of the enforcement section of FEA, 179 OHA remedial
orders are specifically excepted from such internal committee re-
view.1 80  In addition, OHA regulations provide for stays of its
orders,1 8' have a provision prohibiting ex parte contacts,1 8 2 place
the burden of proof on the government,' 83 and provide at least
205.197. At the same time a party files a Statement of Objections, a motion for an eviden-
tiary hearing may be filed (id. § 205.199) and a motion for discovery must be filed (id. § 205.198).
177 If the parties fail to settle the case at this stage, one possible approach might have
been for the ERA Office of Enforcement simply to issue a remedial order which, if it were con-
tested, would then trigger a hearing at the FERC. The general DOE Act procedures out-
lined in § 503 would then apply. This approach would have eliminated the adjudicatory
stage at OHA.
178 See generally 10 C.F.R. §§ 205.191-192 (1979).
"9 See Craven, supra note 157, at 11; text accompanying notes 157-62 supra.
180 DOE Order No. 1100.3 (Sept. 15, 1978). As this order makes clear, a review commit-
tee is still in existence; however, it stated: "The Office of Hearings and Appeals shall be the
decisionmaker with respect to the review of Proposed Remedial Orders .... Id. at 5. Other
orders, such as exceptions, for example, can be issued only after "the Director of the Of-
fice of Hearings and Appeals shall obtain the unanimous concurrence of the Administra-
tive Review Committee." Id. at 4. This Committee consists of the Director of OHA, the
General Counsel, and any officer that has primary responsibility for the subject matter
involved. Id. To the extent that the General Counsel's involvement with the exceptions
process may affect or influence the outcome of a particular enforcement case, it may also
be appropriate to prohibit participation by this office in such proceedings.
In effect, OHA has been playing a role similar to that envisioned for the proposed
Board of Hearings and Appeals-that of an in-house energy court. The Secretary's delega-
tion order to the director of OHA vests in OHA broad adjudicatory powers. Similar to the
jurisdictional grant to the proposed Board, this order provides that OHA shall review and
issue "all final DOE orders of an adjudicatory nature in accordance with Departmental
regulations and procedures, other than those orders involving matters over which ...
[FERCI exercises jurisdiction, or those matters within the jurisdiction of the Board of Con-
tract Appeals." Id. at I.
181 10 C.F.R. § 205.199D(h) (1979).
182 Id. § 205.199F.
183 Id. § 205.192A(a).
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the opportunity for an evidentiary hearing if the agency deter-
mines that this is necessary.' 84
Organizational changes also have been made. OHA is no
longer within the Economic Regulatory Agency. Rather, it is di-
rectly responsible to the Secretary of Energy.185 This organiza-
tional change was made in response to criticism that even with
OHA's more elaborate procedures, a separation of powers prob-
lem remained. OHA was a part of the Economic Regulatory
Agency. This agency was charged with enforcement of the
Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act. Members of OHA were, in
effect, working for the chief enforcement officer of the depart-
ment, the head of ERA.
Placing OHA under the Secretary for organizational purposes
does not completely eliminate this "problem." The Secretary of
Energy, of course, supervises both the director of OHA and the
director of ERA. To that extent, OHA is not as independent of
the enforcement process as the initially proposed Board of Hear-
ings and Appeals would have been. Nevertheless, the internal
separation of functions that now exists within the Department
clearly satisfies the dictates of the due process clause and is similar
to adjudication in other executive agencies. 186
The question of OHA's procedures, however, cannot be
viewed in isolation. The fact is that section 503 of the DOE Act
requires FERC to provide substantially the same procedures after
the OHA proceedings. The net result is two sets of adjudicatory
procedures.
c. FERC Review Procedures. FERC has attempted to minimize
this procedural duplication while complying with its statutory
mandate to review DOE remedial orders by reserving its right in
appropriate cases to rely on the record developed by OHA. Thus,
FERC has not interpreted section 503 to require a de novo hear-
ing when OHA "proposed remedial orders" are contested. 187
Rather, the FERC's regulations establish it as a flexible appellate
court-one capable of reviewing a record made elsewhere, but
also capable, without remand, of supplementing that record, when
necessary. 188  The Commission's regulations provide, under cer-
184 See notes 308-09 and accompanying text infra.
185 See DOE Order No. 1100.3, at 1 (Sept. 15, 1978).
186 See note 241 infra.
187 Summary of the Commission's Final Regulations, 43 Fed. Reg. 52,219, 52,223 (1978).
188 Commission Review of Remedial Orders, 18 C.F.R. § 1.38(g) (1979).
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tain limited circumstances, an opportunity to present new evi-
dence to the Commission as well as to contest portions of the
executive record; 189 however, one contesting a remedial order
must make his initial stand at OHA, not the Commission.' 90 When
the case comes to the Commission, it must provide "independent
scrutiny" of the record, but not necessarily allow for further
evidentiary proceedings. As the preamble to the regulations
makes clear:
A separation of the judicial and prosecutorial functions is ac-
complished by Commission review supplemented by limited
evidentiary proceedings where necessary .... [T]he extension of
due process is satisfied in many cases by an independent scrutiny
of the record and by less than a de novo proceeding, so long as
each side has been afforded an opportunity to present its case
in full.1 91
It is a close question whether the Commission's procedures
satisfy Congress' intent as embodied in the DOE Act; 192 providing
189 Id. § 1.38(f)(2)(ii)(A).
190 Administrative Procedures and Sanctions, 10 C.F.R. § 205.199C (1979).
191 Summary of the Commission's Final Regulations, 43 Fed. Reg. 52,219, 52,223 (1978)
(emphasis added).
192 It has been forcefully argued that the Commission must provide a de novo hearing
and cannot rely on the OHA record in any way. See, e.g., Carlson, FERC Review of Reme-
dial Orders (Dec. 6-7, 1978) (summary paper presented at Executive Enterprises Briefing
on DOE Exceptions, Enforcement and Litigation, New Orleans, La.) (on file at Cornell Law
Review) (arguing that § 503 requires a de novo hearing and FERC should conduct all of its
own fact-finding). Several arguments are made. At one point during consideration of the
DOE Act, the House proposed that the review of remedial orders should be placed in
ERA. Congress, however, explicitly rejected this option and chose to place the review func-
tion with FERC. Id. at 3-4. In so doing, it can be argued that:
Congress made clear that an evidentiary hearing was to be held after, not be-
fore, issuance of a remedial order and that the hearing was to be before an
independent decision-maker. It would not appear that this requirement could
be satisfied by an arrangement which precludes an independent adjudicator
from taking the evidence and observing and judging the demeanor and credi-
bility of witnesses, an opportunity denied by reliance upon the record de-
veloped before the Secretary.
Id. at 8-9.
Second, it also has been argued that the explicit requirements of § 503 "are 'trial'
functions, not appellate functions." That is to say, § 503 "provides for an opportunity to
submit oral and documentary evidence and to cross-examine witnesses." Moreover, it im-
plicitly "places the burden of proof on the Secretary and requires that the Commission
make its own affirmative findings of fact." Id. at 9. It is noted in the summary to the
Commission's regulations that the Commission must give "independent scrutiny" to the
facts initially found by OHA. See note 191 and accompanying text supra.
Third, it is argued that the legislative history of § 503 proves that in placing hearing
responsibilities in the Commission, the Congress ordered "a clean separation of prosecuto-
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an opportunity for "independent scrutiny" of OHA factfinding
and, on occasion, cross-examination and the submission of new
facts and issues arguably satisfies the primary purpose of the DOE
Act's mandate, at least in theory. In practice, however, FERC's
backlog of cases and the scarcity of its own resources may result in
substantial reliance on OHA in most cases,' 93 and much less "in-
dependent scrutiny" than might be desired.
d. The Administrative and Judicial Gauntlets. Though greater
and indeed even extensive reliance on OHA factfinding will
minimize some of the procedural duplication that now is possible,
it cannot eliminate repetition. Given OHA's issuance procedures
as well as the minimum procedural requirements imposed on
FERC, at least five separate stages of the administrative process
precede issuance of a final remedial order. Three levels of appel-
late judicial review may then follow.
The administrative process begins with the issuance of a
notice of probable violation by a regional Office of Enforce-
ment.19 4  This triggers a set of informal procedures aimed at set-
tlement or clarification of the charges. 195 A second round of in-
formal procedures is triggered at the federal level if a proposed
remedial order is issued and contested. 196 If the matter is not
settled at that level and a motion for an evidentiary hearing has
been filed, a third, more formal stage within the executive branch
begins at OHA.' 97  While an evidentiary hearing in the APA
sense is not likely,' 98 a full evidentiary hearing is theoretically pos-
rial and judicial functions." Carlson, supra,.at 9. Senator Javits, the Senate sponsor of § 503,
stated that this section would "require that the Secretary exercise the executive functions of
investigating and prosecuting administrative violations, but that the [Commission would]
exercise the quasi-judicial function of determining whether in fact the violation has oc-
curred." 123 CONG. REc. S7,668 (daily ed. May 16, 1977). Moreover, Javits also stated that
"the corporation charged may have a factual hearing upon the evidence [before the Com-
mission], with the right of cross-examination, et cetera, instead of depending upon the
record, which the agency itself may make as the basis for the appeal, which can then be
decided only on the substantial evidence rule." Id. S7,935 (daily ed. May 18, 1977). He also
recognized that the placement of decision-making responsibilities in the Commission "would
put all ... original hearings in the same forum resulting in consistency and the develop-
ment of administrative expertise." Id. S7,668 (daily ed. May 16, 1977).
193 For a discussion of FERC's backlog and a suggested solution by the natural gas in-
dustry, see Lawrence & Muchow, The FERC's Case Load Management Problem, PUB. UTIL.
FORT. Jan. 18, 1979, at 9-15.
,9 See note 175 supra.
195 See note 176 supra.
198 See id.
197 See note 178 and accompanying text supra.
198 As will be explored later, OHA hearings differ from conventional APA adjudication
in two primary ways: administrative law judges are not used and material issues of dis-
puted facts do not necessarily trigger an oral evidentiary hearing.
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sible. 199 If the alleged violator continues to protest, the stage
shifts to the independent FERC. A "presiding officer" at FERC
can hear the case de novo if he feels it is necessary. But even if he
relies fully on the record developed at OHA, there is at a
minimum an opportunity for oral argument, briefs and, possibly,
some new testimonial evidence. 200  The opinion rendered by this
presiding officer then goes to FERC for review. FERC then issues
a final remedial order which only then may be appealed to the
federal courts.20 '
The appeals route through the federal judiciary is nearly as
laborious as the administrative process. The DOE Act retained the
judicial review provisions of the Economic Stabilization Act.20 2
Thus, judicial review continues to begin with district court review
of FERC orders. The review, however, is appellate rather than de
novo. 20 3  Decisions rendered by the district court are then
appealable to the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals. 20 4
Following a decision by this court, a writ of certiorari lies with the
Supreme Court. Mercifully, no enforcement cases have, as yet,
progressed so far.
When President Carter referred to the "almost unbelievable"
federal bureaucracy that has grown up around oil controls, he
surely was referring, at least in part, to this administrative and
judicial gauntlet.
III
STRUCTURAL RECOMMENDATIONS
The evolution of the administrative and judicial gauntlets that
presently characterize the DOE oil enforcement process raises im-
portant structural and procedural issues. Part III focuses on the
structural issues and sets forth specific recommendations applica-
ble to the Department of Energy for the remainder of its oil pric-
ing program. To put these structural issues in some perspective,
however, it is useful to begin by examining briefly the evolving
199 In any event, OHA does provide for a hearing consisting, at a minimum, of oral
argument plus an opportunity to submit documentary evidence and extensive briefs. See
Administrative Procedures and Sanctions, 10 C.F.R. § 205.199-.199A (1979).
200 See text accompanying note 170 supra.
201 42 U.S.C. § 7193(c) (Supp. 1 1977).
202 See note 125 supra.
203 See id.
204 See id.
[Vol. 65:491
ENERGY CRISIS
role of administrative agencies in general and the increasing skep-
ticism that now surrounds them.
A. Administrative Agencies, Congress, and the Regulatory Dialogue
The administrative process has become a "surrogate political
process."205  Administrative agencies cannot be viewed simply as
a means by which clear congressional policies are more fully de-
veloped, fine-tuned and then implemented. For a variety of
reasons, not the least of which is the ambitious nature of much of
today's regulation, congressional delegations of legislative power
to administrative agencies often are vague, amorphous provisions
that provide little in the way of substantive guidance to the agen-
cies involved.206 As a consequence, agencies represent a distinct
and often quite independent voice in the regulatory dialogue that
ensues among Congress, the courts, the agency and the affected
public.
A variety of procedural safeguards such as those embodied in
the APA 20 7 have developed to check agency power and to ensure
that the exercise of this power is reasoned and fair. Moreover, the
undemocratic aspects of agency power have been at least partially
tempered by the decline of such doctrines as standing and inter-
vention as barriers to participation in the administrative process.
As Professor Stewart has noted, the traditional model of the ad-
ministrative agency has given way to an interest representation
model, an essential element of which is "fair representation of a
wide range of affected interests in the process of [an] administra-
tive 208tive decision." o
The administrative process, however, also has been increas-
ingly affected by a growing distrust of government in general and
205 Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1669, 1670
(1975).
206 As Professor Stewart has noted:
The factors responsible for this lack of specificity are (1) the impossibility of
specifying at the outset of new governmental ventures the precise policies to be
followed; (2) lack of legislative resources to clarify directives; (3) lack of legisla-
tive incentives to clarify directives; (4) legislators' desire to avoid resolution of
controversial policy issues; (5) the inherent variability of experience; (6) the
limitations of language.
Stewart, supra note 205, at 1677 n.27. See generally T. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM
92-126 (2d ed. 1979); Freedman, Book Review, 43 U. CH. L. REv. 307 (1976).
207 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1976). With regard to the problems inherent in broad delega-
tions of power by Congress to administrative agencies and the role of procedural
safeguards, see 1 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 207-08 (2d ed. 1978).
208 Stewart, supra note 205, at 1670.
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increased antipathy towards administrative agencies in particu-
lar.20 9  Clean air, clean water, worker safety, a healthy environ-
ment, abundant but reasonably priced energy, safe nuclear power,
in short a relatively risk free, yet economically affluent society are
noble legislative goals. But there is growing skepticism over the
ability of traditional New Deal regulatory approaches and
bureaucracies to attain them, an increasing awareness of the often
harsh political and economic tradeoffs their accomplishment re-
quires and, more fundamentally, an overall lack of consensus over
what the costs of these goals may be, who should bear these costs,
and, in some cases, over what the actual goals should, in fact,
be. 2
10
The skepticism concerning traditional government responses
to perceived problems in general and administrative action in par-
ticular has increased Congress' participation in the dialogue. This is
reflected by its willingness to increase the number and variety of
checks on agency power from both outside and within agency
walls. Currently, there are, for example, sunset laws,21' legislative
veto provisions, 212 and proposed requirements that agencies per-
form elaborate regulatory analyses before they issue regula-
tions.21 3 In addition, there is an increased willingness on the part
of Congress to intervene directly in the affairs of a particular
agency, such as the Federal Trade Commission, when that agency
engages in activities that are arguably within its authority, but not
politically acceptable. 4  At least one house of Congress has also
209 See generally J. FREEDMAN, CIsIs AND LEGITIMACY 259-66 (1978).
210 This is particularly true in the case of energy. See note 38 supra.
211 For example in the Federal Energy Administration Act Congress provided for the
demise of the FEA by June 30, 1976. See note 25 supra. Various bills have from time to
time been proposed that would impose sunset laws on all or many federal agencies. See,
e.g., S. 3318, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) (proposing termination of several agencies, in-
cluding CAB, FAA, OSHA, FEA, ICC, and FMC); S. 2, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG.
REC. 496 (1977) (requiring authorizations of new budget authority for programs every 5
years and periodic review of those programs). See generally Vidas, The Sun Also Sets: A Model
for Sunset Implementation, 26 Am. U.L. REV. 1169 (1977).
212 For an analysis of veto provisions, see Bruff & Gellhorn, Congressional Control of Ad-
ministrative Regulation: A Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1369 (1977).
213 See, e.g., S. 2147, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 602, 603, 125 CONG. REc. S19,040 (daily
ed. Dec. 18, 1979). This bill to amend the APA would require elaborate analyses of the
need for regulations before rulemaking could commence.
214 Both the House and the Senate recently have included elaborate procedural provi-
sions in FTC appropriation bills. See H.R. 2313, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (passed on
Nov. 27, 1979, as amended by voice vote on Feb. 7, 1980) and S. 1991, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess., 126 CONG. REc. S1,074 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1980) passed as S. 2313, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess., 126 CONG. Rc. S1,242 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1980), on Feb. 7, 1980). These bills contain
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voted to remove the presumption of validity that attaches to
agency rules under judicial review.215  All these examples are il-
lustrative of increased congressional distrust of bureaucratic
power and the political appeal of attempting to exert more direct
control over bureaucracies and their policies. Given the undemo-
cratic character of administrative agencies, such measures can
also be viewed as legitimate attempts to ensure at least a
minimum level of political accountability and responsiveness on
the part of bureaucracies. But the cumulative effect of these ap-
proaches and the potentially paralyzing effect they can have on
agency initiative and action may be indicative of a deeper, more
substantive concern-the disintegration of any consensus about
the wisdom of and need for the specific substantive missions of
the agencies involved.
The evolution of the structure of the Department of Energy
is consistent with, and in large part the result of, both the increas-
ing trend toward distrust of bureaucratic power in general and
the overall lack of consensus concerning the substantive mission
and goals of agencies in particular. The structural result is, in
many ways, the logical extension of the basic premise that the
administrative process has become a surrogate political process-
an agency which, at least with regard to oil policy, begins to re-
semble our own tripartite form of government and the constitu-
tional system of checks and balances inherent in this approach. As
noted above, the DOE consists of an executive department whose
power is offset by FERC, an independent commission. Due to its
power to exercise a Commission veto over various secretarial
elaborate regulatory analysis provisions, separation of functions requirements, and a legis-
lative veto provision. They also effectively terminate one adjudicatory proceeding under
way at the FTC and jeopardize a number of other rulemaking and investigatory proceed-
ings. These bills have gone to conference but a final product has yet to emerge. The
Administrative Conference has opposed this approach. Administrative Conference of the
United States, Resolution Concerning Congressional Termination of Pending Administra-
tive Proceedings at the Federal Trade Commission (adopted Dec. 14, 1979) (to be codified
in 1 C.F.R.).
215 For a formulation of what has come to be known as the Bumpers Amendment, see
S. 2408, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975). This amendment would amend § 706 of the APA (5
U.S.C. § 706 (1976)), so as to abolish the presumption in favor of the validity of agency
rules and regulations challenged in court. For recent formulations of this amendment see
S. 86, 95th Cong., Ist Sess., 123 CONG. REc. S286 (daily ed. Jan. 10, 1977); S. 111, 96th
Cong., Ist Sess., 125 CONG. REc. S410 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 1979). The Administrative Confer-
ence of the United States has opposed this amendment. See Administrative Conference of
the United States, Recommendation 79-6, Elimination of the Presumption of Validity of
Agency Rules and Regulations in Judicial Review, As Exemplified by the Bumpers
Amendment (adopted Dec. 14, 1979) (to be codified in I C.F.R.).
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rules, FERC's role is akin to that of Congress when it exercises its
legislative veto powers; due to its power to review certain execu-
tive adjudications, de novo if it so chooses, FERC is, in effect, an
in-house judiciary, separate and distinct from the executive
branch of the agency.
B. The Problems and Sources of DOE Structure
There are a variety of reasons why the efficacy of such a
structural model should be seriously questioned. Significant prac-
tical problems emerge. Dividing power between separate branches
of the agency government results in jurisdictional ambiguities, 21 6
and can thus encourage procedural duplication 217 as well as sub-
stantial policy fragmentation. 21 8  These practical problems, how-
216 See text accompanying notes 73-98 supra. The DOE Act has divided authority be-
tween the executive wing of the agency and the FERC in ways which often make the
jurisdiction of either agency unclear. The control of imports and exports of natural gas is
one such example (see notes 86-87 supra), as is the setting of curtailment priorities and the
making of curtailment plans (see notes 84-85 supra). Similarly, FERC's authority to review
secretarial action that affects its jurisdiction fails to define clearly what kinds of actions
affect FERC and fall into the reviewable category. Indeed, if FERC were to interpret this
mandate very broadly, its veto power could paralyze the Secretary. Happily this has not yet
happened. For example, FERC has recently indicated that certain proposed regulations do
not significantly affect FERC functions: "[T]he Federal Energy Regulatory Commission re-
ceived a copy of the proposed rulemaking and has notified the ERA that it has not deter-
mined that the proposed regulation would significantly affect any function within its juris-
diction." Incentive Prices for Newly Discovered Crude Oil, 44 Fed. Reg. 25,828, 25,829-30
(1979).
17 See text accompanying notes 193-94 supra.
218 Dividing jurisdiction over important matters (see note 216 supra), as well as giving
FERC review power over certain proposed secretarial rules and orders (42 U.S.C. § 7174
(Supp. I 1977)), can lead to a clash of two distinct views on policy matters. FERC has
played an active role in reviewing secretarial rules in some instances. See, e.g., Petroleum
Allocation Regulations-Revision for Propane and Other Natural Gas Liquids, 44 Fed.
Reg. 60,638 (1979); Motor Gasoline Decontrol and Transition Regulation, 43 Fed. Reg.
14,491 (1978). Thus, though there may be policy conflict, it can be resolved either by
issuing a rule acceptable to the Commission or issuing no rule at all.
Other opportunities for policy fragmentation exist when FERC reviews OHA remedial
orders and exceptions. Since very few cases have been presented to both OHA and FERC,
it is difficult to assess in any complete way the actual impact of the FERC review on execu-
tive price-control policy at this time. To date, 16 appeals of OHA remedial orders have
been docketed at FERC. See DOE Memorandum on OHA RO cases Appealed to FERC
from Floyd Robinson to Tony Miles, Assistant General Counsel (Jan. 9, 1980) (on file at
Cornell Law Review). Only one remedial case has been decided by FERC. See Chester F.
Dolley and Atlantic Oil Co., No. R079-3 (FERC Feb. 12, 1980) (summary affirmance of
presiding officer's proposed order). Similarly, only one case concerning an exception has
been decided. See Lunday-Thagard Oil Co., [1979] 6 EN. MNGM'T (4 DOE) T82,506 (Nov.
16, 1979) (affirming in part and reversing in part OHA's proposed decision).
For a study of an analogous split that developed over the policy differences between
the Secretary of Labor and the Occupational Health and Safety Commission, see Sullivan,
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ever, are ultimately less significant than the underlying reasons
that account for them-Congress' approach to energy administra-
tion legislation.
Historically, Congress has tended to resist bureaucratic reor-
ganizations aimed at increasing executive power and control over
vital national programs. 219  The creation of the Department of
Energy is a particularly good example of congressional antipathy
toward executive power. The uncertainty over the precise substan-
tive energy policies actually favored by the executive, coupled with
the lack of consensus within Congress itself over the underlying
causes of the energy crisis 220 exacerbated Congress' distrust of
executive power in general, and the substantive role of the pro-
posed new agency in particular.
Rather than resolving substantive issues first, Congress, along
with the administration, chose to establish a new super agency. In
effect, creation of the Department of Energy institutionalized the
existing energy crisis. The unresolved substantive controversies
and ambiguities simply were transferred to DOE. In the process,
these unresolved conflicts underlay much of the debate over the
structure of the new department and motivated many of the in-
ternal checks and balances built into the agency.
Questions of substance logically should precede questions of
agency structure. This is particularly true when, as in the case of
energy pricing regulation, the fundamental substantive question is
whether there should be any regulation at all. Once such funda-
mental questions have been resolved, substantive disagreement is,
perhaps, less likely to politicize the design of agency structure.221
Indeed, a new administrative structure may not be needed at all.
In any event, if substantive issues are resolved first, at least the
general powers to be wielded by the agency would be clearer, and
a structure and procedures appropriate for the regulatory tasks at
hand could more easily be created. 222
Independent Adjudication and Occupational Safety and Health Policy: A Test for Administrative
Court Theory, 31 AD. L. REV. 177 (1979). See generally Currie, OSHA, 1976 AM. B. FOUNDA-
TION RESEARCH J. 1107. Professor Currie notes that since a judicial commission necessarily
has a certain policymaking character, it should have been given rulemaking authority:
"[T1o give rulemaking authority to the Secretary is not to unify but to divide the power to
make interstitial policy." Id. at 1116.
219 See Karl, Executive Reorganization and Presidential Power, 1977 Sup. CT. REV. 1.
220 See text accompanying notes 38-40, 91-93 supra.
221 See also Scalia, supra note 14, at 402.
222 Of course, even if the major substantive questions have been resolved, agency struc-
ture and procedure may still be susceptible to manipulation by the losers of the substantive
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Attempts to soften or, perhaps, thwart the implementation of
potentially controversial substantive legislation by building com-
plex procedural protections into the agency administering the
program only postpones substantive conflict. It does not aid in its
resolution. Moreover, the resulting structure of DOE creates a
risk of significantly contributing to administrative paralysis. Con-
gress may have been unwilling or unable to decide what an ap-
propriate energy policy should be, but setting up a complicated
and fragmented agency did little to ensure that the new depart-
ment would efficiently carry out whatever policies ultimately
emerged. For DOE, it was virtually inevitable that the organiza-
tional structure should be a procrustean bed on which substantive
energy policy presently rests most uncomfortably.223
C. Reorganization or New Alliances-The Problems of Administrative
Duplication
In addition to the extensive checks and balances built into
DOE, Congress created an organization arguably prone to the de-
velopment of duplicative procedures in the parallel operations of
the commission and the agency.224 The extensive issuance pro-
cedures developed by the Office of Hearings and Appeals are
battles. But with at least a basic policy direction in mind, attempts at using procedure to
thwart a substantive program would be more apparent and more easily defeated.
223 Woodrow Wilson's criticism of our constitutional system of checks and balances may
be particularly appropriate when applied to the internal workings of an administrative
agency.
The trouble with the theory [of checks and balances] is that government is not
a machine, but a living thing .... No living thing can have its organs offset
against each other as checks, and live. On the contrary, its life is dependent
upon their quick cooperation, their ready response to the commands of instinct
or intelligence, their amicable community of purpose. Government is not a
body of blind forces; it is a body of men, with highly differentiated functions,
no doubt, in our modern day of specialization, but with a common task and
purpose. Their cooperation is indispensable, their warfare fatal. There can be
no successful government without leadership or without the intimate, almost
instinctive, coordination of the organs of life and action. This is not theory, but
fact, and displays its force as fact, whatever theories may be thrown across its
track.
W. WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 56-57 (1908).
Of course, it should also be noted that structuring an agency so as to allow for a
Commission veto of an executive rule ensures that there be a check on such power in the
event that one-house legislative veto provisions prove to be unconstitutional, impractical, or
both. For a discussion of various legislative veto provisions, see generally Bruff & Gell-
horn, Congressional Control of Administrative Regulation: A Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 HARV.
L. REV. 1369 (1977).
224 See generally text accompanying notes 173-93 supra.
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primarily responsible for the administrative gauntlet described
above. 225  These procedures represent more than an attempt by
OHA to be thorough and fair. They represent a certain bureau-
cratic resolve to retain primary adjudicatory decisionmaking au-
thority within the agency that traditionally has handled oil en-
forcement proceedings. 2  OHA has thus broadly construed sec-
tion 503's regulation of procedure to require elaborate safeguards
in the form of OHA "issuance procedures" despite the existence
of similar protections in FERC proceedings. Though not statutor-
ily compelled, 227 this interpretation is not at all surprising and,
perhaps, is even predictable.
When Congress allocated major gas and oil ratemaking and
price control functions within DOE, it did not create new adminis-
trative agencies with new identities and powers to carry out these
tasks.228 With regard to these functions, the Department created
by the DOE Act consists of new alliances between two pre-existing
agencies, now under new names-the Federal Energy Administ-
ration, predecessor of ERA, and the Federal Power Commission,
predecessor of FERC. 22 9  A reorganization leaving pre-existing
administrative identities and powers intact risks retaining past
policies and past modes of operation. In the case of OHA, en-
forcement procedures have improved considerably, but in appar-
ent oblivion to the role Congress designed for FERC, which argu-
ably was to have been the sole or at least primary adjudicator of
contested remedial orders. Thus, either OHA or FERC proce-
dures involve a wholly unnecessary layer of adjudicative proce-
dures within the agency; the question is, which?
D. Solving the Problems -The Alternatives
Potentially, many solutions are available to cure the pro-
cedural duplication that presently plagues DOE's enforcement
process. First, OHA could abolish its remedial order proce-
222 See generally text accompanying notes 173-86 supra.
226 See generally OHA's Goldstein: A Bureaucratic Mastermind, Legal Times of Washington,
July 9, 1979, at 5; Obscure, Bristly Energy Official: A Power Center, Legal Times of
Washington, July 31, 1978, at 1.
227 See text accompanying notes 169-170 supra.
228 FEA has handled such matters since passage of the Federal Energy Administration
Act in 1974. With the passage of the DOE Act, most of FEA's duties were transferred to
the Secretary and then delegated to ERA. See notes 104-105 and accompanying text supra.
229 See text accompanying notes 94-98 supra.
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dures.2 30  Agency adjudication would then occur primarily at
FERC. This approach most closely tracks Congress' apparent in-
tent.23 a The second option approaches the problem from the
opposite direction: Congress could abolish FERC review, leaving
agency adjudication entirely at OHA. One variant of this ap-
proach would be the establishment of OHA as an independent,
in-house court, not unlike the Board of Hearings and Appeals
proposed in the Administration's Department of Energy Bill. A
second variant would ensure independence in the factfinding
process by having administrative law judges render initial opin-
ions, appealable to OHA. Since the choice among these options 2 32
turns largely on the extent to which agency adjudication should
be separate from other agency functions, we will first examine the
need for and extent of such judicial independence.
230 See text accompanying notes 171-85 supra. There it was suggested that executive pro-
cedures be limited to essentially settlement conferences. If the case could not be settled and
litigation could not be avoided, the case would be handled at FERC.
231 See text accompanying notes 187-93 supra; Carolson, note 192 supra, at 3-4. See gener-
ally 42 U.S.C. § 7193 (Supp. I 1977). It can be argued that providing for secretarial "is-
suance procedures" along with Commission review of these procedures gives the agency
the discretion to come up with their own procedures for handling remedial order and
adjustment cases. Nevertheless, it strains credulity to think that Congress anticipated two
sets of adjudicatory procedures. Congress was more likely to have anticipated development
of the informal settlement procedures in the executive wing of the agency and adjudicatory
proceedings at FERC.
232 There are, of course, others as well. For example, a third approach is simply to
bypass agency adjudication altogether and bring all enforcement actions directly in the
district courts. This approach is similar to the appeals procedure for a tax deficiency notice
issued by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Upon receipt of such an IRS notice, a tax-
payer may file a notice of appeal with the United States Tax Court, a United States District
Court, or with the Court of Claims. 26 U.S.C. § 7422 (1976).
It is important to note that some remedial order proceedings also are taken directly to
district court under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-379, § 209, 84
Stat. 799, reprinted at 12 U.S.C. § 1904 note (1976). Despite vigorous argument that the Act
in § 211 does not allow filing such suits without exhausting the administrative remedies of
FERC review under the DOE Act (42 U.S.C. § 7193 (Supp. I 1977)), a district court re-
cently has upheld this approach. See United States v. Exxon Corp., 470 F. Supp. 674
(D.D.C. 1979), aff'd, No. DC-75 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 1980). See also 10 C.F.R.
§§ 205.190(a), .204 (1979) (regulations purporting to authorize this approach).
Moreover, "DOE has recognized that it does not have authority to impose [civil penal-
ties] itself and must instead refer such cases to the Justice Department for prosecution in
the Federal Courts" even though "DOE does compromise, settle and collect civil penalties
whenever deemed advisable," See Trowbridge, supra note 136, at 208 n.51. As the Exxon
case illustrates DOE is now trying, in some cases, to "bypass those procedures and initiate
... civil action[s] in District Court." Id. Utilizing various district courts around the country
to enforce EPAA regulations on recovery of overcharges would seriously undermine the
important goal of policy coherence. Given gradual decontrol of oil prices, however, this
goal is of diminishing importance. Nevertheless, since this Article is primarily concerned
with what is required for fair and efficient administrative adjudication in general, as well
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1. Separating Judicial Functions from Prosecutorial and Legislative
Functions-An Overview
Proposals for increasing judicial independence in the adminis-
trative process have been common throughout our regulatory his-
tory. They were forcefully advocated during the early twentieth
century and especially during the New Deal. 233  Federal adminis-
trative courts, separate and distinct from administrative agencies,
often were proposed as methods of ensuring that the judicial
function remains separate from other agency activities. 234  Though
such courts never were created, the agencies themselves gradually
assimilated the judicial decisionmaking model.235 In part, assimi-
as with oil pricing litigation in particular, it does not examine district court proceedings as
an alternative approach to agency regulation in detail. It assumes that the bulk of the
overcharge cases are and should be handled in the first instance by OHA.
Finally, there are other variants of the approaches analyzed in the text. For example,
OHA could issue a remedial order subject to appeal to FERC with FERC's role clearly
designated by statute as appellate in nature. The same risk of policy fragmentation would,
however, remain.
233 See Verkuil, The Emerging Concept of Administrative Procedure, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 258,
264-74 (1978).
Independent commissions were roundly criticized by many commentators during the
New Deal because of their combination of executive, prosecutorial and judicial functions
which compromised judicial independence. In 1937, the Brownlow Committee proposed
that independent commissions be placed within the various executive departments and
their administrative and judicial functions be separated into distinct divisions. PRESIDENT'S
COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE WITH STUDIES
OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 40-41 (1937), partially re-
printed in SUBCOMM. ON SEPARATION OF POWERS OF THE SEN. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
SEPARATION OF POWERS AND THE INDEPENDENT AGENCIES: CASES AND SELECTED READINGS S.
Doc. No. 49, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 343, 347 (1970). Professor Cushman summed up these criti-
cisms of independent commissions: "[The independent commission] lack[sJ the atmosphere
of detachment and impartiality in which private rights ought to be adjudicated." R.
CUSHMAN, THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 701 (1941).
24 See Verkuil, supra note 233, at 262, 268-69, 271. For a recent proposal to establish an
administrative court, see de Seife, Administrative Law Reform: A Focus on the Administrative
Law Judge, 13 VAL. L. REv. 229, 242-43 (1979). For recent proposals to broaden the scope
of federal judicial review of agency action, see note 181 supra.
23 There are various explanations why administrative agencies easily assimilated adver-
sary procedures. Dean Pound observed that the emerging legal characteristics of the early
twentieth century-the sequence of rules, principles, conceptions, and standards-was a
phase in the development of modern conceptions of justice and truth. Pound, The Adminis-
trative Application of Legal Standards, 42 A.B.A. REP. 445, 458-64 (1919). The application of
these standards to administrative bodies was necessary to maintain the objectivity and con-
fidence inspired by legal standards. Id. at 463-65. Professor Bernstein, on the other hand,
explains this development differently:
Original preoccupation with the inadequacies of the legislative and judicial
processes gave way gradually to skepticism about the judicial capacity of the
commissions and even to charges that they were by nature inherently absolutist
and arbitrary. Commissions, it was claimed, could achieve fairness only by fol-
lowing the pattern of the courts in handling cases. Kept on the defensive by the
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lation was the natural response to the skeptical view taken of gov-
ernment's relatively new regulatory role.236  The check on reg-
ulatory power provided by an adversarial system perhaps allayed
some of this skepticism. Moreover, as Jerome Frank observed,
"the 'fight' [or adversary] theory of justice is a sort of legal laissez-
faire."237 A gloves off adversarial approach theoretically ensured
the "best" decision possible. It also provided the regulated indus-
tries with every opportunity to contest, and perhaps thwart or de-
lay, substantive agency action.
There are, of course, other reasons to adopt an adversarial
decision-making model. It embodies certain notions of fairness that
are appropriate regardless of one's view of the wisdom or efficacy
of the substantive regulation involved. For example, the APA's
adversarial model fulfills the litigants' general expectation that the
same person or tribunal cannot be both prosecutor and judge.238
The reason is clear, particularly in enforcement proceedings: a
attacks of the bar and the courts, commissions have judicialized their proce-
dures.
M. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 72 (1955).
In explaining this development, other commentators recognized that administrative
decisions were actually judicial determinations made by an agency rather than by a court
and that these judicial-like decisions were best left to agencies because of their inherent
expertise and procedural flexibility. See, e.g., J. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS
93-100 (1938); B. SCHWARTZ, THE PROFESSOR AND THE COMMISSIONS 45-46 (1959). A more
recent suggestion is that the push for political independence, especially in the independent
regulatory commissions, resulted in the judicialization of regulatory procedures. Reformers
believed that they could obtain freedom from political influence and corruption by adopt-
ing the judicial model as opposed to the political model. See Cutler & Johnson, Regulation
and the Political Process, 84 YALE L.J. 1395, 1402-03 (1975).
236 See, e.g., M. BERNSTEIN, supra note 235, at 72; see also Pound, supra note 235, at 446,
458-59. Dean Pound saw the growth of administrative law as an adjunct to the overall
"shifting of the center of gravity in our polity" to the executive branch. Id. at 446. He was
concerned with this shift because the executive gave more authority and responsibility to
administrative agencies. In nineteenth century American thinking, law and administration
were put as rivals rather than complementary agencies. Id. at 450. The appropriate role for
administration had yet to be worked out in the scheme of governmental powers. R. POUND,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 1-5 (1942). Dean Pound recommended that adjudication be given to
the courts and not left with administrative agencies. Pound, supra note 235, at 464.
Felix Frankfurter also noted that the general fear of administrative arbitrariness sur-
rounding the growth of administrative agencies would only be eliminated by the in-
stitutionalization of judicial standards and by the increasing of awareness and zealousness
of the populace. Frankfurter, The Task of Administrative Law, 75 U. PA. L. REV. 614, 618
(1927).
237 J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 92 (1st Princeton paperback ed. 1973).
238 See 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 207, §§ 12.01-.06; K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE
SEVENTIES §§ 12.01-.06 (1976 & Supp. 1980); see generally Hamilton, supra note 14, at 1179;
Pedersen, The Decline of Separation of Functions in Regulatory Agencies, 64 VA. L. REv. 991,
1002-03 (1978).
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basic tenet of procedural fairness in such proceedings is impartial-
ity on the part of the decisionmaker. 239 A presiding officer who
is intimately involved in the prosecution or investigation of an in-
dividual is likely to have a predetermined opinion of the ultimate
outcome of the case and, in any event, usually will be perceived by
litigants as being biased against them.2 40  The Supreme Court has
held that complete separation of judicial, prosecutorial, and inves-
tigatory functions is not necessarily constitutionally required, 241
239 See Cramton, supra note 18, at 588.
240 A first and fundamental principle of natural justice is that no man shall be
judge in his own cause; a tribunal that has enforcing functions has by that fact
an interest in the outcome of the litigation to which it is a party and hence
should not take part in the process of decision.
J. LI_ S, supra note 235, at 92. See Pedersen, supra note 238, at 1002. Cf Mashaw, The
Management Side of Due Process: Some Theoretical and Litigation Notes on the Assurance of Accu-
racy, Fairness, and Timeliness in the Adjudication of Social Welfare Claims, 59 CORNELL L. REV.
772, 778-90 (1974) (suggesting that full adversary proceedings inappropriate in nonac-
cusatory social welfare cases).
241 Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975). The Supreme Court rejected the argu-
ment that a combination of functions was constitutionally impermissible.
The contention that the combination of investigative and adjudicative func-
tions necessarily creates an unconstitutional risk of bias in administrative ad-
judication has a much more difficult burden of persuasion to carry. It must
overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as ad-
judicators; and it must convince that, under a realistic appraisal of psychological
tendencies and human weakness, conferring investigative and adjudicative pow-
ers on the same individuals poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that
the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be
adequately implemented.
Id.
In Hortonville Joint School Dist. No. 1 v. Hortonville Educ. Ass'n, 426 U.S. 482, 493-
94, 497 (1976), the court held that a school board's unsuccessful negotiations of a collective
bargaining agreement with a teacher's union did not taint the board's subsequent decision
to dismiss striking teachers. Neither the board's familiarity with the facts of the case, nor its
prior public position on a policy issue related to the dispute were sufficient to overcome
the presumption of honesty and integrity in policymakers with decision-making _power.
It has been suggested that the separation of prosecutorial or investigative functions
from adjudicatory functions may be more constitutionally desirable with regard to "pros-
ecuting agencies" such as the FTC or the NLRB than with "non-accusatory" hearings be-
fore bodies such as the Social Security Board or the Veterans Administration. 2 K. DAVIS,
supra note 207 § 13.01, at 173; Pedersen, supra note 238, at 993-96. Courts have not gener-
ally recognized such a distinction. See, e.g., Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 311 (1955)
(due process not violated in deportation case when adjudicating officers were supervised by
investigators and prosecutors); Marathon Oil Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 564
F.2d 1253, 1265 (9th Cir. 1977) (due process not violated when regional administrator,
who made initial decision on permit issuance, reviewed his decision after additional hear-
ings); NLRB v. Aaron Bros. Corp., 563 F.2d 409, 413 (9th Cir. 1977) (regional director's
exercise of both investigative and adjudicative responsibilities in connection with issuance
and resolution of unfair labor practice complaint did not violate due process). See also 2 K.
DAvis, supra note 207 § 13.02, at 175.
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:491
but the adjudicatory provisions of the APA clearly provide for
such separation.24 2 Nevertheless, even for purposes of APA
adjudication, adequate separation of these functions does not re-
quire that such tasks be confined to separate and distinct agen-
cies. 43 Internal separation of these functions has long been con-
sidered a satisfactory way of resolving the inevitable problems
confronting an agency charged with legislative, executive, and ju-
dicial tasks. 244  Moreover, while prosecutorial and adjudicatory
functions are separate in most agencies,245 independent commis-
sions as well as executive officials regularly mix their judicial and
policymaking functions.246
There is, however, precedent for the establishment of an in-
house agency court devoted solely to "on the record" adjudicatory
disputes. The Occupational Health and Safety Commission is an
242 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556, 557 (1976) (governing on the record adjudicatory proceedings).
Section 554(d) provides that:
The employee who presides at the reception of evidence pursuant to section
556 of this title shall make the recommended decision or initial decision re-
quired by section 557 of this title, unless he becomes unavailable to the agency.
Except to the extent required for the disposition of ex parte matters as au-
thorized by law, such an employee may not-
(1) consult a person or party on a fact in issue, unless on notice and
opportunity for all parties to participate; or
(2) be responsible to or subject to the supervision or direction of an
employee or agent engaged in the performance of investigative or pros-
ecuting functions for an agency ....
243 See, e.g., Jaffe, Invective and Investigation in Administrative Law, 52 HARV. L. REV. 1201,
1218 (1939); Nathanson, Separation of Functions Within Federal Administrative Agencies, 35 ILL.
L. REV. 901, 934-35 (1941).
244 Jaffe, supra note 243, at 1216-18; Nathanson, supra note 243, at 934-35. But see
Pedersen, supra note 238, at 994 (on the breakdown of this concept in nonaccusatory pro-
ceedings).
245 For recent proposals calling for complete separation, see note 234 supra. Compare
THE PRESIDENT's ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EXECUTIVE ORGANIZATION, A NEW REGULATORY
FRAMEWORK: REPORT ON SELECTED INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENCIES (1971) [hereinafter
cited as THE ASH COUNCIL REPORT] with R. NOLL, REFORMING REGULATION: AN EVALUATION
OF THE ASH COUNCIL PROPOSALS (1971).
246 For example, the Federal Trade Commission has rulemaking powers under 15
U.S.C. § 57a (1976), and also hears appeals from decisions of administrative law judges in
cases applying those rules. See Appeal from initial decision, 16 C.F.R. § 3.52 (1979). See also
Petitions for discretionary review of initial decisions or recommended decisions-review
proceedings, 14 C.F.R. § 302.28 (1979) (CAB). Similarly, executive departments have ad-
ministrators involved in both adjudication and policymaking. For example, the Clean Air
Act empowers an administrative law judge in the Environmental Protection Agency to con-
duct an adjudicatory hearing in a determination of noncompliance. The judge's decision is
in turn appealable to an agency administrator. 42 U.S.C. § 7420 (Supp. 1 1977). See Orloff,
Buttressing the Traditional Approach to Enforcement of Environmental Requirements: Noncompliance
Penalties Under the Clean Air Act, 9 ENVT'L L. REP. 50029, 50037 (1979).
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independent agency within the Department of Labor. It consists
of three independent commissioners whose sole function is to de-
cide adjudicatory disputes.24 7 The Board of Hearings and
Appeals proposed in the initial DOE bill appears to have been
modeled on this commission.2 48 Abolishing FERC review and
making OHA an independent commission with jurisdiction over
adjudicatory disputes such as contested remedial orders similarly
would approximate the Occupational Health and Safety Commis-
sion approach as well as the proposal in the Administration's ini-
tial DOE bill.249 But neither independent FERC review of reme-
dial orders nor an independent in-house agency judiciary is neces-
sary for fair and efficient agency adjudication.
2. An In-House Agency Court-The Pure Form
An independent commission whose sole function is to resolve
adjudicatory disputes within an agency offers several advantages,
particularly in enforcement cases. Since agency judges would be
independent factfinders, they would be neither responsible for
the specific rule applied in the particular case, nor accountable to
agency policymakers in cases of disagreement over a rule's mean-
ing or application. Further, as independent commissioners, they
would be above the political fray and presumably immune to
247 29 U.S.C. § 661 (1976). See generally Sullivan, supra note 218, at 181-83.
248 See text accompanying notes 53-64 supra.
249 There is, however, one major difference. OHA also engages in policymaking through
its exceptions program. The DOE Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7194 (Supp. 1 1977), authorizes the
Secretary to grant adjustments to any rule, regulation or order issued under the laws pres-
ently governing the price and allocation of oil and various petroleum products. The pur-
pose of such adjustments is "to prevent special hardship, inequity, or unfair distribution of
burdens" in the application of such rules to any person. Id. The Secretary has delegated
the power to grant or deny adjustment requests to OHA. In effect, OHA now plays the
role of an equitable court exercising significant policymaking functions. See generally A.
Aman, supra note 120, at 20-48. This is a continuation of the policymaking role played by
the Office of Exceptions and Appeals in the old FEA. See generally PRESIDENTIAL TASK
FORCE REPORT, supra note 18, at 111.
The scope of exceptions relief can vary from regulatory fine tuning to serious en-
croachment on DOE's rules. The complexity of the petroleum industry and the DOE reg-
ulatory program makes it impossible to anticipate all, or even a significant portion of, the
factual circumstances that might arise in energy regulation. The flexibility provided by the
exceptions process allows these varied circumstances to be met. However, the exceptions
can swallow up the rules, in effect, becoming an alternative form of rulemaking. See A.
Aman, supra note 120, at 76-84. Decisions significantly changing a rule should be referred
to the Secretary for a rulemaking proceeding). Both OHA and its predecessor, the Office
of Exceptions and Appeals, have used the exceptions process to formulate significant new
pricing policies. See PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 18, at 110-11.
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political pressure. 250  Decisions by an in-house agency court could
thus enhance litigants' perceptions of fairness and, in some cases,
perhaps the actual fairness of the adjudicatory process. 251  Fur-
thermore, if recent reforms aimed at streamlining the administra-
tive processes are to survive judicial attack, courts must have con-
fidence in the agency's procedural expertise.252 Perhaps courts
would grant more deference to innovative procedural decisions
made by an agency judiciary.
There are, however, serious disadvantages to in-house agency
courts. The foremost is policy fragmentation. Policy considera-
tions underlie any application of law to fact even though they do
not generally dominate enforcement proceedings. The separation
of judicial and policymaking functions increases the possibility of
conflicting decisions between those who make the rules and those
who apply them.253 The likelihood of such conflict becomes
greater still if appointments to the agency court extend from one
administration into the next, when new executive officers may dif-
fer with the policy perspectives of the incumbent judges.2 54
Furthermore, if an agency court is granted jurisdiction over
all agency adjudication, including licensing or ratemaking, policy
determinations may become overjudicialized.255 In many areas,
only integration of judicial and legislative functions offers the
court the broad perspective and data base necessary for an en-
lightened decision. As one commentator recently pointed out, de-
250 This notion of independence from politics often is a primary reason for advocating
that policymaking and judicial functions should be combined in decisionmakers who are
immune from pressure by elected officials or cabinet-level presidential appointees. See, e.g.,
K. DAvIs, supra note 238, § 1.09-1. Independence from politically accountable officials,
however, has been sharply attacked and criticized. See, e.g., M. BERNSTEIN, supra note 235,
at 294-95; W. CARY, POLITICS AND REGULATORY AGENCIES 19 (1967); Cutler & Johnson,
supra note 235, at 1399-1400, 1402-09. But see, Robinson, On Reorganizing the Independent
Regulatory Agencies, 57 VA. L. REV. 947, 950-56 (1971) (asserting that independent commis-
sions are no less politically accountable than executive agencies). See generally ABA REPORT,
supra note 77, at 99-154.
25'1 See Currie, supra note 218, at 1160. See also R. CUSHMAN, supra note 233, at 701-02
(emphasizing that those before an administrative tribunal need to feel that they are receiv-
ing impartial justice).
252 See generally Verkuil, supra note 233, at 309-10.
252 See Currie, supra note 218, at 1116-20 (discussing problems of policy fragmentation
and conflict between Secretary of Labor, rulemaking authority, and OSHRC, independent
adjudicator). For a discussion of the institutional conflict between OSHA and OSHRC, see
Sullivan, supra note 218, at 183-94.
254 This, of course, is entirely possible given the staggered terms of office agency judges
would be likely to have.
"' See Pedersen, supra note 238, at 1002-07.
558 [Vol. 65:491
ENERGY CRISIS
cisions "in complicated technical fields, such as those concerning
licenses for nuclear power plants, permits to discharge substances
into water, and removal of pesticides from the market" require
the decision-maker to face "a large number of policy-related
choices that fall within the statutory mandate." '25 6 To the extent
that an in-house agency court encourages adherence to the judi-
cial decision-making model even when policy questions are in-
volved, it might undercut sound decisionmaking on energy-
related matters. 2
57
3. Making OHA an Independent Agency Court
Even if one were to decide that the advantages of an in-house
court outweigh the disadvantages, conferring independent status
on OHA would not produce an agency court in the pure form
described above. OHA is directly involved in agency policymaking
because of its role in granting or denying requests for adjustments
to secretarial rules and orders.258 Indeed, OHA has utilized the
adjustments process as a cutting edge of policy formulation within
the department. 259  Given FERC's power to review and possibly
to veto certain secretarial "energy actions" and rules pertaining to
oil regulations, an independent OHA would further fragment
policymaking by splitting authority over oil matters among two
independent commissions and the executive.
In addition to exacerbating the likelihood of policy -fragmen-
tation, creating a second independent commission within DOE
would further remove policymaking powers from political con-
trols. The wisdom of entrusting significant policy decisions to un-
democratic institutions such as independent commissions has long
been debated. 260 Recent reform proposals urge that policymak-
256 Id. at 995-96 (footnotes omitted).
25'7 See id. at 1008-10.
258 See note 23 supra.
259 Id. This is a continuation of the old FEA approach. See generally PRESIDENTIAL TASK
FORCE REPORT, supra note 18, at 111-23.
260 Though they are labeled "independent commissions," some have argued that these
commissions are anything but independent. The theory that independence assures 'judge-
like wisdom, balance, and insight" in administration is a dangerous illusion. Fesler, Indepen-
dent Regulatory Establishments, in ELEMENTS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 227 (F. Marx ed.
1946). Notions of independence allow us to pretend "that we can preserve democracy and
still vest economic powers in a governmental agency that is not clearly subject to officials
who in turn are responsible to the people." Id. at 228. But "[t]he process of regulation is
unavoidably political." M. BERNSTEIN, supra note 235, at 258. Thus, the "most serious im-
plication of the theory of the independent commission is a dangerously naive concept of
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ing functions should rest in the hands of officials more directly
accountable to the electorate.261 Making OHA independent
would help to insulate another policymaking unit within the gov-
ernment from more direct political control. Yet even if one were
to reject the policy arguments underlying the criticisms of inde-
pendent regulatory commissions, there are, nevertheless, less dras-
tic means of providing for independence in the OHA decision-
making process, short of the creation of another commission. The
use of administrative law judges would, for example, ensure corn-
democracy as a scheme of government to which political responsibility has no necessary
relevance." Id. at 146; cf. Jaffe, The Illusion of the Ideal Administration, 86 HARV. L. REV.
1183, 1188-91 (1973) (independent commissions susceptible to political process and their
failure to satisfy public interest cannot result from political immunity). Critics through the
years have argued for a reappraisal of the role of independent commissions on this
ground. See, e.g., M. BERNSTEIN, supra notd 235, at 281-84; R. CUSHMAN, supra note 233, at
616-21 (experience of British Unemployment Assistance Board demonstrates futility of
placing impartial, nonpolitical board in charge of program whose past administration has
been controversial).
One of the focal points of present criticism is the independent commission's failure to
integrate its substantive policy with that made by other independent commissions:
While Congress establishes the goals, it cannot legislate the details of every ac-
tion taken in pursuit of each goal, or make the balancing choices that each such
decision requires. It has therefore delegated this task to the regulatory agencies.
But we have given each of the regulatory agencies one set of primary goals,
with only limited responsibility for balancing a proposed action in pursuit of its
own goals against adverse impacts on the pursuit of other goals. For most of
these agencies, no effective mechanisms exist for coordinating the decisions of
one agency with those of other agencies, or conforming them to the balancing
judgments of elected generalists, such as the President and Congress.
ABA REPORT, supra note 77, at 99-100. Lack of policy integration impedes not only the
political goals of the executive and legislature but also regulation in the broad public in-
terest. M. BERNSTEIN, supra note 235, at 164-66. Thus, any reform of independent regula-
tory commissions must attempt to restore political accountability as the basis for policy
integration. See THE PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EXECUTIVE ORGANIZATION, A NEW
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 13-15 (1971). But see Robinson, supra note 24, at 950-55 (political
accountability and policy integration would not necessarily be achieved by replacing inde-
pendent commissions with executive agencies under presidential control); Thomas, Politics,
Structure and Personnel in Administrative Regulation, 57 VA. L. REv. 1033, 1062-65 (1971)
(factors impeding policy control extend beyond structural characteristics to include inher-
ent political nature of regulation). For another source discussing independent commissions,
see J. FREEDMAN, supra note 209, at 58-77.
261 See ABA REPORT, supra note 77, at 99-154. See also Cutler & Johnson, supra note 235,
at 1397, 1399. The authors argue that in the absence of any political control, agency deci-
sions on substantive policy often fail to coincide with the policy decisions that politically
accountable bodies would have preferred. We allow the independent agency to make its
decision independently; but when we dislike this decision, we then resort to the political
process to change it. ,This failure of regulation can be avoided in the first instance with
political checks and oversights, which have been proposed in various reorganization
schemes. Cutler and Johnson argue that the President should be given the authority to
modify or direct agency actions and priorities. Id. at 1414-17. Bernstein condemns the
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plete independence at the crucial factfinding stage of the proceed-
ing. 262
Finally, there are practical reasons for rejecting a proposal to
make OHA an independent commission. The oil program is being
phased out. Enforcement actions are likely to be completed within
a few years. OHA undoubtedly will have other regulatory tasks to
perform for which independence may be neither necessary nor
desirable. 263
4. Abolishing FERC Review
Rather than creating a second independent commission
within DOE, FERC review of contested remedial orders should be
abolished. 64 OHA would then have sole responsibility for ad-
judicating these cases. In addition to minimizing the policy frag-
entire regulatory commission concept, arguing that "new forms, techniques, and ideas"
must be adopted. M. BERNSTEIN, supra note 235, at 296-97.
262 See text following note 338 infra.
263 See note 9 supra. Of course, to the extent new enforcement proceedings are begun,
these cases may go on well into the 1980's.
264 Abolishing FERC review will be controversial and, in general, likely to be opposed by
the regulated companies involved. A primary argument on their behalf is that DOE's struc-
ture should continue to protect the judicial function, "both in fact and in appearance, from
undue political influence." Letter from Donald B. Craven, Attorney for Exxon Corp., to
Betty Jo Christian, Chairman, Administrative Conference Committee on Ratemaking and
Economic Regulation (Jan. 18, 1980) (on file at Cornell Law Review). Unlike politically ac-
countable cabinet officers, independert commissioners are presumed to be relatively im-
mune to the ever-changing political winds.
We may conclude, then, that Congress has had two general aims in creating
independent regulatory bodies: first, to secure reasonably impartial and non-
partisan handling of quasi-judicial tasks; second, the honest and efficient handl-
ing of tasks too big to be entrusted to the politicians in the executive depart-
ments.
R. CUSHMAN, supra note 233, at 669. See also THE ASH COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 18, at
16-18.
There are, however, other possible reasons. The regulated industries often accept the
combination of functions inherent in an independent commission because they do not al-
ways perceive the regulators as their foes. In many agencies, the regulators are sympathetic
to industry's point of view. M. BERNSTEIN, supra note 235, at 87-90; W. CARY, supra note
250, at 67-68; B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 235, at 118-19; Cutler & Johnson, supra note 235, at
1404; McFarland, Landis' Report: The Voice of One Crying in the Wilderness, 47 VA. L. REv.
373, 424-25 (1961). But cf. Jaffe, Book Review, 65 YALE L.J. 1068, 1071-72 (1956) (review-
ing M. BERNSTEIN, supra note 235) (arguing that industry orientation occurs in executive
departments as well as independent agencies). Independence is also related to the ideas of
expertness, judicialization, and freedom from political influence. M. BERNSTEIN, supra note
235, at 148. The independent regulatory commissions are perceived to combine these
characteristics into one group. Courts may also be independent, but they lack the necessary
expertise and executive departments lack freedom from political pressures.
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mentation that is likely to result under the present approach,
there are. other reasons why Congress should adopt this approach.
First, FERC's present judicial role differs significantly from
an independent agency court in its pure form, primarily in that
FERC's duties extend far beyond agency adjudication dealing with
oil pricing matters. As successor to the Federal Power Commis-
sion, FERC inherited a substantial backlog of cases, and acquired
a number of new responsibilities as well. 265  It has enormous
day-to-day policymaking and enforcement responsibilities for a
variety of programs, including the enormously complex Natural
Gas Policy Act of 1978.66 Moreover, prior to passage of the
DOE Act, FERC's predecessor, the Federal Power Commission,
had no expertise in oil regulation.267 Adding one more new task,
such as review of OHA remedial orders, to an already overbur-
dened agency is impractical and, in any event, is likely to result in
FERC playing primarily an appellate role.2 68  To the extent this
occurs, the FERC layer of review does not provide much addi-
tional actual protection for the litigants, but rather serves primar-
ily as a source of delay before issuance of a final agency order.
Indeed, the appellate role in this process is, and should be, played
by the judiciary.
Second and more important, even if FERC were to exercise
its apparent authority to review OHA orders on a de novo basis,
such scrutiny no longer appears to be necessary. The primary
reasons for Congress' institution of FERC review no longer exist.
DOE's adjudicatory and enforcement responsibilities now are
adequately separated: OHA handles adjudicatory functions, ERA
deals with enforcement, and each unit independently reports to
the Secretary of Energy.26 9 Moreover, OHA's enforcement pro-
cedures provide much more protection to litigants than those in
existence at the time Congress authorized FERC review. Though
some may question why OHA developed such elaborate proce-
265 For FERC's new responsibility, and for authority on its backlog of cases, see Law-
rence & Muchow, supra note 193; text accompanying notes 110-116 supra.
266 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 3311-3432 (West Supp. 1979).
267 See generally text accompanying notes 94-97 supra.
268 See text accompanying notes 110-116 supra.
269 As the new regulations issued on behalf of OHA demonstrate, internal separation of
adjudicatory and enforcement responsibilities can be achieved within an executive agency.
See text accompanying notes 173-91 supra. It is possible to establish substantial indepen-
dence within an executive agency without necessarily becoming a fully independent reg-
ulatory commission.
562 [Vol. 65:491
ENERGY CRISIS
dures in the first place,270 their beneficial, protective effects can
and should be preserved by statute.
In short, though acceptability, efficiency, and accuracy considera-
tions permit various ways to overcome the present problems, abo-
lition of FERC review of OHA remedial orders provides the best
solution. It would ease FERC's burden and eliminate the present
duplication of administrative functions. Most important, it would
lessen the risk of policy fragmentation between FERC and DOE.2 7'
A unified, coherent approach to energy policy was one of the
main goals of the reorganization attempt that led to the
creation of DOE. Retaining adjudicatory responsibility for an
executive program within the executive wing of the agency would
further this goal. Congress should abolish FERC review and, at
the very least, make the procedural provisions for FERG review
under the DOE Act applicable to OHA. As is discussed below,
Congress should also consider applying the adjudicatory provi-
sions of an amended APA to all agency enforcement proceedings,
including those at DOE.2 72
E. A Residual Problem-Duplication of Judicial Review
Even if the problems of internal policy fragmentation and
procedural duplication are solved, an overarching problem re-
mains: duplication of judicial review of decisions emanating from
DOE. There are presently two levels of appellate review as of
right. 273 Final orders issued by FERC are appealable to the dis-
trict court, and then to the Temporary Emergency Court of Ap-
peals. Only one level of appellate review is needed.
Duplication should be eliminated by abolishing district court
review of agency remedial order decisions.2 74 The present two-
270 See notes 171-185 and accompanying text supra.
271 In this regard, Congress should also consider abolition of FERC review of various
secretarial rules. Though a complete review of these provisions is beyond the scope of this
Article, keeping the policymaking functions within one agency is a worthwhile goal. Giving
the Secretary the basic responsibility for the EPAA and its progeny and then allowing
FERC the opportunity to redirect the executive's policy directions offers not only a check
on executive power, but an additional opportunity for conflict and dissension. Even if such
dissension does not surface, it may just as well be due to conflict avoidance as general
agreement.
272 For the pros and cons of these proposals, see notes 298-301 and accompanying text
infra.
273 In addition, Supreme Court review is available by way of writ of certiorari.
274 Two levels of appellate judicial review also exist for adjustments decisions. This too,
would appear to be unnecessarily duplicative.
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tier judicial review provisions established by the Emergency Pe-
troleum Allocation Act resulted from an emergency approach to
legislation, 75 rather than from a carefully thought-out legislative
program. In its haste to meet the demands of the moment, Con-
gress simply incorporated by reference the judicial framework es-
tablished under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970.276 Two-
tier appellate review may have been appropriate for a program
applying temporary price controls to virtually all American
businesses, large and small. District court review provided a local
judicial forum for smaller businesses that needed an inexpensive
method of resolving disputes. But this rationale loses much of its
force when applied to a relatively long-term oil pricing program.
The advantages of the two-tier approach to judicial review 277
evaporate when the losing party, whether it be the government or
a company, decides to appeal. A substantial portion of remedial
order decisions from district courts are likely to be appealed,
given the enormous amounts of money that often are at stake. In
this category of cases, district court review merely duplicates the
circuit court's function and delays the issuance of an authoritative
and final decision.278  To the extent that some cases are not ap-
275 The House report describes the bill as giving the President "temporary authority" to
deal with "existing or imminent shortages and dislocations" in oil distribution, and "to
adopt within 10 days of enactment and to implement 15 days thereafter a program provid-
ing for the mandatory allocation" of oil and petroleum products. H.R. REP. No. 531, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 5, reprinted in [1973] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2582, 2582.
27I The legislative history of the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act does not discuss
judicial review for the oil regulation program. The Act referred to the judicial review
provisions of the Economic Stabilization Act and simply incorporated them by reference.
See H.R. REP. No. 531, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 22, reprinted in [1973] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 2582, 2599; H.R. REP. No. 628, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 31, reprinted in [1973] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2688, 2707-08.
277 An additional advantage "of mandatory two tier review [appeal as of right] over
single-tier district court review is that it provides a mechanism for the resolution of incon-
sistencies within and between districts and for the achievement of circuit-wide uniformity."
Currie & Goodman, Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action: Quest for the Optimum
Forum, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 16 (1975).
278 As Professors Currie and Goodman have noted with regard to two-tier review:
In every case eventually appealed to the circuit courts, interposition of the
district court substantially increases the cost of litigation and delays the resolu-
tion of the controversy .... The litigant must pay double filing fees and brief
reproduction costs, and must transport his attorney to two courts instead of to
one. He must also pay for extra work by his lawyers .... The indirect costs of
the added delay ... are more elusive. Delay may induce parties to settle on
terms less just than would be imposed by a court decision; it may cause deterio-
ration of evidence that must be used if there is a retrial; similar cases may have
to be litigated until the disputed point of law is settled; it also increases the
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pealed, however, the risk of various conflicting district court deci-
sions increases. Moreover, if a case is not appealed from district
court to the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals, one cannot
necessarily assume that the process was acceptable to the parties
involved. The cost of two appeals rather than one may have effec-
tively excluded some litigants from the superior forum. 7 9
Many of the regulated companies have argued, however, that
the primary value of district court review in the oil program is
that it allows the parties involved broader discovery rights than
those provided by OHA.28 ° In many cases, it is contended, dis-
covery has made the difference between victory and defeat.281
These litigants, however, have focused on a problem wholly unre-
lated to the primary purpose of appellate district court review of
administrative decisions. Moreover, the discovery granted by dis-
trict courts has been in the context of pre-enforcement actions
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, not in the context of ap-
peals to the district court after a final agency adjudication.282
harm done by a challenged practice or by its temporary restraint during the
period of litigation.
Id. at 16-17.
27' Even if there is no appeal, one cannot assume that the process was necessarily ac-
ceptable to the parties. As Professors Currie and Goodman have noted:
Nor are the disadvantages of two-tier review limited to those cases in which
appeals are taken. Perhaps the most unfortunate consequence of adding the
district court stage is that it prices the appeals court beyond the reach of many
litigants. The party who loses in the district court may stop at that point, not
because he is satisfied or even rsigned, but because he is exhausted. When that
occurs, the objection is not only that the exhausted litigant has been denied
access to a superior forum, as under a single-tier district court system, but that
he has effectively been excluded from a superior forum that is available to
more affluent litigants. Further, if the cost of another appeal is sufficiently
great in comparison to the stakes in an entire class of cases, interposing the
district court could create substantial disuniformity.
Id. at 17.
280 See note 314 infra.
281 See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. DOE, 596 F.2d 1029, 1052-56 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.
1978). See also Sun Co., Inc., Tentative Recommendations Regarding Remedial Order Pro-
cedures of the Department of Energy 37-41 (Nov. 28, 1979) (pursuant to the testimony of
Robert 0. Lewers before the Administrative Conference of the United States) (on file at
Cornell Law Review).
282 See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Schlesinger, 465 F. Supp. 913 (E.D. Penn 1979); Standard
Oil Co. v. FEA, 440 F. Supp. 328 (N.D. Ohio, 1977); Phillips Petrol. Co. v. FEA, 435 F.
Supp. 1239 (D. Del. 1977).
An argument can be made, however, that abolition of appellate district court review
could jeopardize the ability of companies to seek pre-enforcement district court review and
thus deprive them of an opportunity to engage in discovery under the federal rules. See,
e.g., Rochester v. Bond, 603 F.2d 927, 931 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ("In the absence of a statute
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Adequate discovery, however, can and should be made available
at the agency level.283 It simply is unnecessary to add an extra
prescribing review in a particilar court, 'nonstatutory' review may be sought in a district
court under any applicable jurisdictional grant. If, however, there exists a special statutory
review procedure, it is ordinarily supposed that Congress intended that procedure to be
the exclusive means of obtaining judicial review in those cases to which it applies"). The
validity of or need for pre-enforcement review is beyond the scope of this Article. The
recommendations with regard to judicial review deal solely with appellate district court re-
view after final agency adjudication has occurred.
283 OHA's regulations provide for discovery (10 C.F.R. § 205.198(a) (1979)), but only
under an order issued by OHA. These orders are granted if OHA determines that discov-
ery is "necessary for the party to obtain relevant and material evidence and that discovery
will not unduly delay the proceeding." Id. § 205.198(e). Oil companies have expressed
great dissatisfaction with OHA's rule and its application. They argue that OHA's discovery
rules fall short of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and that, in any event, OHA has
applied its standards far too stringently in the past.
Discovery under OHA's regulations differs from discovery under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in at least five ways. First, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
discovery is permissible "if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to
the discovery of admissible evidence," even though the information immediately sought is
not evidence itself. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). OHA generally will permit discovery of evi-
dence itself and will not allow discovery which may lead to evidence, because this latter
type of discovery "would unduly delay the . .. proceeding." See, e.g., Supreme Petroleum
Co., [1979 Transfer Binder] EN. MNGM'T (CCH) (3 DOE) 82,515 (1979).
Second, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure the parties, by and large, regulate
discovery between themselves. They do not have to apply to the court for permission to
engage in discovery. Parties only appear in court if there is a breakdown in discovery and a
protective order (FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)), an order compelling discovery (FED. R. Civ. P.
37(a)), or imposition of sanctions for failure to comply with an order (FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b))
is sought. Under OHA regulations, however, if a person wishes to utilize discovery, he
must file a motion to do so with OHA. 10 C.F.R. § 205.198 (1979).
A third difference relates to the timing of discovery. Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure discovery may generally be obtained anytime from the filing of the lawsuit until
trial actually begins; the only significant exception to this being that plaintiffs may not take
depositions upon oral examination "prior to the expiration of 30 days after service of the
summons and complaint upon any defendant" without leave of court unless the defendant
has sought discovery within the 30 day period. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(a). OHA regulations
narrowly limit the time period during which a person may file a motion for discovery. As
noted above, ERA begins an enforcement proceeding by filing a NOPV. 10 C.F.R.
§ 205.191 (1979). After 30 days, ERA may issue a proposed remedial order (PRO). Id.
§ 205.192. Once notice of the PRO is published in the Federal Register, an "aggrieved
person" then has 15 days within which to file a Notice of Objection to the PRO. If a Notice
of Objection is not filed within that time period, the person "shall be deemed to have
admittec the findings of fact and conclusions of law as stated in the PRO ... [and] the
PRO may be issued as a final order." Id. § 205.193. A person then has 40 days after he has
filed his Notice of Objection to file his Statement of Objections. Id. § 205.196. If a person
intends to file a motion for discovery, he must file it at the same time he files his Statement
of Objections. Id. § 205.198. Thus, persons generally are required to request all discovery
they may want to employ within 55 days of the publication of the PRO.
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layer of appellate judicial review to achieve this result. In short,
OHA has indicated a strong reluctance to depart from this strict timetable. In Time
Oil Co., [1979 Transfer Binder] EN. MNGM'T (3 DOE) 82,542 (1979). OHA denied a
motion for discovery which was filed after the time limitation had expired. Time Oil
claimed that this motion should be granted under the provisions of the regulations which
allow for extensions if cause can be shown. See generally 10 C.F.R. § 205.199G (1979). OHA
stated that, while it is "more concerned with the merits of controversies than with mere
procedural niceties and technicalities .... Time has already been given considerable pro-
cedural flexibility during the course of this proceeding .... " [1979 Transfer Binder] EN.
MNGM'T (3 DOE) 82,542. OHA also indicated that Time had neither indicated that dis-
covery of this material was "critical" to proving its case nor "that the substance of this
request differs substantially" from that of a prior request which had been partially granted.
Id. Also, Time's motion of an evidentiary hearing on similar issues had been partially
granted. Finally, Time had requested discovery here as an intervenor in a case brought by
DOE against another oil company, and that company had opposed this discovery motion.
OHA has also denied a motion for discovery in a case where the party moving for
discovery not only failed to file the motion within the proper time limitations but also
failed to specify, as the regulations require (10 C.F.R. § 205.198(c) (1979)), the reasons why
discovery was necessary. Mid-Continent Sys., Inc., [1979 Transfer Binder] EN. MNGM'T (3
DOE) 82, 556 (1979). In addition, the Company had previously been granted an eviden-
tiary hearing at which it could present testimony on issues identical to those for which it
sought discovery. The company had, however, failed to comply with OHA requirements to
identify witnesses and serve documentary evidence in advance on the other parties. Al-
though the tight time requirement imposed by OHA can, in some circumstances, appear to
be unreasonable, OHA generally is willing to accede to legitimate requests for extensions
but not to allow dilatory motions to delay the proceedings.
A fourth difference relates to the persons to whom discovery is available. Under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, discovery is available only to parties. FED. R. Civ. P.
26(a). Under the OHA regulations, motions for discovery may be filed by persons who
filed a Notice and Statement of Objections. 10 C.F.R. § 205.198 (1979). These Notices may
be filed by any person aggrieved by the issuance of the PRO. 10 C.F.R. § 205.193(a)
(1979).
A fifth difference relates to the type of issue for which an admission may be re-
quested. Federal rule 36 permits requests to admit the application of law to facts. The
OHA regulations governing discovery state that "[a] motion for discovery may request that
... [a] person admit to the genuineness of any relevant document or the truth of any
relevant fact." 10 C.F.R. § 205.198(b)(3) (1979). OHA has interpreted the language "truth
of any relevant fact" to include only requests to admit facts, and that requests to admit
issues of law or the application of law to facts are impermissible under the regulations.
William Herbert Hunt Trust Estate, [1979 Transfer Binder] EN. MNGM'T (3 DOE) 82,525
(1979).
Though there arguably may have been problems with OHA's discovery processes, re-
quiring that OHA adopt the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for purposes of discovery
would be an overreaction to these problems. The federal rules are designed to cover a very
wide variety of circumstances, and broad procedures are necessary for the success of the
rules in this wide variety of situations. OHA litigation is much narrower in scope and there
is substantial similarity among the cases brought before OHA. OHA discovery procedures
can and should be tailored to the specific needs of OHA litigation. Moreover, OHA's fear
that discovery may be used as a delaying tactic is not unjustified, particularly in enforce-
ment cases where there often may be an incentive on the part of those contesting remedial
orders to delay the proceedings. For example, in the discovery sought in the case of Atlantic
Richfield Co., No. BRZ-0015 (DOE Jan. 25, 1980), thousands of interrogatories were sub-
mitted by the oil companies to Office of Special Counsel. OSC estimates that it would re-
quire 60 professional person years to respond to these interrogatives. OSC Brief at 88. The
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given a fair administrative adjudicatory process, one level of ap-
oil companies conceded that their requests were extensive, but noted that the amount in
dispute in this case exceeds $1.2 billion. They also disputed the accuracy of OSC's estima-
tion of the time required to respond. Reply Brief at 146-49. OHA's procedures give the
agency much more flexibility in controlling this process and greatly lessen the likelihood of
abuse by the litigants involved. In this regard, the federal rules discovery procedures
hardly are models of efficiency. They have long been subject to abuse and a source of
unnecessary delay. OHA's approach tries to avoid these pitfalls.
This is not to suggest, however, that in retaining such tight control over its discovery
process, OHA has not been subject to intense criticism. This is particularly true with regard
to its handling of discovery requests seeking to obtain an agency's contemporaneous con-
struction of arguably vague and improperly applied regulations.
Perhaps the greatest problem throughout the oil pricing program has been the com-
plexity of the oil pricing regulations which is often compounded by imprecision and
vagueness. To a large extent, this is due not only to the magnitude of the regulatory task
involved, but also to the hasty manner in which these regulations were drafted and the
inability of understaffed agencies such as FEO and FEA to clarify these rules promptly and
consistently. As a consequence, a good deal of litigation has arisen in attempting to give
these regulations a precise meaning through the enforcement process. The meaning of
these regulations to the enforcement offices of DOE, however, often is at odds with the
way the industry has interpreted the relevant rules. The industry's interpretation, it is con-
tended, was based on a reasonable reading of the regulation involved and often, assurances
from various levels of FEA officials, staff and auditors in the field. Discovery of the in-
terpretations given to its regulations by FEA personnel was thus viewed as an extremely
significant aspect of these enforcement proceedings. Some district courts have granted such
discovery requests.
In Standard Oil Co. v. DOE, 596 F.2d 1029 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1978), for exam-
ple, the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals dealt with, among other things, FEA's
rule requiring recovery of nonproduct cost increases. In regulations effective February 1,
1976, FEA announced that producers would be prohibited from recovering nonproduct
cost increases before they recovered all product cost increases, as these terms were defined
in the regulations. FEA announced that this ruling was implicit in its regulations and
applied it both retrospectively and prospectively. Two months later FEA announced that it
would not apply the rule prospectively but would continue to apply it retrospectively.
Although FEA claimed that the sequence of cost recovery was implicit in its regula-
tions, it was nowhere explicit and was, in fact, contradicted by advice given by FEA staff to
several oil companies. The Court recognized the well established principle "that where
administrative regulations are ambiguous on their face, the court should look to the con-
struction which the responsible agency has given to them." Id. at 1055. It went on to note,
however, that "the weight to be given to an administrative interpretation depends upon
'the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency
with earlier and later pronouncements, and all of those factors which give it power to
persuade, if lacking power to control.' " Id. at 1056. It thus concluded that evidence of the
agency's contemporaneous construction of its own regulations was relevant and in this case
the agency's construction showed little consistency or thoroughness. Indeed, the court
stated that the usual deference given to administrative interpretations simply could not be
given in this case.
This rule is simply not applicable to the FEA's interpretation first announced
on February 1, 1976.... The FEA relies upon an after the fact interpretation
in the preamble to the new rule that, "The order specified in the new Section
212.85 is the same as that under the regulations previously in effect." Yet, it is
undisputed that during the relevant period the only public pronouncements
were made by officials of the Office of Compliance and the FEA auditors and
were contrary to the interpretation set forth in the February 1, 1976 rule.
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... [W]e find no basis for according deference to the interpretation of the FEA
first announced on February 1, 1976.
Id.
This case is a prime example of the importance of evidence dealing with the agency's
contemporaneous construction of the regulations involved. It was initiated by several oil
companies in district court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against DOE. Thus, the
companies were able to take advantage of the discovery procedures set forth in federal
rules as well as the Court's inclination to interpret those rules broadly in developing their
record. It is this kind of broad discovery which the litigants claim is lacking at OHA.
The office of Special Counsel generally has opposed motions for discovery of docu-
ments attempting to establish the agency's contemporaneous construction of its regulations.
See, e.g., Tenneco Oil Co. v. DOE, 475 F. Supp. 299, 316 (D. Del. 1979). The usual
grounds for objection is that they are predecisional, internal agency memoranda which
reflect "the mental processes of administrative decisionmakers" (Citizens To Preserve Overton
Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971)), and therefore, are not subject to discovery.
United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941). Given, however, the uneven history of the
oil pricing program, the complexity of its regulations and the general state of flux that has
existed ever since they first went into effect, questions involving the proper interpretation
of the regulations can be particularly important in these cases. Though OHA initially has
been very stringent in its approach to these questions, there are now signs that it has
broadened its approach to this problem.
On January 25, 1980, OHA issued an opinion in Atlantic Richfield Co., No. BRZ-0015
(DOE Jan. 25, 1980), dealing with a variety of discovery motions filed by the companies
involved. The thrust of these motions was to obtain discovery of the agency's contem-
poraneous construction of certain key regulations including those involving the proper in-
terpretation of the "property concept," the stripper well property exemption, its applicabil-
ity to newly designated properties as well as natural gas wells, and the definition of "posted
price." OHA's opinion is significant in that for the first time it recognizes the need for this
kind of discovery. The opinion attempts to strike a compromise between the extensive and
exhaustive requests of the oil companies regarding contemporaneous construction of all
regulations applicable to their case and a position that prohibits such discovery as a general
matter. In effect, OHA's rule is as follows: "[Clontemporaneous construction evidence is
warranted if a showing is made that the regulation at issue is susceptible to more than one
reasonable interpretation and is not given.a more specific meaning through formal agency
or congressional documents." Id. at 50-51.
In applying this approach to the discovery motions at hand, OHA granted several of
the company's motions. For example, with regard to the agency's definition of property, a
term whose meaning is absolutely basic to the multi-tier system of pricing adopted by the
agency, OHA noted:
Despite the apparent simplicity of the language used in the property definition,
no official guidance was provided as to the application of the definition until
the issuance of Ruling 1975-15, 40 Fed. Reg. 40,832 (1975), more than two
years after the promulgation of the provision. No detailed guidance and no
clear statement of the literal interpretation of the property definition was avail-
able until Ruling 1977-1 was first issued as a regulatory preamble in August
1976, three years after the crude oil price rule was put into effect.
Id. at 44. It went on to order discovery, concluding:
Therefore, although we find in the language and history of the property defin-
ition and in the overall system for regulating the price of domestic crude oil
strong support for a literal interpretation, we are troubled by the checkered history of
this provision. While this should have been a provision free of doubt, it is clear
that the agency was slow to provide detailed guidance to affected firms despite knowledge
that difficulties were being encountered. We believe, therefore, that in the present
proceeding the petitioners should be afforded every opportunity to demonstrate that the
agency's position has been inconsistent and that some meaning other than that described
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pellate judicial review, followed by an opportunity to petition the
in Ruling 1975-15, Ruling 1977-1, and other public pronouncements of the agency is
in fact the correct one. Discovery of contemporaneous agency constructions of the
property definition and the applications of the definition contained in the Rul-
ings and the August 20, 1976 Notice will therefore be permitted.
Id. at 48 (emphasis added).
At the same time, OHA was careful not to allow discovery it sees as reopening matters
already decided by the courts. Thus, it denied discovery requests with regard to certain
regulations affecting stripper wells, noting:
The Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals has explicitly stated that the reg-
ulations always limited the well count to wells that directly yield or produce
crude oil and rejected the argument that the regulations could lead to a
reasonable expectation that injection wells would be counted as "lacking in
merit." ... The Court has thus determined conclusively that the applicable reg-
ulations were no*t susceptible to more than one reasonable construction.
Id. at 51 (citation omitted).
OHA's opinion is not likely to quell all criticism of its discovery rules. Though it rec-
ognizes the principle of contemporaneous construction, it arguably does not go as far as
the courts have gone under the federal rules. OHA limits such discovery by excluding
statements made by non-policy makers such as auditors or low level FEA staff. According
to OHA: "The agency's position may be stated only by those within the agency who have
been given authority to formulate significant agency policy. ... Therefore, the only rele-
vant inquiry concerns official statements by responsible agency officials." Id. at 64. This
does not go as far as the Court in Standard Oil where the statements of staff and auditors
in the field were discoverable and admitted into evidence. OHA has reasoned that not only
are such persons unable to speak for the agency, but "a requirement that the Office of
Special Counsel search thousands of audit files would impose an unwarranted burden on
that office." Id. OHA's opinion thus concludes:
A document is discoverable if it was intended for dissemination within the
agency and if, after analyzing the issues, it sets forth the considerations sup-
porting the interpretations proposed. This category would include directives
from senior officials or from the national office to regional offices of the
agency, and other documents that may be said to reflect the effective law and
policy of the agency. A responsible officer whose opinions are discoverable is
one who has the authority to explain or formulate policy within the agency.
Id. at 65.
Given the relative chaos that marked the beginnings of the oil program, it is arguable
how common such reasoned memoranda are. Nevertheless, OHA's recognition of the con-
temporaneous construction principle is significant. Its desire to draw a line limiting broad
requests seeking any and all statements by present and past employees is understandable.
The line that it does draw may prevent burdensome discovery requests. But it may also
prevent the discovery of the only conflicting interpretations that, in fact, exist. Given that
OHA would not accord much or any weight to the statements of those who were not in
policymaking positions, drawing such a line may be reasonable. To the extent that a court
reviewing OHA's record might give greater deference to the conflicting interpretations of
low level staff and auditors, however, prohibition of this kind of discovery could be sig-
nificant.
On balance, it cannot be said that OHA's position is unreasonable. Arguably, it may
be possible to go a bit further so as to ensure a complete record without necessarily being
subject to undue delay. In cases where no national level documents of the sort described by
OHA exist and the regulations involved are ambiguous, OHA should not rule out com-
pletely the possibility of granting further limited discovery of lower level employee state-
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Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, should suffice.2 8 4
IV
PROCEDURAL RECOMMENDATIONS
If Congress abolishes FERC and district court reviews, then
OHA's enforcement procedures must be assessed in a new light.
They alone will protect the interests of the parties involved, short
of appellate review by the Temporary Emergency Court of Ap-
peals. This section analyzes the adequacy of OHA's procedures
and the reforms they suggest in that light, and in terms of their
appropriateness for DOE and for purposes of APA reform in
general.
Congress and courts have, of late, virtually ignored the in-
formal rulemaking provisions of the APA.285 Various forms of
hybrid rulemaking have developed on an ad hoc, agency by
agency basis. The end result is a crazy quilt of rulemaking provi-
sions; 286 however, there has been relatively general acceptance of
the APA's adjudicatory model in contexts that require trial-type
proceedings.287 Congress' decision continually to exempt the
agencies involved with the administration of the oil program from
the adjudicatory provisions of the APA is, thus, somewhat un-
usual.288 Though the initial rationale for this exemption was the
ments and memoranda, particularly if the requests are reasonably specific and would not
necessarily involve a general search of all OSC's files. The weight accorded such evidence
may not be substantial, however, and may be more significant in cases alleging willful viola-
tions than in the typical civil overcharge proceeding.
284 At present, the primary appellate reviewing court for oil pricing decisions is the
Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals. It is not a completely specialized court in that it
consists of judges from various circuits who hear the whole range of cases that come to
federal court. Similarly, it can sit in various parts of the country and is not restricted to one
geographical location. The primary reasons for establishing a specialized appellate court
were speed, expertise, and a uniform national policy on oil pricing decisions. A complete
examination of the need for, and efficiency of, such a specialized court of appeals is
beyond the scope of this Article; however, the merits of continuing this approach, particu-
larly where the emergency program has turned into a long-term regulatory program, cer-
tainly are open to question.
2"85 See Scalia, supra note 14, at 348-56, 386-88.
288 See Hamilton, Procedures for the Adoption of Rules of General Applicability: The Need for
Procedural Innovation in Administrative Rulemaking, 60 CALIF. L. REv. 1276, 1313-30 (1972);
Williams, "Hybrid Rulemaking" under the Administrative Procedure Act: A Legal and Empirical
Analysis, 42 U. CI. L. REv. 401, 425-36 (1975).
287 Of course, one of the persistent problems of the administrative process has been the
inappropriate use of APA trial procedures to resolve essentially policy issues. See Boyer,
supra note 16, at 111-14; see generally Pierce, The Choice Between Adjudicating and Rulemaking
For Formulating and Implementing Energy Policy, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 27-31, 65-66 (1979).
288 See note 240 supra.
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temporary, emergency nature of the oil price controls program,
this reasoning could not justify continuing the exemption when
Congress created the Department of Energy, over four years after
the OPEC embargo.
Congress' decision to extend the exemption and, presumably,
thereby to preserve agency flexibility 18 9 resulted in the procedural
alternative to APA adjudication set forth in section 503 of the
DOE Act. The procedures required by that provision do not radi-
cally depart from the conventional application of the APA
model; 290 however, they do provide a basis for comparison with
the APA. This section focuses on three questions: (1) Does DOE's
application of section 503 in remedial order proceedings differ
from conventional APA adjudication in terms of the balance
struck among such criteria as efficiency, accuracy and acceptability? 291
(2) If so, is this an appropriate balance for DOE enforcement
proceedings? and (3) Can we generalize from DOE's experience
and thereby suggest APA reforms? For various reasons, some of
which are set forth below, the quest for a generally applicable
APA is an elusive, but worthwhile goal.
A. A Unifom Approach
The differences among agencies should not preclude entirely
the search for fundamental procedural similarities. Enforcement
proceedings are, for example, common to most agencies. Though
the substance of these proceedings as well as the available sanc-
tions vary, it is useful to consider whether these differences can be
accommodated under a uniform act like the APA, whether the
APA should be amended to ensure greater flexibility in such pro-
ceedings, or whether change on an agency by agency basis is a
more appropriate way of achieving administrative reform.
There are several reasons why attempting to maintain a more
uniform approach to procedure by modernizing and revitalizing
the APA can have salutary effects on the administrative process. It
might produce a statute that Congress generally would rely on
when drafting substantive regulatory legislation. A reliable uni-
289 See text accompanying note 170 supra.
290 See Byse, supra note 38, at 207-09.
291 It is important to note that although OHA's procedures are not required by § 503,
they are in accord with that section's general provisions and thus can be used in this section
as a means of analyzing at least one set of the procedures that are allowed under this
statute.
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form procedural statute might then stem the present trend to-
ward using procedure as a commodity to be bartered in the politi-
cal bargaining process.292 Depoliticizing procedure, thus, might
have the effect of encouraging a more productive debate over the
substantive complexities of future regulatory programs. 293
Furthermore, while one might argue that the current spate of
hybrid rulemaking procedures 294 is the result of necessary pro-
cedural experimentation to update the informal rule-making pro-
visions of the APA,295 such agency by agency experimentation
may not be needed when trial type proceedings are, in fact, ap-
propriate. The APA approach in such cases is sound and far
more flexible than conventional interpretations usually allow.2 9 6  It
should not be abandoned lightly. This does not, however, mean
that it cannot be improved. The following sections will examine
OHA's procedures with this goal in mind.
Because the appropriateness of trial-type proceedings in en-
forcement cases turns, in large part, on the nature of the case and
the sanctions sought, analysis should begin with a brief examina-
tion of APA enforcement proceedings in general, followed by a
more detailed analysis of OHA's approach.
B. Conventional APA Enforcement Proceedings
The primary purpose of agency enforcement proceedings is
to determine whether a particular company or individual has vio-
lated the law and, if so, to impose an appropriate sanction. The
APA defines sanction very broadly. It includes not only proceed-
ings to impose fines or penalties, but a variety of other remedies
including damages and restitution.297 Regardless of the sanction
292 See Scalia, supra note 14, at 400-09 (espousing desirability of uniform procedure, but
acknowledging that such a result is very difficult to achieve); but cf. I K. DAVIs, supra note
207, § 2:19, at 145 (procedural experimentation by courts and legislatures has had desir-
able effects).
293 See text accompanying note 222 supra (substance should be considered prior to pro-
cedure).
294 See Hamilton, supra note 286, at 1277, 1313-32.
29- For a discussion of the post-APA changes underlying administrative law and the
need for different procedural approaches to accommodate these changes, particularly with
regard to informal rulemaking, see Scalia, supra note 14, at 375-88. But see Auerbach, In-
formal Rule Making: A Proposed Relationship Between Administrative Procedures and Judicial Re-
view, 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 1, 21-23 (1977); 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 207, §§ 6:1, 6:2.
29' See Verkuil, supra note 233, at 313-317; note 301 infra.
297 The APA defines sanction as follows:
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involved, however, determining whether it should be applied re-
quires the application of law to facts which already have occurred
in an attempt to determine "who did what, where, [and] how." 298
Policy reasons inevitably come into play; but with a retrospective
fact-finding process, the primary focus of the proceeding is on the
alleged violations of agency regulations by a particular party and,
thus, on facts usually within the purview of that party.299
APA trial-type proceedings are appropriate for enforcement
proceedings. The APA provides an opportunity to develop a rela-
tively complete evidentiary record before an impartial decision-
maker.3 00  This usually entails an oral evidentiary hearing before
an administrative law judge with the burden of proving wrongdo-
ing on the government. 301
C. OHA Enforcement Proceedings
OHA procedures differ from conventional APA adjudication
in two primary ways: (1) an oral evidentiary hearing need not be
"sanction" includes the whole or a part of an agency-
(A) prohibition, requirement, limitation, or other condition affecting the
freedom of a person;
(B) withholding of relief;
(C) imposition of penalty or fine;
(D) destruction, taking, seizure, or withholding of property;
(E) assessment of damages, reimbursement, restitution, compensation,
costs, charges, or fees;
(F) requirement, revocation, or suspension of a license; or
(G) taking other compulsory or restrictive action. ....
5 U.S.C. § 551(10) (1976). See Verkuil, supra note 233, at 296. Professor Verkuil notes that
this definition is overbroad and recommends omitting (B) (F) and (G) from this definition.
Id. at 296 n. 188. As will be shown, however, there are good reasons to consider narrowing
the term even further or in the alternative, providing for more flexible trial-type proce-
dures when certain kinds of "sanctions" are involved. See text accompanying notes 324-330
infra.
298 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 207, § 12:3, at 413.
299 See Cramton, supra note 16, at 585.
300 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556 & 557 (1976). See generally Pedersen, supra note 238, at 1002-05.
301 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 557 (1976); 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 207, § 10:7, at 332-33. The
APA, however, is far more flexible than conventional interpretations would suggest. For
example, cross-examination need not be allowed in every case; further, some cases do not
require the presence of an administrative law judge. See Verkuil, supra note 233, at 313-317.
Indeed, as § 556 makes clear, the Commission can preside at the initial hearing. Under §
557(b), the Commission also can require that the record be certified to it prior to an initial
decision by the presiding officer.
The practice of using staff members as trial judges, however, generally has been dis-
continued in favor of using administrative law judges. See generally Davis, Judicialization of
Administrative Law: The Trial-Type Hearing and the Changing Status of the Hearing Officer, 1977
DUKE L. REv. 389, 392-93. See generally J. FREEDMAN, supra note 209, at 161-71.
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granted in some cases even when there are material issues of fact
in dispute; 302 (2) OHA does not use administrative law judges. 30 3
Both of these differences offer a basis forconsidering changes in
conventional APA enforcement proceedings. Analysis of these
changes cannot, however, take place in a substantive vacuum.
Procedural reforms often have as their catalyst substantive
demands that require new modes of implementation and,
perhaps, enforcement as well. The complexity, intricacy and the
ambitious nature of the regulations involved quite naturally have
an effect on the procedures which implement and enforce them.
From OHA's point of view, for example, the financial, engineer-
ing, and legal questions involved often require more of a team
approach to adjudicating contested remedial orders. The exper-
tise of various OHA members, lawyer and non-lawyer alike, are
called upon. The model of an aloof, independent solitary judge
thus is rejected in favor of a presiding officer, who may or may
not be a lawyer and, in any event, is openly assisted from time to
time by a team of experts.
Another salient characteristic of these proceedings is that, in
the final analysis, even factually complex cases frequently turn on
the legal interpretation of complex and often ambiguous regula-
tions.30 4  Though the facts are complicated and difficult to sort
out, they often are not in dispute.
Finally, in virtually all of the oil pricing cases pending at or
decided by OHA, the sanction sought has been a refund of the
amount of alleged overcharges, plus interest. 30 5 Willfulness is not
alleged and criminal sanctions are not invoked. Nor are civil
penalties or fines sought.30 6 The degree of the alleged violator's
302 See note 308 infra.
313 Those presiding at hearings are members of the OHA staff, deputy directors of
OHA and often, the director himself. Since OHA utilizes a multi-disciplinary staff that
includes not only lawyers, but accountants and economists as well, the presiding officer
may or may not be a lawyer. A team approach often is employed. The expertise of various
staff members may be called upon in the course of a case.
OHA procedures also differ from the APA in that they allow for discovery. The APA
neither provides for nor prevents agency discovery procedures. Application of OHA's pro-
visions, however, has generated considerable controversy. See note 47 supra. A more de-
tailed examination of these procedures than that set forth in note 47 is beyond the scope
of this Article.
304 See notes 324-330 infra.
303 Interview with Anthony Miles, Assistant General Counsel, DOE, in Washington, D.C.
(Feb. 28, 1980). This article assumes this amount will, to the extent possible, be returned to
consumers.
306 As one commentator has noted:
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culpability, thus, is not an issue in the administrative proceed-
ing.307 The sole question is whether the regulations were violated
and restitution is now in order. It is within this substantive and
remedial context that OHA's procedures should be assessed.
1. Beyond Summary Judgment
a. Present Procedure. OHA's procedures reflect a policy against
unnecessary oral evidentiary hearings. What is necessary or un-
necessary, however, is determined primarily from the agency's
point of view. Oral hearings are granted only if the presiding of-
ficer "concludes that a genuine dispute exists as to relevant and
material issues of fact and an evidentiary hearing would substan-
tially assist [OHA] in making findings of fact in an effective man-
ner." 3 08 In deciding whether or not to grant a motion for an oral
evidentiary hearing, the presiding officer in an OHA proceeding
possesses considerably more discretion than a federal trial judge
ruling on a motion for summary judgment under rule 56.309
Unlike a federal judge, an OHA presiding officer may, in some
cases, conclude that despite the fact that there is a material issue
With respect to civil penalties, DOE has recognized that it does not have au-
thority to impose such penalties itself and must instead refer such cases to the
Justice Department for prosecution in the federal courts [ERA Enforcement
Manual (CCH) 55,000, 55,100 (1979)]. However, DOE does compromise,
settle and collect civil penalties whenever deemed advisable. 10 C.F.R. §
205.203(b)(2) (1979). A determination of the propriety of seeking civil penalties
requires an examination of whether the violation was the result of an "honest
mistake," in which event penalties are inappropriate. [ERA Enforcement Man-
ual (CCH) 55,051 (1979)]. Criteria for determination of the amount of penal-
ties sought to be assessed and whether to negotiate those penalties focus upon
the magnitude of the violation, the reasonableness of the offender's conduct
and the necessity for deterrence. See [ERA Enforcement Manual (CCH)
55,052, 55,053].
Trowbridge, supra note 136, at 209 n.51.
307 Id.
308 10 C.F.R. § 205.199(e) (1979) (emphasis added). Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 205.199(b)
(1979) a litigant desiring an oral evidentiary hearing, shall with respect to each disputed or
alternative finding of fact:
(1) As specifically as possible, identify the witnesses whose testimony is required;
(2) State the reasons why the testimony of the witnesses is necessary; and
(3) State the reasons why the asserted position can be effectively established
only through the direct questioning of witnesses at an evidentiary hearing.
Cf. 10 C.F.R. § 205.64 (1979) (in exception, rather than enforcement, proceedings the
movant must prove that of the several methods of resolving disputed factual issues-
submission of written documents, interrogatories, depositions, and evidentiary hearings, in
that order of preference-only an evidentiary hearing will be effective in the case at hand).
309 FED. R. Civ. P. 56. See generally 10 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2714 (1973).
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of fact in dispute, an oral evidentiary hearing is, nevertheless, un-
necessary.
Explicitly granting the agency such discretion makes good
sense and represents a useful clarification of the present APA. 310
If an accurate decision can be reached in certain cases without
oral testimony, efficiency dictates that the agency have that option
available. Moreover, OHA's "summary judgment plus" approach
makes it more likely that an agency will deny requests for oral
hearings it deems unnecessary than if an ordinary summary
judgment rule were in effect.
Reversal of trial court sun'imary judgment decisions are com-
mon and relatively easily obtained. Courts have long interpreted
rule 56 of the FRCP very stringently. 31' Though there are a
number of reasons why courts should treat agency summary
judgment decisions differently than those of a federal trial
court,312 agency summary judgment rules hold meaning only if
310 5 U.S.C. §§ 553-558 (1976). The APA provides "A party is entitled to present his
case or defense by oral or documentary evidence, to submit rebuttal evidence, and to con-
duct such cross-examination as may be required for a full and true disclosure of the facts."
Id. § 556(d). Presumably, there are cases in which only documentary evidence is required
and cross-examination is not necessary for "a full and true disclosure of the facts." This
clearly would seem to be the case when no facts are in dispute, but this may not be the case
where material issues of fact are in dispute. In any event, § 556(d) of the APA sets forth
certain categories of cases in which an oral hearing may be denied, arguably even when
there are outstanding factual disputes.
In rulemaking or determining claims for money or benefits or applications for
initial licenses an agency may, when a party will not be prejudiced thereby,
adopt procedures for the submission of all or part of the evidence in written
form.
5 U.S.C. § 556 (1976). OHA's approach would appear to go one step further. It makes
clear that even in enforcement cases seeking restitution where issues of material fact may
be in dispute, an oral hearing is not necessarily required.
For a general discussion of the summary judgment approach in agency litigation, see
Gellhorn & Robinson, Summary Judgment in Administrative Adjudication, 84 HARV. L. REV. 612
(1971).
311 See, e.g., C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 309, § 2716 (appellate court will read
record in light most favorable to party opposing motion).
312 See generally Gellhorn & Robinson, supra note 310, at 616, 628-31. One major differ-
ence is that courts need not worry over depriving a jury of its right to find the facts. In
agency adjudication, of course, there are no jury trials.
As Professors Gellhorn and Robinson also point out, however, how a summary judg-
ment rule actually will be applied will differ from agency to agency. Id. at 615. Moreover,
the presence or absence of agency discovery rules also affects whether or not such a rule
can be applied. Id. at 617-18. Though there has been a good deal of controversy over
OHA's application of its discovery rules in enforcement cases (see note 283 supra) it would
appear that, in most cases, the discovery opportunities authorized by OHA are sufficient to
enable a summary judgment approach.
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the body exercising them can be assured that its decisions are in-
sulated from mechanical judicial review and consequent reversal
on appeal. Given the complexity of OHA enforcement cases and
the relative ease of putting at least some issue of fact into dispute,
a summary judgment rule tracking federal rule 56 might invite a
similarly stringent judicial approach to the agency's summary
judgment rule. The Agency would then have little incentive to
avoid what it considered an unnecessary hearing: given the likeli-
hood of reversal, the most efficient course would be to hold an
oral evidentiary hearing in the first instance.
OHA's "summary judgment plus" approach, however, re-
quires a court to determine not only whether there is a material
issue of fact involved, but whether the agency properly concluded
that an oral evidentiary hearing would not materially assist it in
making its findings of fact. The later part of this standard pro-
vides the opportunity for a reviewing court to defer to the agen-
cy's judgment when determining whether an oral evidentiary
hearing would have been appropriate to resolve that issue. Word-
ing the agency's rule so as to encourage more deferential judicial
review makes agency summary judgment a more realistic adminis-
trative tool.
b. Present Practice. In practice, OHA seldom has gone as far
as its regulations authorize. In most cases, it has taken a tradi-
tional summary judgment approach. Oral hearings usually have
been denied because no material issues of fact were in dispute. 313
3 OHA examines the issues which the party desiring the evidentiary hearing wishes to
raise in great detail. If the movant does not supply the detailed information required by
the regulations his motion will be denied. Karchmer Pipe and Supply Co., [1979 Transfer
Binder] EN. MNGM'T (CCH) (3 DOE) 82,576 (1979), Armstrong Petroleum Corp., [1979
Transfer Binder] EN. MNGM'T (CCH) (3 DOE) 82,538 (1979), Eagle Enterprise, Inc.,
[1978 Transfer Binder] EN. MNGM'T (CCH) (2 DOE) 82,572 (1978).
If OHA finds that there is a genuine factual dispute which is relevant to the issuance
of the PRO, the motion for an evidentiary hearing generally will be granted at least as to
that particular issue. For example, in Greene's Transport Co., [1979 Transfer Binder] EN.
MNGM'T (CCH) (3 DOE) 82,505 (1979), OHA granted an evidentiary hearing on the issue
of whether the company had voluntarily lowered its prices to its customers in order to
refund a portion of previous overcharges. If the company had done this, the amount of
the voluntary rebate would offset liability under the PRO. See also Mid-Continent Sys., Inc.,
[1979 Transfer Binder] EN. MNGM'T (CCH) (3 DOE) 82,522 (1979). In Time Oil Co.,
[1979 Transfer Binder] EN. MNGM'T (CCH) (3 DOE) 82,512 (1979), OHA granted an
evidentiary hearing on whether the class of purchasers in which Time was placed in the
PRO was in fact the most appropriate class. In Ross Prod. Co., [1979 Transfer Binder]
EN. MNGM'T (CCH) (3 DOE) 82,524 (1979), OHA granted an evidentiary hearing to allow
the company to introduce factual evidence which was essential to determine whether the
company's well was properly classified as not being a stripper well. In J.R. Parten, [1979
Transfer Binder] EN. MNGM'T (CCH) (3 DOE) 82,541 (1979), OHA granted an eviden-
tiary hearing on the geological structure of the tract in dispute. In Boswell Oil Co., [1979
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As noted above, this is due to the fact that many of the major
battles in recent oil pricing proceedings center on the proper in-
Transfer Binder) EN. MNGM'T (CCH) (3 DOE) 82,557 (1979), OHA granted a hearing to
permit cross-examination of a law professor on the meaning of a disputed term and to
develop contemporaneous construction of Cost of Living Council regulations. But cf.
Champlin Petroleum Co. [1978 Transfer Binder] EN. MNGM'T (CCH) (2 DOE) 82,554
(1978) (party may not elicit testimony from DOE officials).
OHA has denied motions for evidentiary hearings on at least five bases. The first is
that, although there may be a factual dispute in the case, the dispute is irrelevant to the
PRO. For example, in Howell Drilling Inc., [1979 Transfer Binder] EN. MNGM'T (CCH) (3
DOE) 82,540 (1979), Howell wanted to introduce evidence that the posted price which
DOE used in the PRO was not the highest price paid for oil from the field. OHA said that
this fact was irrelevant because DOE determined the posted price in accordance with its
regulations. The regulations and not industry practice determine what the correct posted
price is. See also Glenn Martin Heller, [1979 Transfer Binder] EN. MNGM'T (CCH) (3 DOE)
82,579 (1979); Karchmer Pipe and Supply Co., [1979 Transfer Binder] EN. MNGM'T
(CCH) (3 DOE) 82,576 (1979); HNG Oil Co., [1979 Transfer Binder] EN. MNGM'T (CCH)
(3 DOE) 82,511 (1979); Mobil Oil Corp., [1978 Transfer Binder] EN. MNGM'T (CCH) (2
DOE) 82,575 (1978).
The second basis on which OHA has denied a motion for an evidentiary hearing is
that the dispute is legal, not factual. For example, in Amerada Hess Corp., [1979 Transfer
Binder] EN. MNGM'T (CCH) (3 DOE) 82,561 (1979), Hess wanted a hearing to present
evidence to dispute the correctness of DOE's position on the types of sales Hess had made
and on the burden which complying with the PRO would place on the company. The
motion was denied because the dispute over types of sales was one of legal characterization.
In addition, Hess offered OHA no alternative, less burdensome means by which to ac-
complish the enforcement objectives of the PRO. See also Glenn Martin Heller, [1980] 6 EN.
MNGM'T (CCH) (4 DOE) 82,579 (June 8, 1979); Monterey Producing Co., [1978 Transfer
Binder] EN. MNGM'T (CCH) (2 DOE) 82,576 (1978).
The third basis on which OHA has denied a motion for an evidentiary hearing is that
absent a preliminary showing of bad faith, no inquiry may be made into the mental proc-
esses by which agency personnel determined that a PRO should be issued. See, e.g.,
Karchmer Pipe and Supply Co., [1979 Transfer Binder] EN. MNGM'T (CCH) (3 DOE)
82,576 (1979); Corpus Christi Management Co., [1979 Transfer Binder] EN. MNGM'T
(CCH) (3 DOE) 82,539 (1979).
The fourth basis upon which OHA has denied a motion for an evidentiary hearing is
that there is in fact no factual dispute in the case. In Lindsey & Elliot, [1978 Transfer
Binder] EN. MNGM'T (CCH) (2 DOE) 82,520 (1978), Lindsey wanted to hold an eviden-
tiary hearing on the nature of production at its well. DOE stated that it did not dispute any
of the factual assertions which Lindsey made. There was, therefore, no need for an eviden-
tiary hearing.
The fifth basis upon which OHA has denied a motion for an evidentiary hearing is
that little value is expected to come from holding a hearing. In Special Counsel, [1979
Transfer Binder] EN. MNGM'T (CCH) (3 DOE) 82,519 (1979), the Office of Special Coun-
sel had moved to strike documents from the record as "vague, immaterial, and irrelevant."
OHA, while conceding that these documents were of little value, nonetheless denied OSC's
motion. It also, however, denied the motion of an intervenor oil company for an eviden-
tiary hearing to cross-examine the authors of the documents. "The time and expense as-
sociated with convening an evidentiary hearing for this purpose at this time outweigh the
probative value of the evidence that would be adduced." Id.
A movant for an evidentiary hearing must demonstrate that evidence of value directly
related to the case will come from the hearing. OHA will not grant a motion for an eviden-
tiary hearing if it suspects that delay or a fishing expedition are the prime objectives.
"Evidentiary hearings are intended to aid the DOE in deciding demonstrated issues of fact,
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terpretation of the regulations involved, not on factual disputes. 14
Nevertheless, the rule should not even theoretically give the
agency unfettered discretion to deny requests for oral evidentiary
hearings when issues of material fact are in dispute. Clear stan-
dards and criteria should circumscribe the authority of the agency
in deciding when a hearing would "substantially assist... in mak-
ing findings of fact in an effective manner."
In an attempt to meet this need, OHA's opinions have, over
time, developed various criteria. OHA will, for example, grant an
oral hearing when an issue of material fact is in dispute and its
resolution requires an assessment of the credibility of the wit-
nesses involved3 15 or an oral hearing will contribute to a better
understanding of the issues involved.31 6 With regard to this latter
determination, OHA has stated that at least three additional fac-
tors may come into play: (1) the probative value of the evidence
which the firm intends to establish at the hearing; (2) the time
and expense involved in holding the evidentiary hearing; and (3)
the probability that the evidence can be satisfactorily presented
not to provide firms with the opportunity to create such issues." Gas del Oro, Inc. [1979
Transfer Binder) EN. MNGM'T (CCH) (3 DOE) 82,526 (1979).
OHA has generally granted motions for evidentiary hearings in remedial order cases.
In 1979, OHA decided 19 remedial order cases which contained motions for evidentiary
hearings. Of those cases, the motions were granted in whole or in part in 11 cases. The
motions were denied in the remaining 8. Two of those opinions, however, expressly al-
lowed the movant to renew his request if examination of documentary evidence provided
under the decision did not give the information he sought. Glenn Martin Heller, [1979
Transfer Binder] EN. MNGM'T (CCH) (3 DOE) 82,579 (1979), Corpus Christi Manage-
ment Co., [1979 Transfer Binder] EN. MNGM'T (CCH) (3 DOE) 82,539 (1979). Of the
other four, only one of these proceedings had what one might arguably characterize as
questions of material fact. HNG Oil Co., [1979 Transfer Binder] EN. MNGM'T (CCH) (3
DOE) 82,511 (1979). In the remaining six, the oil companies did not comply with OHA
regulations regarding evidentiary hearings. See, e.g., Armstrong Petroleum Corp., [1979
Transfer Binder] EN. MNGM'T (CCH) (3 DOE) 82,538 (1979); Karchmer Pipe and Supply
Co., [1979 Transfer Binder] EN. MNGM'T (CCH) (3 DOE) 82,576 (1979).
3'4 See, e.g., Atlantic Richfield Co., No. BRZ-0015 (DOE Jan. 25, 1980). In deciding
whether or not to grant discovery of contemporaneous constructions of agency regulations,
OHA set forth, in detail, the history of some of the vague, but nevertheless fundamental
regulations involved. As this opinion makes clear, much of the recent litigation revolves
around the meaning of certain key regulations. See also Standard Oil v. DOE, 596 F.2d
1029 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1978); Coastal States Gas Corp. v. DOE, No. 79-2181 (D.C.
Cir. Feb. 15, 1980).
315 See, e.g., Petroleum Management, [1978 Transfer Binder] EN. MNGM'T (CCH) (2
DOE) 82,555 (1978).
316 See, e.g., Atlas Gas Co., [1978 Transfer Binder] EN. MNGM'T (CCH) (2 DOE) 82,566
(1978).
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and considered through a process other than an evidentiary hear-
ing1'7
c. Assessing OHA's Approach. OHA's criteria help to ensure ac-
curacy and efficiency in the decision-making process. When cases
turn on the credibility of the witnesses involved, accuracy is en-
hanced by live testimony. But when resolution of conflicting facts
turns, for example, on resolving a dispute over which accounting
methods may or may not be appropriate, neither efficiency nor
accuracy is always served by oral testimony. OHA, thus, reserves
the right to deny an oral hearing in such cases.
The value of an oral evidentiary hearing, however, usually is
assessed differently by the litigants involved than by the agency.
From the point of view of the alleged violator, an oral evidentiary
hearing is not only a means of building a record, but also an op-
portunity to persuade and educate the decision-maker. Indeed,
the opportunity for advocacy provided by an oral hearing often is
viewed by litigants as a significant part of the fairness of the deci-
sion-making process. During the course of the hearing, the attor-
neys involved attempt to determine how the presiding officer
views the case, what arguments are likely to prevail or encounter
difficulty and, consequently, the approaches to the case that are
most likely to increase the possibility of success on the merits. In
short, hearings play a role that goes beyond simply compiling a
record. They provide an opportunity for the attorneys involved to
engage in an extended on-the-record dialogue with the decision-
maker.
OHA's procedures, however, provide for oral argument as a
matter of right. Thus, even if denied an oral evidentiary hearing,
the losing party can argue the meaning of the documentary evi-
dence involved, attempt to explain its significance as well as con-
tend why any factual disputes that may exist should be resolved in
its favor. This preserves the advocacy elements of an oral hearing
without necessarily confusing this purpose of an oral presentation
with the record formulation function such hearings provide.
OHA's approach to oral evidentiary hearings thus attempts to bal-
ance the needs of the agency to reach an accurate decision in an
efficient manner with the litigants' perception of the fairness of
the process.
... See C & H Refinery, Inc., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] EN. MNGM'T (CCH) (1 DOE)
5 82,561 (1978).
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The balance struck by OHA seems appropriate, particularly
given the context of these enforcement proceedings. The cases
before OHA usually involve corporate entities charged with pre-
sumably unintentional violations of complex and intricate pricing
regulations. The remedy sought is a form of restitution. In such
proceedings, fairness, from the point of view of what will fully
satisfy the litigants involved, should be strongly tempered by such
competing values as accuracy and efficiency. Unlike a decision to
terminate an individual's welfare or social security benefits, a de-
termination that a corporate entity has inadvertently charged an
unlawful price for its oil does not directly involve the worth or
dignity of a particular human being.318 Nor can such proceed-
ings be closely analogized to criminal cases. The kind of stigma or
social opprobrium that attaches to one convicted of a crime is not
likely to be associated with a company that unintentionally violates
certain pricing regulations. 319 Though such violations, particu-
larly with regard to large oil companies, are widely publicized and
may temporarily affect the company's reputation, this is a far cry
from the stigma that attaches to an individual convicted of bank
robbery or any serious felony. The effects of such a conviction are
likely to follow that individual for the rest of his life. An order
requiring a company to refund unintentional overcharges to its
customers, however, is not likely to tarnish the company's reputa-
tion for the indefinite future. This is particularly true when civil
penalties are not sought and degrees of culpability are not in-
"'s See Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in
Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28, 49
(1976). Professor Mashaw sets forth a number of approaches for determining how much
process is due including a dignitary model that is particularly appropriate in welfare or
social security proceedings. Of course, individuals within the company who are directly
responsible for oil pricing matters may be adversely affected by these determinations in
that it may reflect poorly on their performance. Similarly, shareholders and the corporate
hierarchy in general may be affected if huge pay back obligations are imposed. This kind
of impact, however, substantially differs from welfare or social security cases where a par-
ticular person stands to lose the sole or primary basis of his or her livelihood because of an
administrative determination.
319 To some extent, however, the stigma involved will vary with the industry and the
violation charged. For example, a charge that an airline has flown unsafe airplanes may
have more of an impact on that company's reputation and consequently its future business
than a charge that a company has over time unintentionally charged too high a price for its
oil. The effects of that violation are dispersed throughout the economy and it is often
difficult to identify all or even most of the actual consumers who may have overpaid. In
any event, the airline cases are likely to result in a sanction that requires payment of an
actual penalty or fine, rather than a form of restitution.
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volved in the case. Under such circumstances, these proceedings
are somewhat akin to those in which the government claims that a
rate charged by the company was, in retrospect, too high and now
must be refunded. 320
This is not to suggest, however, that the charge that a corpo-
rate entity, large or small, has violated the law is not serious or
that the interests of corporate litigants are unimportant. The law
demands respect whether a violation results in criminal or civil
penalties or other sanctions. Agency regulations setting forth
maximum prices for the sale of crude oil or, for that matter, the
maximum amount of air or water pollution that will be tolerated,
represent a collective political judgment to establish certain rules
aimed at preventing or at least minimizing the likelihood of a per-
ceived societal harm. Violations are serious. But a charge that a
company has unintentionally violated the complex regulations that
attempt to carry out such goals usually implies that the company
has interpreted differently the regulations' applicability or mean-
ing. At worst, the company may have lacked sufficient diligence in
carrying out its legal obligations. Trial-type proceedings are
appropriate for such cases, but the procedures employed need not
play a symbolic or therapeutic role.
d. Recommendation. OHA's "summary judgment plus" ap-
proach, coupled with an opportunity to present oral argument as
a matter of right, enables an agency to avoid unnecessary oral
hearings without unduly prejudicing the rights of the regulated
companies involved. This approach would appear to be au-
320 For an example of such file and suspend laws, see Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. §
717c(e) (1976). Under that Act companies may file and collect a particular rate, subject to
refund after a proceeding to determine its justness and reasonableness. Of course, the
price controls approach inherent in the EPAA and its regulations represents a different
regulatory approach than the cost of service ratemaking approach utilized under the
Natural Gas Act. Nevertheless, the vagueness and complexity of the regulations involved
introduce a good deal of uncertainty and discretion in setting the appropriate price.
Moreover, the similarities to cost of service ratemaking are more striking when one factors
in OHA's exceptions process. As one report has noted with regard to the old FEA ap-
proach in this area:
FEA has established the principle of granting relief from lower tier crude oil
pricing restrictions where significantly increased production costs leave a firm
with little or no economic incentive to produce crude oil from existing wells on
a developed property ....
The decision thus represents a substantive determination by FEA to modify
the crude oil pricing mechanism for a single firm solely to encourage additional
production from existing properties .... The procedure necessarily involves
regulation of the rate of return on new producing investments.
PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 18, at 113-15.
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thorized if Congress were to make section 503 of the DOE Act
applicable to OHA.32a Arguably, OHA's approach might even be
authorized under the adjudicatory provisions of the present
APA. 22  Given the value of such an approach, however, Con-
gress should consider amending the APA to make this option
explicit for all agencies. In so doing, the APA definition of sanc-
tion should be re-evaluated.
e. Amending the APA. The present APA's definition of sanc-
tion includes not only penalties and fines but a wide variety of
other options including "assessment of damages, reimbursement,
restitution, compensation costs, and charges in fee." 323 Such sanc-
tions, however, differ in many ways. They differ in terms of their
respective degrees of severity as well as the nature of the substan-
tive proceedings necessary to impose them. They also differ in the
role the government plays when it seeks to impose them. In a civil
proceeding, monetary penalties and fines, for example, generally
are viewed as severe, not only because of the dollar amounts that
may be involved, but because of the role that the government
plays as well as its relationship to private property. The govern-
ment's role is prosecutorial in nature. Though the long run goal
of such cases may be to deter future violations, the primary pur-
pose of the proceeding is punitive in nature. Degrees of culpabil-
ity, short of willfulness, usually must be determined to assess the
appropriate fine. 324  The fine itself represents an authorized tak-
ing of private property. In such accusatory cases not only are
321 Section 503 states:
The Commission shall, upon request, afford an opportunity for a hearing,
including, at a minimum, the submission of briefs, oral or documentary evidence,
and oral arguments. To the extent that the Commission in its discretion determines
that such is required for a full and true disclosure of the facts, the Commission shall
afford the right of cross examination.
42 U.S.C. § 7193(c) (Supp. 11977). The language "oral or documentary evidence"could be read
to allow for documentary evidence even when issues of fact are in dispute. This language is, of
course, similar to that used in § 556(d) of the APA, but § 503 provides the opportunity for a new
and more liberal interpretation of this phrase. Of course, the language "and oral arguments"
would appear to make the opportunity for oral arguments mandatory, as is now the case at
OHA.
322 See note 310 supra. Conventional APA adjudication in enforcement prodeedings,
however, usually would provide a hearing if material issues of fact were in dispute. In any
event, it is unlikely that APA formal adjudication would require those seeking an oral
hearing to make as elaborate a showing of the need for such a proceeding as is now
required by OHA.
323 5 U.S.C. § 551(10)(E) (1976).
324 See note 306 supra.
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trial-type proceedings appropriate,3 2 5 but close procedural ques-
tions generally are resolved in favor of the accused.32 6
In a proceeding whose purpose is solely to obtain a refund of
alleged overcharges by a particular company, neither willfulness
nor degrees of culpability are involved. Though companies in-
volved initially argue that they are in compliance and thus, the
government's action similarly can be viewed as an attempted tak-
ing of their property, such cases nevertheless differ from penalty
or fine proceedings. The underlying premise of these proceedings
is that the amount of alleged overcharges in contention arguably
belongs to the public, not the company. If the government pre-
vails, what is refunded presumably belonged to the public all
along. A taking in the sense of a penalty or fine is not involved,
unless one is willing to view the statutes and regulations establish-
ing the maximum prices to be charged as a taking of private
property. The income redistribution effects of such statutes and
regulations, however, are not particularized in purpose or effect.
They are industry-wide in scope and impact and, usually, clearly
within Congress' legislative powers.3 2
Furthermore, in restitution proceedings, the government's
role is somewhat less prosecutorial in nature and more akin to
that of a negotiator or bargaining representative on behalf of the
public at large. Overcharge cases represent disputes over the price
the public is entitled to pay for crude oil under the law. Due to
the complexity and ambiguity of the regulations involved, the res-
olution of such disputes is by no means a foregone conclusion.
Though the aggregate amounts involved can be enormous, the
individual amounts often are not significant enough to make pri-
vate actions asserting overcharges particularly likely or effec-
tive. 28  The government's role is primarily to assert and protect
the public's interest in resolving such disputes, not necessarily to
punish wrongdoing.
In short, restitution, in the context of proceedings involving
allegations of unintentional overcharges, can and should be dis-
325 See generally, Pedersen, supra note 238, at 993.
326 Verkuil, supra note 233, at 295. Of course, in cases where penalties are threatened
but not imposed, more formal procedures may be necessary even though a lesser sanction
ultimately is selected.
327 The constitutionality of the EPAA was implicitly upheld in Condor Operating Co. v.
Sawhill, 514 F.2d 351, 359-62 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975).
328 But see Mode, supra note 144, at 102-08. Large purchasers, of course, may have a
significant interest in bringing a private action against their suppliers. In general, however,
smaller consumers will not.
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tinguished from penalties or fines. Congress should amend the
APA definition of sanction so as to narrow its scope.3 29 In the
alternative, different categories of sanctions should be established.
For sanctions such as restitution the agency should have the op-
tion of utilizing more flexible adjudicatory procedures. These
should include, at a minimum, the explicit opportunity to make a
decision "on the papers" even when material issues of fact argu-
ably may be in dispute 30
3'29 One commentator recommends narrowing the scope of the APA definition of sanc-
tion where fairness requires adjudicatory procedures, but would retain penalties and fines
as well as restitution in the new definition. Verkuil, supra note 233, at 296 & n.189, 321-22.
330 Various bills now pending in Congress seek to amend the APA. See, e.g., S. 262, 96th
Cong. Ist Sess. (1979); S. 755, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. (1979); S. 1291, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979). Of particular importance for purposes of this discussion is the fact that both S. 262
and S. 755 incorporate a summary judgment approach at least somewhat similar to that
used by OHA. Section 2 0 4(c)(3) of S. 262, for example, would provide for the opportunity
for a paper hearing even in cases where formal adjudicatory procedures are appropriate.
It would amend section 556(b) of the APA by adding the following:
The presiding employee may require the submission of evidence in written
form, or the conduct of cross-examination in written form, if oral presentation
of testimony or oral cross-examination is not required for a full and true disclo-
sure of relevant evidentiary facts and a denial of such opportunity for oral
proceedings would not materially prejudice such party. Upon the motion of any
party, the presiding employee may, prior to the completion of the hearing,
issue a decision in the case when there is no genuine and substantial dispute as
to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law.
The present APA makes the opportunity for a paper hearing explicit in "rulemaking
or determining claims for money or benefits or applications for initial licenses." 5 U.S.C.
§ 556(d) (1976). S. 262's amendment makes clear that hearings need not be oral presumably
even in enforcement proceedings where formal adjudicatory proceedings usually are ap-
propriate.
The above provision does not explicitly, however, set forth the "summary judgment
plus" approach used by OHA. S. 262, does, however, provide for adjudicatory procedures
that are more flexible than its amended formal hearings. Section 202(e) sets forth a "gen-
eral hearing process." This section applies not only to "rulemaking or licensing" proceed-
ings, but to
any other agency proceeding subject to subsection (a) of this section which the
agency determines should be conducted in accordance with the provisions of
this subsection after considering such factors as the extent to which the decision
is likely to depend on the resolution of genuine and substantial disputes of
facts, the number of persons interested in participating in the proceedings, and
whether the conduct of the proceeding solely in accordance with subsection (f)
of this section is essential to a full and fair disclosure of all material facts.
S. 262, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 202(e)(1) (1979).
Though § 202 (e)(A) explicitly excludes proceedings to withdraw, suspend, revoke or
annual a license, arguably a restitution case could qualify as a proceeding subject to this more
informal approach. It would seem particularly appropriate given the fact that OHA over-
charge cases often do not have significant factual disputes. Assuming restitution proceed-
ings qualify for S. 262's "general hearing" processes, § 202(e)(C)(2) of the bill provides:
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2. Administrative Law Judges
Another significant difference in OHA's adjudicatory ap-
proach to remedial order proceedings from conventional APA ad-
judication is its decision not to use administrative law judges.3 3 1 At
times, the presiding officer will be the director or deputy director
of OHA; at other times, a staff member will preside and often a
panel of two or three individuals will be involved. The presiding
In any proceeding subject to this subsection, the agency shall conduct a hearing
to afford parties an opportunity to submit for the record such written data,
views, or arguments and such responses to the data, views, or arguments sub-
mitted by other parties, as the agency or the presiding employee may specify.
At the request of any party in the proceeding, the hearing shall include an
opportunity for oral argument with respect to such written submissions ....
Section 202(e)(G)(3) then goes on to set forth a similar "summary judgment plus" ap-
proach:
(3) At the conclusion of any hearing held pursuant to paragraph (2) of
this subsection, the presiding employee shall designate any disputed question
for resolution of a formal hearing conducted in accordance with subsection (f)
of this section, only if he determines-
(A) there is a genuine and substantial dispute of fact, including a
dispute involving factual assumptions or methodology upon which expert
opinion is based, which can only be resolved with sufficient accuracy by
the introduction of reliable evidence in formal hearing; and
(B) the decision of the agency in the case is likely to depend in whole
or in part on the resolution of such dispute.
It is interesting to note that like OHA's regulations, this bill also seeks to insulate
agency decisions from mechanical judicial review. Section 202(e)(C)(3) goes on to provide:
Upon review no court shall hold unlawful or set aside any agency action, find-
ing, or conclusion on the basis of the choice of procedures made by the agency
under this subsection, unless such choice was a clear abuse of discretion which
substantially prejudiced the rights of the parties.
Unlike OHA's summary judgment regulations, however, Congress requires the presiding
officer to justify holding an oral hearing. The officer must state reasons why an oral hear-
ing should, in fact, be held. Section 202(e)(C)(3) provides:
In making a determination under this paragraph, the presiding employee shall
designate in writing the specific facts which are in genuine and substantial dis-
pute, and the reason why the decision of the agency is likely to depend on the
resolution of such facts.
OHA's summary approach lends support to such provisions, though it does not go so far as
to place a burden of justification of the agency if it decides to hold a hearing. For similar
provisions in another bill see S. 755, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 202-204 (1979).
M' This is not surprising, given the present arrangement calls for FERC review of OHA
decisions. It is not likely, however, that abolition of FERC review will result in OHA's
voluntarily using administrative law judges. OHA's approach is based on an interdiscipli-
nary approach to decision-making that envisions a different model than that set forth in
the APA. In any event, to the extent that the presiding officers in these cases are members
of OHA, this approach would be in accord with the APA. Section 556(b) allows the agency
or members that comprise the agency to preside at the taking of evidence.
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officer may or may not be an attorney. Indeed, accountants and
economists at times also may preside at hearings.
The use of staff as presiding officers and the interdisciplinary
team approach to decision making is well suited for a case in
which policy issues predominate. 32 In granting or denying re-
quests for exceptions, for example, OHA's approach is particu-
larly appropriate, given the insights an interdisciplinary approach
can provide in making the policy judgments that often are in-
volved.3 33  Enforcement cases also have a policy component and
they can be exceedingly complex. As noted above, however, the
primary focus of the proceeding is the determination of past acts
and the application of particular regulations to these facts. Con-
ventional APA adjudication usually provides for an administrative
law judge in such cases.3 34 An examination of the pros and cons
of this approach in the context of OHA litigation is in order.
a. Arguments for the ALJ Approach. The history of the oil en-
forcement process has been characterized by controversy and dis-
satisfaction on the part of the private litigants involved. 35 This
dissatisfaction goes beyond what one might naturally expect from
the application of pricing regulations to an industry that views
such an approach as an unwise philosophy and a counterpro-
ductive energy policy. Rather, dissatisfaction with the program's
administration goes deeper and dates back to the very begin-
nings of the oil program.3 3 6 A variety of factors have undermined
the petroleum industry's perception of the process' fairness: the
informality of early FEO and FEA procedures, the gradual
extension of a temporary emergency program administered
under emergency conditions to one that has now been in place
132 See generally Pedersen, supra note 238, at 994-97.
... See note 15 supra (exceptions explained). OHA's exceptions procedures stress flexibil-
ity and the expertise of its multi-disciplinary staff. See A. Aman, supra note 120, at 34. Such
an approach seems appropriate, particularly given the policymaking function of the excep-
tions process. Id. at 7-10.
334 See 5 U.S.C., §§ 554, 556, and 557 (1976); Pedersen, supra note 238, at 996-1000. For
a discussion of the history and functions of administrative law judges, see 2 K. DAVis
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 10.01-.06 (1958). Of course, even the APA does provide
that the agency itself can hear cases in lieu of an initial decision by an ALJ. See 5 U.S.C. §
556(b) (1976).
335 See 2 SPORKIN REPORT supra note 9, at xxi. See also text accompanying notes 156-162
supra; Trowbridge, supra note 136, at 201-02.
116 See text accompanying note 137 supra.
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for nearly ten years, the inability of an understaffed agency,
particularly in the early days of the oil program, to articulate clear
and comprehensible regulations or render prompt authoritative
interpretations of these provisions, the consequent perception on
the part of the industry, from time to time borne out by the
courts, that enforcement proceedings represented the application
of new rules on a retroactive basis, and the fact that even after
passage of the DOE Act, oil enforcement adjudication initially
remains in the hands of the same agency and, to some extent, the
same key personnel that were involved in the early days of the
program. Despite the enormous improvement in OHA's present
procedures, this legacy remains.
Not all of the problems are historical. The present process
has problems in its own right. Dissatisfaction presently centers on
OHA's handling of requests for discovery.3  Though OHA's
approach to discovery has broadened considerably, it nonetheless
depends, in large part, on how OHA's presiding officer chooses to
exercise his discretion. 33 8 A decision-maker whom the industry
views as intimately involved in policy-making or susceptible to in-
fluence by policy-makers within the Department may not, from
their point of view, be sufficiently independent to compile a full
and adequate evidentiary record in an impartial manner. Since
many of the key decisions in remedial order cases involve pre-trial
discovery and hearing motions, this can be a serious problem. If
OHA is the only agency involved in the decision-making process,
a completely independent decision-maker would not be involved
in the enforcement process until the case reached the courts. The
court's function is appellate in nature, however, and that would
not provide the protection the litigants desire.
Administrative law judges would introduce a modicum of in-
dependence to the decision-making process without completely
separating judicial and policy-making functions. An ALJ would
ensure an initial decision by one who is neither involved with pol-
icy formulation nor dependent on a policy-maker for job security.
There would thus be complete independence at the crucial fact-
finding and record formulation stage of the proceeding. At the
same time, providing for an appeal of ALJ decisions to OHA
would retain at least the opportunity for a uniform executive pol-
icy.
337 See note 283 supra.
338 See note 281 supra.
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The use of ALJ's thus would constitute a compromise
between the complete separation of judicial and policy-making
functions that results with de novo FERC review and the lack of in-
dependence that exists if OHA is the sole adjudicator in these pro-
ceedings. Similarly, it would provide for independence in the
agency's decision-making process, while stopping short of the far
more drastic measure of making OHA itself independent and
thus creating yet another commission within DOE.
Furthermore, the use of administrative law judges may offer
litigants more protection than appellate FERC review. OHA pres-
ently compiles the record and FERC plays essentially an appellate
role at least to the extent that it has rejected the right of the
parties involved to seek de novo review. Given this approach,
along with FERC's workload and its relative lack of expertise in
the area, FERC, as an independent decision-maker, may not offer
as much protection as an administrative law judge. Indeed, the
use of ALJ's definitely would prevent what FERC review might
not: the possibility of any preconceived OHA policy biases affect-
ing pre-trial decisions at the crucial record formulation stage of
the process.
Finally, the use of ALJ's need not result in a serious loss of
efficiency in the enforcement process. The summary judgment
plus rule should be available as well as a variety of other
techniques aimed at providing the presiding officer with substan-
tial control over the proceeding.
b. Arguments against the ALJ Approach. There are disadvan-
tages with using ALJ's as well. On the one hand, agencies easily
can disregard the administrative law judge's findings of fact and
conclusions of law and proceed as if an initial hearing had not
been held.33 9 Assuming that ALJ decisions are appealable to
OHA, it is entirely likely, given that agency's expertise, that ALJ
decisions and the record on which they are based would be re-
viewed de novo.240
3'9 See Pedersen, supra note 238, at 1005-07.
540 This might not always result in the same decision that OHA would have rendered
without an ALJ. The ability to develop a full and complete record before an independent
fact-finder may result in an entirely different record than would have been compiled by
OHA in the first instance. This may particularly be the case in OHA proceedings if certain
discovery requests are more likely to be granted by an ALJ than by an OHA presiding
officer, and they arguably compel a different interpretation of the regulations involved.
Further, a full record arguably will more likely reveal to a court reviewing OHA's final
decision whether it treated the judge's findings arbitrarily.
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A related drawback to this proposal is that an initial decision
followed by an administrative appeal results in two levels of ad-
ministrative process, rather than one. Given the fact that OHA
would, in any event, thoroughly review the record and issue the
final orders in most of these cases, the ALJ stage is unnecessary.
To the extent that this is a problem, it can be minimized. OHA
need not entertain every appeal, just those in which important
policy questions are at stake or clear error on the part of the ALJ
is involved. Further, decisions turning primarily on the interpreta-
tion of a particular regulation involved could be certified to OHA
for decision prior to the initial decision by the ALJ. 341
A more serious disadvantage to the ALJ approach, however,
is the loss of OHA staff expertise that would result if initial deci-
sions were made by a person unlikely to be familiar with the com-
plexities of oil pricing regulations. Arguably, however, even this
difficulty can be overcome. The model of a federal judge need
not apply in the kind of enforcement proceedings heard by OHA.
Given the complexity of the record that is compiled, an adminis-
trative law judge often may consult with staff members who are
not in any way involved with prosecuting, litigating or investigat-
ing the case at bar, particularly on difficult technical or policy
oriented questions. 342  Yet, if one is willing to go this far, the
OHA team approach may, in fact, be a more appropriate and
efficient way of adjudicating such complicated cases.
An accurate decision is more likely to be rendered by an offi-
cial and staff intimately involved in oil pricing and allocation pol-
icy and adjudicatory matters on a daily basis. Though a precon-
ceived policy bias may underlie his or her interpretations of the
regulations involved, they are likely to be informed judgments
about very complex matters. This is arguably superior to the kind
of open mindedness that comes with a lack of any knowledge at
all and thus, at least initially, the lack of any pre-conceived policy
bias.
'" See text accompanying note 343 infra.
342 As Professor Davis has pointed out, "the APA imposes no restrictions on consultation
by members of agencies with non-investigating and non-prosecuting personnel, but forbids
presiding officers to consult 'any person or party on any fact in issue' except in public
proceedings. 2 K. DAvIs, supra note 334, § 11.08. Arguably, 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(1) (1976)
which prohibits ALJ consultation of "a person or party or a fact in issue" could be interpreted
to allow for consultation with agency staff on facts in issue as distinct from outsiders.
See 2 K. DAVIs, supra note 334, § 11.17. This interpretation generally has not been adopted
by most agencies. Pedersen, supra note 238, at 1000 n.38.
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Furthermore, internal separation of functions within the
agency provides substantial and more than adequate indepen-
dence for the OHA decision-makers. Ex parte rules prevent any
contact with the prosecutorial or investigatory wing of this agency.
As noted above, the theoretical susceptibility to influence regard-
ing the application of the proper policy need not be viewed as a
fundamental flaw in OHA's approach. The opportunity for policy
coherence should be viewed as a positive factor in the decision-
making process. Though losing parties invariably will argue with
the results of the proceeding, the existence of an opportunity to
develop a full and fair record, coupled with a decision supported
by substantial evidence and reasons, is more important than the
degree to which the decision-maker conforms to traditional notions
of what a judge should or should not be. Indeed, the more fun-
damental problem in such cases may not be whether an ALJ
should or should not be employed, but an unwillingness to accord
legitimacy to alternative models of what an agency judge should
be.
c. Recommendation. Due particularly to the history of the oil
enforcement program, whether or not OHA should use ALJ's in
oil enforcement proceedings is, nevertheless, a close question. For
many of the regulated companies involved, the use of ALJ's is
essential, particularly if FERC review is abolished. On balance,
however, introducing a new set of decision-makers at this stage in
the oil program is unnecessary and may even be counterproduc-
tive in terms of the accuracy and efficiency of the decision-making
process. Allowing decisions to be made by OHA in the first in-
stance would enable this agency to maximize its expertise for the
remainder of the oil program. Moreover, unless appeals are taken
to some agency other than OHA, thus rendering OHA's expertise
in these matters essentially useless, it is entirely likely that OHA
will closely examine and often substantially change ALJ decisions
with which it disagrees. Interjection of an ALJ for substantive de-
cision-making purposes thus may be an unnecessary and counter-
productive stage in the administrative process. Finally, an agency
judge need not be totally aloof and detached from the policy-mak-
ing functions of the agency. In complex, technical cases, the pres-
iding officer should have the benefit of staff expertise.
Abolition of FERC review coupled with a statute mandating
the basic procedural safeguards OHA must provide, plus OHA
regulations making explicit the standards by which it rules on mo-
tions for oral evidentiary hearings and discovery, would ensure the
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development of a full and fair record. Using OHA personnel does
not undermine the development of this record; however, if ALJs
are to be used, an alternative approach allowing them to play a
role limited to the formulation of the record may be in order.
Given the importance in OHA litigation of pre-trial decisions such
as how much discovery to allow or whether an oral evidentiary
hearing is appropriate, an ALJ could be used to provide an inde-
pendent, impartial judge to rule on such motions and to supervise
the development of the record. The issues presented, however,
need not be decided twice, particularly if they ultimately involve
the application of regulations to undisputed facts. After such a
record has been developed, it could be certified to OHA for a
final decision. The ALJ would, in effect, play the role of an ad-
ministrative magistrate.343
d. Amending the APA. OHA's experience highlights at least
two changes that should be considered in the APA. First, for sanc-
tions such as restitution, the flexibility to utilize more of an inter-
disciplinary approach, including members of the staff as presiding
officers rather than ALJ's should at least be available under the
APA. Conventional APA adjudication in such technical proceed-
ings, with primary reliance on an aloof, independent judge may
not always be appropriate. Second, Congress should consider
amending the APA to encourage broad consultation by ALJ's with
agency staff who, of course, are not in any way involved in pro-
secutorial or investigatory activities with regard to the case at
hand.34
4
'43 The APA presently allows for "the entire record to be certified to it for decision." 5
U.S.C. § 557(b) (1976). Making use of this provision would encourage a prompt final
agency decision by omitting the initial decision when it is likely that the agency itself will
have the final word. In cases where the ALJ does render a decision, however, review of
that decision should not have to be automatic. As S. 262, § 205(c) provides:
The agency may exercise its discretionary right to review a decision ... only
after determining that-
(A) a finding or conclusion of material fact appears clearly unsup-
ported by the evidence;
(B) the proceeding involves novel or important issues of law or pol-
icy;
(C) a necessary legal conclusion appears to be clearly erroneous; or
(D) a clearly prejudicial error of procedure was committed.
Id. § 205(c).
34 As stated in note 342 supra, the present APA already allows presiding officers to
engage in substantial consultation with agency staff. S. 262, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., however,
would explicitly provide that:
the agency may designate one or more employees to assist the presiding
employee by questioning parties at an oral hearing, or otherwise advising the
presiding employee.
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D. Summary
In summary, the problems of administrative and judicial du-
plication can be dealt with as follows. Administrative duplication
should be eliminated by abolishing FERC review. Though this
removes a certain degree of independence from the decision-
making process, it is questionable whether total separation of judi-
cial and policymaking functions is, indeed, desirable. In any event,
the primary reasons for providing for FERC review no longer
exist. OHA has improved its procedures considerably and there is
adequate separation of functions within the executive wing of
DOE.
But in abolishing FERC review, OHA should not be free to
return to the minimal statutory guidance that existed under the
Federal Energy Administration Act of 1974. At the very least, the
procedures mandated by section 503 should now be applicable to
OHA and the standards set forth in its recent decisions over
whether to grant or deny oral evidentiary hearings as well as dis-
covery requests should be made explicit in its own regulations.345
Imposing conventional APA adjudicatory procedures on OHA
could minimize the effectiveness of some of its procedural innova-
tions and may go farther than is necessary to ensure fair adjudica-
tion in such proceedings. Arguably, the APA would not explicitly
allow for a paper hearing in an enforcement case when there
were material issues of fact in dispute. Moreover, in cases in
which the agency or members thereof did not preside, conven-
tional APA adjudication would utilize administrative law judges.
OHA's deviations from conventional application of the APA pro-
vide a modest increase in procedural flexibility. On balance,
this flexibility should be retained and Congress should seriously
consider making some of the procedural options exercised by
OHA explicit in an amended APA. Ideally, the APA should then
be made applicable to all agency enforcement decisions, including
those at DOE.
Id. § 202(e). This may sidestep the restriction on presiding employees consulting with agency
staff on "facts in issue." In any event such a provision also may encourage greater use of a
more interdisciplinary approach in appropriate cases. Based on OHA's experience with the
kinds of cases and issues presented in its enforcement proceedings, Congress should seri-
ously consider encouraging such an approach.
3"- A more detailed statute than § 503 can also be considered, but a more detailed provi-
sion may be difficult to pass and, in any event, could result in unnecessary procedural
rigidity. Section 503 coupled with OHA regulations implementing this provision, along the
lines suggested in this Article and to a large extent already developed by OHA would
suffice.
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Finally, there is no need for two levels of appellate court re-
view, prior to petitioning the Supreme Court for a writ of cer-
tiorari. District court appellate review should be abolished.
CONCLUSION
The administrative process has entered a new age of regula-
tory reform, one characterized by proposals that seek to achieve
fundamental substantive change. New Deal conceptions of and
approaches to problems are increasingly under attack. Regulation
of competition in the airline, trucking, and communications indus-
tries, for example, no longer can be justified by depression-
mentality rationales. Competition in such industries is not an evil
to be checked, but a positive force generally to be encouraged.
Bills seeking to abolish, phase out, or, at least, transform New
Deal agencies and legislation are common and some already have
passed.3 46 Moreover, the need to devise new regulatory ap-
proaches to deal with more recent problems such as energy and
the environment also has been increasingly apparent. 347
Fundamental procedural reform should go hand in hand
with substantive reform. But to the extent that the political cli-
mate that fuels such reforms reflects an increasing skepticism of
the efficacy of government, in general, and bureaucracy, in par-
ticular, the underlying motivation for substantive reform risks
undercutting proposals for constructive procedural change and
can encourage excessive checks on agency initiative and action.
For example, procedural reforms, that seek to streamline over-
judicialized administrative processes may be viewed not only as
attempts to increase agency flexibility and efficiency, but as propos-
als to augment agency autonomy and power. At a time when de-
fining the appropriate regulatory role that government should
" See, e.g., Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 94-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978)
(amends various sections of Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1551 (1970 &
Supp. V 1975)). Various deregulation bills dealing with the trucking and communication
industries are now pending in Congress. See, e.g., S. 2245, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.; H.R. 6418,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. (bills to decontrol various aspects of the trucking industry). See also
H.R. 612, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (bill to deregulate long-distance communications).
'47 See, e.g., C. SCHULTZE, THE PUBLIC USE OF PRIVATE INTEREST 16-27 (1977) (arguing
for regulatory techniques such as taxes that rely on the market mechanism to achieve valid
environmental goals). Similarly, the phased decontrol of oil prices can be viewed not neces-
sarily as a philosophic commitment to minimum governmental intervention in a competi-
tive industry, but also as the constructive use of the pricing mechanism as a regulatory device
to achieve levels of oil conservation that otherwise might not be possible.
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play has become increasingly difficult, proposals viewed in that
light may meet with substantial congressional resistance. On the
other hand, Congress may be all too eager to adopt reforms that
seek to make agencies more accountable and responsive. Such
reforms may be laudatory in principle; however, the cumulative
effect of legislative vetoes, de novo judicial review of agency rules,
sunshine and sunset laws, as well as agency structures that build in
checks and balances on administrative action from within agency
walls can, if carried too far, result in a modified form of substan-
tive decontrol by procedure. Just as there may be contradictions
inherent in a capitalist culture that ultimately may undermine
productivity, 348 so too may there be contradictions inherent in a
decision-making process that appropriately values public participa-
tion and political accountability very highly. Too much participa-
tion, or too much political accountability, can undermine essential
agency effectiveness.
Professor James 0. Freedman recently has written that "[tihe
task of devising an effective theory of the legitimacy of the ad-
ministrative process is one of the most important challenges facing
those concerned with American administrative law and institu-
tions." 349 The increasing uncertainty over government's future
regulatory role should not, of course, undermine the search for
such a theory, nor should it discourage the development of a
theory that recognizes the uniqueness of the administrative proc-
ess as distinct from more familiar legislative and judicial processes.
Moreover, as traditional New Deal regulatory approaches become
increasingly open tp question and reform, the temptation to use
procedure as an indirect means of accomplishing essentially sub-
stantive ends must be resisted. Substantive issues and conflict
should be faced and, hopefully, resolved directly. In this sense,
substantive and procedural regulatory reforms should be kept
separate and distinct.
348 See generally D. BELL, THE CULTURAL CONTRADICTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1976).
3'9 J. FREEDMAN, supra note 209, at 266.
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GLOSSARY
Throughout this Article various regulatory statutes and adminis-
trative agencies are discussed or referred to. Some of these stat-
utes and agencies no longer are in existence, others remain but
have new names and still others represent entirely new statutes or
administrative agencies. The following is a glossary of agency
names and acronyms to assist the reader.
The primary substantive legislation referred to in this Article
governing oil pricing and allocation is as follows:
(1) The Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 (ESA)-This Act es-
tablished mandatory wage and price controls. These controls,
while lifted for the economy in general, were continued on the
petroleum industry, in part as a response to the oil embargo and
price increases by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun-
tries (OPEC).
(2) The Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973 (EPAA)-
This Act formally authorized the President to establish (and in
effect, continue the price controls begun under the ESA) "equita-
ble" prices for domestic crude oil. It has since been amended but
is usually referred to in the Article as the EPAA.
The primary organizational statutes that established the agen-
cies discussed are as follows:
(1) The Federal Energy Administration Act of 1974 (FEA Act)-
This Act created the Federal Energy Administration, an executive
agency outside the office of the President.
(2) The Department of Energy Organization Act of 1977-(DOE
Act)-This Act reorganized much of the federal bureaucracy deal-
ing with energy-related problems. It created the new Department
of Energy, which consists of a cabinet-level office of Secretary
of Energy, various executive units under the Secretary's con-
trol or supervision as well as the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, an independent agency.
The relevant administrative agencies discussed throughout
the Article are as follows:
(1) The Cost of Living Council (CLC)-the agency that adminis-
tered the wage and price controls issued under the Economic
Stabilization Act or ESA.
(2) The Federal Energy Offwe (FEO)-This was the first execu-
tive agency charged with responsibility of implementing and ad-
ministering the oil price and allocation controls authorized under
the 1973 Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act or EPAA. It was
established by the President by Executive Order.
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(3) The Federal Energy Administration (FEA)-Shortly after pas-
sage of the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act or EPAA, the
FEO functions were transferred to the Federal Energy Adminis-
tration (FEA) in 1974. FEA was an executive agency outside the
office of the President that continued to administer, implement,
and enforce the oil program authorized by the EPAA.
(4) The Office of Exceptions and Appeals (OEA)-This was an
administrative unit within FEA that was responsible for resolving
various adjudicatory matters including contested remedial orders
and requests for adjustments or exceptions.
(5) The Federal Power Commission (FPC)-This was an inde-
pendent regulatory commission charged with primary responsibil-
ity for the regulation of natural gas and electricity, but, until the
energy reorganization required by the 1977 Department of
Energy Organization Act took place, it had no authority over oil
pricing or allocation.
(6) The Department of Energy (DOE)-This is the new depart-
ment established in 1977 pursuant to the Department of Energy
Organization Act (DOE Act). It consists of both an executive wing
headed by a cabinet level Secretary and an independent commis-
sion that succeeded to the powers of FPC.
(7) Federal Energy Regulatory Commission(FERC) -This is the
independent commission within DOE which shares power with the
Secretary and the executive units under his control or general
supervision. FERC essentially replaces the Federal Power Com-
mission. It too consists of 5 commissioners, as did the old FPC,
and it retains virtually all of the FPC's authority as well as acquir-
ing some new functions including authority over certain oil pric-
ing and allocation rules made by the Secretary. FERC also reviews
adjudications made by the executive.
(8) The Economic Regulatory Administration (ERA)-This is an
executive unit under the Secretary. In large part, it replaces the
FEA. It is charged with oil pricing matters.
(9) The Office of Hearings and Appeals (OHA)-This once was a
unit within ERA but has since been made an executive agency
that reports directly to the Secretary. It, in effect, replaces the
Office of Exceptions and Appeals that once was a part of FEA.
OHA presently adjudicates contested remedial orders and its pro-
cedures are examined in detail in Part IV of this Article.
(10) Office of Special Counsel (OSC)Q-A special enforcement of-
fice established to deal with alleged pricing violations by major oil
companies. All other enforcement actions of this sort are handled
by the Office of General Counsel, also within DOE.
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